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Abstract 
 
I argue that a theory of symbolic value formation is implicit in the writings of 
Kenneth Burke.  I analyze ten of Burke’s major writings and use what Burke refers to 
as the ten key terms of moral and aesthetic valuation as the means to ascertain what 
this theory is.   I then outline the process of how individuals and social orders imbue 
people, ideas and things with value via symbol system  and how those values are 
altered over time based on interactions with the social and physical world.  The work 
highlights people’s desire for stable value systems along with how unstable those 
systems actually are.        
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 In 1952, Marie Hochmuth Nichols argued that Kenneth Burke “has become 
the most profound student of rhetoric now writing i America” (M. H. Nichols 18), 
and in 1993 Edward Schiappa stated “forty years later, few would disagree” with 
Nichols’ assessment (401).  For many, Burke’s effect on the field of rhetoric cannot 
be overstated.  Edward Appel contends that he is “at the very least the most 
influential American rhetorician of the twentieth century” ("The Negative" 62), and 
Phillip Tompkins et al believe that “no reader of this journal needs to be convinced 
that the theories of Kenneth Burke have heavily influenced the practice of literary and 
rhetorical criticism” (135).  He is seen by some as being ahead of his time as “one of 
America’s most prescient modern” critics (Jay 535).  Specifically, Bernard Brock 
contends that “a brief examination of current communication journals will reveal that 
today Burke has become the most popular rhetorical theorist in the field” (347); 
Debra Hawhee goes so far as to note that many see him as “the father of 
contemporary rhetoric” (130).  Even critics of Burke’s theories acknowledge the 
significant influence his work has had on the field.  While they argue that his theories 
function “virtually hegemonicaly in the study of rhetoric,” Foss and Griffin (331), 
note that the creation of the Kenneth Burke society, the number of graduate seminars 
focusing on Burke’s theories, and the dominance of his theories in critical practice 
signifies the importance he has played in the field of communication studies (331).  
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Kenneth Burke achieved his reputation in the study of rhetoric by being one of 
the most prolific writers of the twentieth century1 and by blending together a wide 
array of topics into a provocative theory of symbolic action.  However, Burke was not 
merely a rhetorician as his works covered a vast array of topics, and one could argue 
that he was one of the original interdisciplinary scholars.  As Herbert Simons notes, 
Burke was unique in the academy as a “college dropout who never held a tenured 
academic position” and who “resisted being ‘disciplined’” (4).  This resistance to 
disciplinary structures is, in part, what makes Burke’s writings so fruitful.  “[H]e 
invariably brings to each object of his scrutiny an overarching interdisciplinary 
framework, and he consistently takes from his engagements with the texts of a given 
field’s ideas that might help to fertilize another” (4).   The profound effect that his 
holistic approach to his studies has had on the academy is best illustrated by the vast 
array of disciplines that have been touched by his writings.  Scholars in fields as 
diverse as Sociology,2 Philosophy,3  Business,4  Economics,5 Anthropology,6  
                                                     
1 The Kenneth Burke society has compiled a bibliography of 595 writings by Burke.   
2 See for example Valerie Malhotra Bentz and Wade Kenny, ""Body-as-World":  Kenneth Burke's 
Answer to the Postmodernist Charges against Sociology," American Sociological Association 15.1 
(1997).  Ann Branaman, "Reconsidering Kenneth Burke:  His Contributions to the Identity 
Controversy," The Sociological Quarterly 35.3 (1994).  James G. Carrier, "Knowledge, Meaning, and 
Social Inequality in Kenneth Burke," The American Journal of Sociology 88.1 (1982).  Hugh Duncan, 
Communication and Social Order (New York: The Bedminster Press, 1962). Bruce E. Gronbeck, 
"Tradition and Technology in Local Newscasts:  The Social Psychology of Form," The Sociological 
Quarterly 38.2 (1997). Joseph Gusfield, "The Literary Rhetoric f Science:  Comedy and Pathos in 
Drinking and Driving Research," American Sociological Review 4 (1976). Michael A. Overington, 
"Kenneth Burke as a Social Theorist," Sociological Inquiry 47.2 (1977).  Thomas Meisenhelder, "Law 
as Symbolic Action:  Kenneth Burkes Sociology of Law," Symbolic Interaction 4 (1981). 
3 See for example James G. Carrier, "Misrecognition and Knowledge," Inquiry:  An Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Philosophy and the Social Sciences 22 (1979). David L. Hildebrand, "Was Kenneth Burke a 
Pragmatist?," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce So iety 31.3 (1995).  David Lawrence, "The 
Mythico-Ritual Syntax of Omnipotence," Philosophy of East and West 48.4 (1998).  Paul Meadows, 
"The Semiotic of Kenneth Burke," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 18.1 (1957). 
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Religious Studies,7  Psychology,8 Education,9 and Geography10 have utilized his 
theories.       
Burke resisted disciplinary boundaries because he saw the social world as a 
complicated web of interacting variables that did not fit neatly into the delimited 
boundaries established by the academy.  His writings are difficult because “he is 
dealing with complex and subtle situations” (Warren 226) that cannot be easily 
reduced and simplified.  His corpus of writings expands over most of the 20th century, 
and to understand his theories a synthesis of many of his works is frequently required.  
One commonality among many of his texts is human symbol systems and the ways in 
which they shape human motivations and actions.  He was greatly influenced by the 
tumultuousness of the century in which he lived (P&C xlvii), and he sought answers 
to numerous questions about the relationship between language use and the ways in 
which humans understand and act toward the social and physical world around them.  
I was drawn to Burke’s theories because of this aspect of his writing.  I am interested 
                                                                                                                                                      
4 See for example Janis Forman, "Collaborative Business Writing:  A Burkean Perspective for Future 
Research," Journal of Business Communication 28 (1991).  Mark Simpson, "The Pentad as Map:  A 
Strategy for Exploring Rhetorical Cases," Bulletin of the Association for Business Communication 49 
(1986). 
5 See for example Donald N. McCloskey, "The Rhetoric f Economics," Journal of Economic 
Literature 21 (1983).  Donald N. McClosky, "The Dismal Scienc and Mr. Burke:  Economics as 
Critical Theory," The Legacy of Kenneth Burke, eds. Herbert W. Simons and Trevor Melia (Madison, 
WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989). 
6 See for example William Mishler, "The Question of the Origin of Language Rene Girard, Eric Gans, 
and Kenneth Burke," Anthropoetics 5.1 (1999). Karen Ann Watson, "A Rhetorical and Sociolinguistic 
Model for the Analysis of Narrative," American Anthropologist 75.1 (1973). 
7 See for example C. Allen Carter, "Logology and Religion:  Kenneth Burke on the Metalinguistic 
Dimensions of Language," The Journal of Religion 72.1 (1992). 
8 See for example Richard Y. Duerden, "Kenneth Burke's Systemless System:  Using Pepper to 
Pigeonhole an Elusive Thinker," Journal of Mind and Behavior 3 (1982). 
9 See for example James Stanley Mullican, "Kenneth Burke's Comic Attitude:  A Corrective to 
Propaganda Analysis," Contemporary Education 43 (1971). 
10 Jonathan M. Smith, "Geographical Rhetoric:  Modes and Tropes of Appeal," Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers 86.1 (1996). 
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in valuation and its relationship to symbol systems, and Burke believed that the 
foundation of moral thought resides within the linguistic construct of the hortatory 
negative (LAS 10, 16).  As such, the proper realm to study values is the rhetorical.  
While Burke did not neatly outline a theory of (re)valuation, 11  I believe that Burke’s 
writings provide insight into the question of how values are formed, transmitted and 
altered.  Many of his writings implicate (re)valuation, and I believe that he expresses 
an implicit theory of symbolic (re)valuation.  My goal in this writing is to compile 
and explicate his understanding this process as well as show how it needs to be 
adapted to contemporary exigencies.   
While values have been discussed and analyzed for millennia, my purpose is 
not to place Burke’s theories in this broader discus ion.  Instead, my goal is to 
compile and explicate Burke’s understanding of (re)valuation, its relationship to 
symbol use, and to illustrate ways in which his theories can help explain social 
phenomena that are related to values.  Placing Burke’s theory within the broader 
discourse of values is certainly important, but it is not possible without first 
unpacking his theory.  This effort will add greater insight into Burke’s writings by 
compiling and clarifying his understanding of the issue of (re)valuation.  The process 
of (re)valuation is intrinsic to human interactions, and analyzing how this process 
occurs adds to our understanding of Burke’s conception of symbolic action.  The 
values we possess provide motivation for the decisions we make and the actions that 
                                                     
11 I utilize the term (re)valuation to illustrate the ways in which values are continually being altered as 
individuals and social orders exist.  While some might like to think of values as an unchanging part of 
their person, the reality is that one’s value system is continuously being altered as new exigencies ar  
encountered.   
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we take, and gaining insight into the process of how we come to hold and alter values 
further clarifies this important aspect of Burke’s writings.         
While discussions of values are present throughout much of Burke’s writings, 
few scholars have attempted to directly address how Burke’s theories implicate 
(re)valuation.  A number of authors have mentioned el ments of his views of 
(re)valuation, but only Jeffrey Murray has attempted a systematic discussion of 
Burkean ethics.  I will first outline the ways in which Burke’s notion of (re)valuation 
have been tangentially discussed, then I will address Murray’s position on Burkean 
ethics and argue that it provides an insufficient grounding to fully explain Burke’s 
conception of (re)valuation.      
Because much of Burke’s writings involved literary c iticism, some approach 
his ideas of values from within this tradition.  James Albrecht attempts to show how 
the relationship between Ralph Ellison and Kenneth Burke adds an element of social 
responsibility to Ralph Waldo Emerson’s American individualism (Albrecht 47).  
Specifically, he contends that “Burke argues that an individualist ethics must include 
gestures of communication and self-analysis that are more directly political” (52).  
Hence, “we must consider how our individual acts participate in larger social 
contexts” (52).  Here Albrecht lays out a central element of Burke’s notion of 
values—humans are social beings and as such, any understanding of values must 
recognize the social aspect of the value choices made by individuals.   
S. John Macksoud further clarifies this point by acknowledging Burke’s belief 
that all elements of communication are imbued with valuations—including the 
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aesthetic and the scientific.  “Burke cautions us not to suppose that an apparently 
exclusively aesthetic12 or scientific set of purposes prohibits the coexist nce of an 
ethical set of purposes” (169).  Scientific thought has attempted to bracket questions 
of values and portray itself as disinterested in questions of values; however, for 
Burke, this is an impossibility because scientists necessarily make choices of what to 
investigate and how the study should be done, and these choices are always value 
laden.  As Lewis notes “he regards all language…as having an ethical-moral 
function,” and the “splitting of the analytical from the moral” is problematic and 
“against this splitting he places his integrated pers ctive, one which combines in a 
single action the analytical and the moral” (86).       
A number of authors have further highlighted the inherent relationship 
between language use and ethics (Appel "The Negative" 58; Coe "Beyond Diction" 
370; Coe "Defining Rhetoric" 43; Feehan "Theory of Language" 145; Hawhee 135).  
This topic will be accounted for in greater detail in chapter two; for now it is 
sufficient to note that many scholars have acknowledged Burke’s notion that all 
language use is infused with value choices and as such, language is inherently ethical.  
However, we also use language to create and shape particular value judgments about 
the world around us.  C. Allen Carter argues that one f the ways Burke’s writings 
help to explain this process is through his explanatio  of the narrative form, which 
provides moral purpose to human existence and establishes the guiding force of our 
lives ("Myth" 344).   
                                                     
12 The relationship between aesthetic judgments and moral values will be discussed in greater detail in 
chapter 3.   
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The most systematic discussion of ethics and Burkean thought is found in the 
writings of Jeffrey Murray, who is interested in creating a metaphysical foundation 
for the ethical thought presented by Burke.  Murray contends that Burke fails to 
create a complete system of ethics (Dialogue 73) because Burke elides the Other 
("Other Ethics" 29).  As a result, Murray feels that a metaphysical account of ethical 
obligations cannot be created solely from Burke’s writings because Burke 
foregrounds a focus on the self at the expense of the O her ("Other Ethics" 33).  He, 
however, does not see this as a reason to reject all aspects of Burkean thought.  For 
him, the master trope of Irony and the concept of recalcitrance found throughout 
Burke’s writings provide a basis for an ethical system that accounts for the Other 
("Motives" 22).  Murray draws upon the ethical theory f Emmanuel Levinas to 
extend and make more complete a Burkean ethical system.  It is from Levinas’ 
writings that Murray attempts to establish the necessity of grounding ethics within a 
metaphysical system.  He believes ethical metaphysics should be considered the first 
philosophy because both ontology and epistemology are tied up in the self, but ethics 
as a social act must precede the self ("Other Ethics" 35).  He argues that combining 
Burke’s ideas with those of Levinas’ ethical stance enhances both theorists.  For him, 
this move provides a completion to a Burkean ethical system while helping to fix 
Levinas’ questionable assumption of an actual encouter with the Other (Dialogue 
100).   
Murray lays out an interesting hypothesis about the ability to connect the work 
of Burke and Levinas.  However, it is problematic as Burke resisted grounding his 
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theories in metaphysics (Hawhee 131-2), since “a metaphysic or mechanistic way of 
viewing the universe posits the universe in almost a predetermined way—as a uni-
verse—as one body, one cause, one truth” (139-40).  His rejection of a metaphysical 
grounding for his thought was deliberate.  “For Burke himself this is a principled 
omission rather than a lack” (Bygrave 45).  Timothy Crusius explains 
Burke represents a doubly skeptical attitude toward metaphysics.  On the one 
hand, he doubts that it can be overcome or simply put aside.  We can change 
the subject, but it will keep coming back.  On the other hand, he finds no 
grounds for affirming an assured grounding.  As all genuine skeptics must 
do…he simply leaves the metaphysical question open.  His affirmations, his 
constructions and reconstructions, are all, so to speak, suspended in mid-air or 
“grounded in ways that are ultimately groundless themselves.  In this sense he 
offers Being without metaphysics.  Above all, what we must not forget in 
trying to understand Burke on Being is that he takes everything significant 
that anyone says and writes as rhetoric, as strategies for encompassing 
situations.  This means that all notions of Being are tools for coping with 
ourselves, with others, with life.  Burke does not purport to reflect on Being-
in-itself.  What interests him is not Being as such, but the value of concepts of 
Being as part of an art of living.  (94-5)     
As Hildebrand notes, metaphysical questions for Burke must be grounded in 
“experience as lived” (638).   
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 Murray acknowledges that his own ethical frame does not account for value 
claims as lived experiences.  “Levinas’s philosophy of ethics is not intended to 
provide a normative rule for ethical decision making” and “because any ethical 
dilemma involves more than one Other, or at least a self and an Other there is always 
a plurality of ethical imperatives,” which means one has “entered into ‘politics,’ 
where politics is understood in contrast to ethics, as a realm of decision making” 
(Murray Dialogue 28-9).  However, it is this realm of “politics” that Burke considered 
the most important issue.  “Bracketing the existence of metaphysical truth allows 
Burke to concentrate on how truth claims arise in interaction and how people use 
these claims to accomplish certain purposes in the world” (Hassett 383).  Hence, to 
understand Burke’s conception of values it is necessary to understand the ways in 
which valuations occur within people’s actual existence, and it is here that I locate my 
project.  My purpose is not to create a system of values but instead to explore the 
ways in which people come to hold certain values and the processes that occur to 
allow valuations to be altered over time.    
 Burke’s writings are replete with attempts to understand human motivations 
on both the individual and the social level.  Underlying these assessments is a theory 
of symbolic valuation.  People’s motivating forces are frequently driven by their 
value system, which for Burke is necessarily derived from human interaction via 
symbol systems.  Hence, it is necessary to understand the role language plays in 
shaping our valuation of the world and how these valuations shape and are shaped by 
the social orders in which we live.  Burke provides a pragmatic theory of symbolic 
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valuation that accounts for the influence of the materi l world and broader social 
structures in the development of individual and social value systems.  He focuses his 
writings on the interplay among symbols, individuals, and society, and his writings 
provide a broad based understanding of (re)valuation that accounts for how individual 
values are (re)constructed by the interplay among self, society, the material world, 
and language. 
Conducting an etymological analysis of the word “crisis,” Burke provides the 
foundation for the import of values in both the social and symbolic realms.  He notes 
that the word “crisis” is the Greek word for judgment, which suggests the centrality 
of values because every effort at judgment necessitate  an underlying act of valuation 
(P&C xlvii).  It is impossible to make a judgment without the process of evaluation, 
which can only occur within the realm of the symbolic.  “[I]nsofar as the individual is 
involved in conflict with other individuals or groups, the study of this same individual 
would fall under the head of Rhetoric” (ROM 23).  The study of the relationship 
between symbol use and actions is an essential area of inquiry.  “The very power of 
criticism has enabled man to build up cultural structures so complex that still greater 
powers of criticism are needed” (P&C 5), and “his greater critical capacity has 
increased not only the range of his solutions, but also the range of his problems” (6).  
As such, increasing our understanding of the complexity of human interactions via 
symbol systems is necessary if we hope to overcome the inevitable conflicts that 
these structures produce.        
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Burke views social motives as a critical point of analysis for two reasons.  
First, the ramifications of conflict in the social realm have the potential to be 
significantly more devastating than strife at the individual level.  Second, the 
individual is necessarily a product of the social environment in which she13 resides.  
When assessments are made about the individual, one “must discover how many 
collective ingredients, how much deference to custom, was assumed” when making 
the judgment (ATH 113).  This is not to deny the import of individual v lue systems 
because social values are a product of the aggregate of individual values; what it does 
indicate, however, is that individual value systems are greatly influenced by the social 
world that they occupy and the pre-existing value frame of the culture.  The process 
of socialization always influences the individual’s value system whether it is by a 
complete or partial acceptance of the dominant value system and/or by a complete or 
partial rejection of it.  For Burke, socialization provides the basis for all valuations 
because “man justifies himself in the modes of socialization that go with his society,” 
(P&C lv); hence, its effects manifest themselves as a guidebook for interacting with 
the world.  As such socialization is a strategy—an  orientation (24), and these 
orientations provide the framework in which and the criteria through which 
(re)valuation occurs.   
Value systems will always be a nexus between individually held values and 
those expressed by the larger social order.  People hav  systems of values that are 
                                                     
13 For the sake of clarity and stylistic concerns, I am choosing to use the singular case in many 
instances.  To deal with the problems of using the generic “he” as the referent, I will be alternating 
between feminine and masculine pronouns among the paragraphs.  Any single paragraph will only use 
either the feminine or the masculine.     
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unique to them, but those systems are greatly influe ced by the social order in which 
they reside.  This complexity makes understanding (re)valuation difficult because 
value expressions are often ephemeral, and pinpointing the time, place and reason for 
value change will always be imprecise.  These difficult es, however, do not justify 
avoiding efforts to understand how the process works—even though any conclusions 
reached will necessarily be incomplete.  I turn to Burke in this endeavor because he 
provides a rationale and a partial methodology for doing so, which I will utilize 
throughout my work.   
David Timmerman and Larry Smith argue Burke offers both macroscopic and 
microscopic methodologies (235).  The macroscopic aproach “interprets the ways in 
which public discourse labels the typical, recurrent situations of life for particular 
groups of auditors,” and “it is through this process of naming that rhetors provide 
equipment for living or medicine for their audiences” (235).  Because values are 
necessarily a social phenomenon, I utilize this macroscopic approach to illustrate the 
way in which people and behaviors are valuated can potentially alter the overall value 
system of an individual or social order.  Microscopi  methodologies, on the other 
hand, refer to the specific tools that Burke outlines as a means to better understand a 
given piece of rhetoric, such as agon analysis or pentadic criticism (235).  Utilizing 
both macroscopic and microscopic analysis, I will engage in two endeavors in 
subsequent chapters.  The first is to extract from Burke’s writings14 his understanding 
                                                     
14 The texts examined in this work are:  Attitudes Toward History, Counter-Statement, Permanence 
and Change, A Grammar of Motives, A Rhetoric of Motives, Language as Symbolic Action, On 
Human Nature, The Philosophy of Literary Form, The Rhetoric of Religion, and Essays Toward a 
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of symbolic value formation—a Burkean theory of (re)valuation.  While he discusses 
values throughout his writings, he does not lay out his theory in a single location.  
Instead, his theory is found in fragments throughout his writings.  Austin Warren 
notes the difficulty with Burke’s writings is that “he invests his subjects with no false 
clarity or artificial simplification.  He is dealing with complex and subtle situations” 
(Warren 226), which frequently means that his ideas are not found in a single 
location.  My goal is to compile these fragments and to outline what his theoretical 
perspective is.  To this end, I begin my analysis in Attitudes Toward History where he 
argues that ten key terms are “at the very basis of both esthetic and moralistic 
strategy” (202)15.  While some of these terms have been analyzed, no one has yet 
examined the ten terms in relationship to each other as a foundation for (re)valuation.  
Since Burke sees these ten terms as the foundation for u derstanding values,16 my 
goal is to trace the contours these terms take through ut his differing texts to unpack 
Burke’s overall understanding of symbolic valuation.  I  a sense, I am Burking Burke 
and using one of his expressed methods on his own writi gs to better understand his 
theoretical understanding of values.  I begin with the microscopic method of a key 
word analysis, although I modify it slightly from how it is commonly understood, to 
examine how the ten terms function as a means to understand symbolic (re)valuation.  
                                                                                                                                                      
Symbolic of Motives.  While a plethora of other writings by Burke exists, these texts provide a strong 
representation of his theories across his lifetime.   
15 These terms are authority symbols, identification, acceptance and rejection, rituals of purification 
and rebirth, transcendence upward and transcendence ownward, character building by secular prayer, 
the collective poems of socio-economic organization, bureaucratization of the imaginative, alienation, 
and repossession (ATH 202).   
16 Burke’s writings are complex in that he uses terms interchangeably and at points abandons some 
terms in favor of other terms.  I am not arguing that t ese ten terms are the only possible terms one 
could focus on in examining Burke’s understanding of values; however, my analysis accounts for other 
terms as well in that they are examined in relation to the ten key terms outlined above.   
   
  15 
Critics utilizing this method generally determine th  key words in a text based upon 
the text itself by finding the words that best inform and attract one’s attention and the 
effort of the entire piece is to define the terms (Kuseski 327-8).  I, however, am 
modifying this approach.  Since Burke stated that he saw ten terms as the basis for 
moral action, I am following his stated view of the issue and utilizing these terms as 
the basis for my key word analysis.  I examine the terms in relation to other terms and 
concepts related to valuation to ascertain Burke’s overall understanding of 
(re)valuation.   
The second Burkean method that I utilize is the representative anecdote, 
which is the “principle tool” of the macroscopic critic (Timmerman and Smith 235).  
Brummett explains the representative anecdote as “when the critic identifies a 
dramatic form that underlies and can thus represent discourse” ( 3).  However, the 
“anecdote need not have been said explicitly in the discourse under analysis.  It is a 
method for better understanding the vocabulary of utterances rather than the utterance 
itself” (4).  The anecdote can take two different forms:  the synecdotal and the 
metaphorical.  In the synecdotal, the critic examines a “single discourse” (6), and the 
anecdote represents the motives found in the discour e (4).  This “allows the critic to 
judge the motives in the discourse which have been rought to light and thus, to 
function as a social critic” (5).  In the metaphorical, the critic focuses on “groups of 
discourses” (6), and “seeks something that ties the discourses together” (6).  Since my 
focus is on the question of valuation, I use the representative anecdote in two ways.  
The first is in the analysis of Burke’s work itself as I look for the common linkages 
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regarding values throughout his texts.  In the second, I use Burke’s theories to 
highlight values present in public discourse in the United States.    
Hence, the second endeavor of my project is to show how Burke’s theory can 
be illuminated by and can illuminate examples of (re)valuation that occur(ed) both 
historically and in the contemporary era.  As such, I will point to specific examples 
that help to clarify Burke’s theory as well as exemplars that Burke’s theories can help 
to explain.  All claims being made in this book areefforts to illustrate the implications 
of Burke’s understanding of (re)valuation.  I will point to a multiplicity of examples 
from social institutions and popular culture to illuminate what Burke’s theories can 
tell us about particular social phenomena.  At points, I will be discussing issues that 
have been addressed from different theoretical perspectives and in other literatures.  
However, because my goal is only to elucidate what Burke’s theory tells us, I will not 
be placing my analyses within this broader discourse.  I recognize that Burke’s views 
do not tell the entire story of any issue that I examine, but for the sake of clarity and 
brevity, my sole focus will be on what Burke’s theori s suggest about them.  Hence, 
all claims made herein should be understood as only an explication of Burke’s theory 
or of the directions that Burke’s theories might poentially lead us in understanding 
the relationship between (re)valuation, individuals, nd the social order.        
Burke argues that comprehending “man in society” is necessary if we are to 
understand humans because we are social beings who create our knowledge of self 
and our place in the universe based upon our relations with other human beings (ATH 
170).  “People learn of life’s conditions through the prescriptive contents of public 
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messages” (L. D. Smith 252).  One area where this is particularly true is in the realm 
of valuation because value judgments regulate the ways in which we act toward 
others.  In contemporary American society, people int ract with far more people who 
possess a greater diversity in values than at any previous time in history; this is 
magnified by communication technology that allows for social engagements among 
people and in settings that have not been previously possible.  For example, on-line 
gaming communities let individuals interact with oters from around the globe in a 
forum that allows for both anonymity and the development of relationships that 
would otherwise not occur.  This circumstance brings questions of valuation to the 
forefront because many problems that we face at the individual and social level are 
directly connected to our value systems and the ways in which we rhetorically engage 
others.   
To understand how values are symbolically formed and instantiated within a 
social order, it is necessary to examine value discourse.  “To think through a matter is 
to trace an ever widening circle of relationships” (Burke P&C 230).  It is what 
provides the ability to create a representative anecdot  that highlights the overarching 
system of values and how they are rhetorically constructed.  Consequently, it is 
imperative to analyze myriad social locations wherein value discourse is present 
because they provide insight into the ways in which values are symbolically 
negotiated within and among social orders,17 which can highlight the way in which a 
revaluation of values occurs.  “This strategy even opens us to the resources of 
                                                     
17 When I refer to social orders, I am using the term in its broadest possible sense.  Social orders can 
range from the smallest dyad to complex societies such as the United States, and large social orders ar  
comprised of myriad smaller groupings that have uniq e values.   
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‘popular’ philosophy, as embodied not only in proverbs and old saws, but also in the 
working vocabulary of every-day relationships” (ATH 172).  Terms from politics, 
business, the law, folk art, and such should be viewed “as a collective philosophy of 
motivation, arising to name the relationship, or social situations, which people have 
found so pivotal” (173).  This approach entreats us to make “even bad books and 
trivial remarks legitimate objects of study” (173), and “it does not waste the world’s 
rich store of error, as those parochial-minded persons waste it who dismiss all thought 
before a certain date as ‘ignorance’ and ‘superstition’” (172).  All symbolic action 
provides a lens through which to understand valuation, and this approach “cherishes 
the lore of so-called ‘error’ as a genuine aspect of truth” (172).  This approach 
provides a means to understand the relationship between symbols, values and our 
existential condition from a multiplicity of perspectives, which adds to our overall 
knowledge of how (re)valuation occurs.   
Any project of this nature will never be complete, but what I hope to illustrate 
throughout this book by using a macroscopic approach to representative anecdotes is 
that studying a variety of cultural markers is necessary to understand any social 
order’s value system.  I will draw liberally from social institutions such as the legal 
system and political organizations, which represent the meta-level discourse on 
valuation in the order because all aspects of governm nt function to bureaucratize the 
value system of the order by codifying and enforcing particular value judgments.  The 
bureaucratized values provide the scene in which all (re)valuation occurs.  Examining 
institutions could not be more important in understanding the process of (re)valuation.  
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Politicians attempt to symbolically enact the values h ld by members of their political 
party and engage in efforts to establish their value lens as the preferred one of the 
order.  Laws outline critical values that are to be compelled by the power of the state.  
However, the bureaucratized nature of social institutions seldom changes rapidly and 
frequently lags alterations in valuation that are occurring within the broader society.  
Hence, it is necessary to look at other social locati ns, such as popular culture.                   
Many of Burke’s analyses revolved around art and literature, and to better 
examine his contention that the symbolic process of moral and aesthetic valuation is 
the same, it is necessary to follow this same approach to better flesh out what this 
aspect of his theory suggests.  He found it useful to mine the great works to ascertain 
what issues were important to people during particular eras.  This does not imply that 
art always imitates culture.  It does, however, mean th t art illustrates cultural values, 
even when the work of art is intended to repudiate the values.  Art is derived from and 
created through the symbol systems of the culture in which one resides, and it is 
inherently limited by that symbols system and its concomitant values.18  As in all 
symbol use, art can function as a reflection, selection, and/or deflection of reality, but 
it also has the potential of imagination, which allows one to see a world that is not.  
As such, it plays a role in developing the broader nar ative around which social 
values are constructed and has historically played a significant role in the 
development of Western culture (Burke CS66).  Art is symbolic and as such, it is 
                                                     
18 This issue will be discussed in greater detail in chapter three when I discuss the relationship between 
moral and aesthetic valuation.   
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necessarily imbued with ethical aspects;19  popular culture is no different, and 
because of its increased import in the contemporary era it plays a significant role in 
the process of (re)valuation.  “By transmitting cultural values to a mass audience and 
by providing a nonthreatening forum whereby these values can be exposed, 
challenged and refined, popular art serves the ‘classic l’ function of making clearer a 
society’s axiomatic assumptions and root beliefs” (Kimberling 94).  The 
representations of individual and societal choices n cessarily contain implicit value 
judgments that will influence the values of individuals and the order itself.   
What is critical for this analysis is that art provides a virtual symbolic realm to 
explore ideas and how to valuate them, which can the be replicated if so desired in 
one’s extant life.  This process, of course, is a double-edged sword; it can be used to 
envision and enact a better way to live one’s life,or it can be used to maintain an 
oppressive system, or to justify destructive behaviors.  In his essay “The Nature of 
Art Under Capitalism,” Burke argues that art can fuction to cause acceptance of the 
status quo system by allowing a symbolic resolution of conflict that cannot be 
resolved in actuality (PLF 271-278).  Conversely, art can also serve as a lightening 
rod that allows individuals to discuss and deal with social tensions in a safe 
environment (CS  xii).  In both situations, art provides a symbolic outlet through 
which people can better understand their extant lives and how to approach its daily 
exigencies.  When one considers the import that artistic expression plays in shaping 
our systems of valuation, it is important to have an expansive understanding of artistic 
                                                     
19 The relationship between symbols systems and ethics will be further discussed in chapter two. 
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expression so that a more complete analysis of valuation can occur.  I believe that the 
inclusion of a plethora of venues, such as popular culture, that would not have 
traditionally been considered artistic expression is justified because they function in a 
symbolically similar way.  In all instances, “artistic” expression is likely to have 
unintended consequences because of the easy slippage between aesthetic and ethical 
valuation.20  However, an action that provides a compelling story line does not always 
translate into a workable way to actually live one’s life.  As such, it is critical to 
analyze the myriad places in which this transference occurs.  To truly understand the 
ramification of aesthetic standards for valuation into the realm of the ethical, it is 
useful to expand the discussion of art to encompass all a pects of popular culture.  I 
believe that in contemporary America, any symbolically based leisure activity ought 
to be considered in the same genus as that of the hig  art and literature on which 
Burke focused much of his analyses.  Popular culture s ch as television, movies, 
music, sporting events, playing video games, etc., functions in much the same way as 
traditional art forms.  In order to grasp the enormity of the sway that artistic 
expression has on society, it is necessary to view it in its broadest sense.  While I do 
not include analyses of all of these aspects of popular culture, I believe it is 
productive to operate from this expanded definition of artistic expression for the 
reasons listed above.    
Jim Cullen argues that popular culture has a significant impact on today’s 
culture because it is “refracted through the prism of ass production” (20-21).  
                                                     
20 This relationship between aesthetic and moral valuation will be discussed in detail in chapter 3.   
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Economic interests can see greater gain from popular c ture, and consequently, it is 
easier to access because it is disseminated through every possible media.  It finds you; 
you do not have to find it.  Furthermore, an economic interest exists in continually 
pushing the boundaries of what is acceptable.  If a movie or song makes money, it 
will be (re)produced, and competition guarantees that what makes money for one will 
be utilized by others, magnifying the effect that it has.  Hence, popular culture has 
become a significant purveyor of values within contemporary society, and as Burke 
argues, one should “give thought to ‘folk criticism’” (ATH  173).   
In subsequent chapters, I explore Burke’s notion of (re)valuation and draw 
upon examples of value discourse to both help explain what Burke’s theory looks like 
in practical application as well as to illustrate th  ways Burke’s theory can illuminate 
cultural phenomena.  To begin in chapters two and three, however, I lay out key 
concepts of symbol use generally that help provide the broad framework in which 
Burke’s theory of (re)valuation operates.  In chapter two I discuss orientations to 
illustrate how they provide the scenic background for all valuation, and what Burke 
sees as the inherent relationship between ethics and language.  On its face, the latter 
may give the appearance that there is not a differenc  between symbolic action and 
(re)valuation.  The ethical aspect of language merely indicates that all of our language 
use has an ethical aspect; however, it does not explain how things are ultimately 
imbued with value through the process of (re)valuation.  My focus on (re)valuation 
helps to explain how individuals and social orders determine what is good and bad, 
and right and wrong, which is a distinct process.  The purpose of this chapter is to lay 
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the scenic background in which (re)valuation occurs.  In chapter three, I examine the 
relationship between moral and aesthetic valuations, which Burke saw as being 
symbolically the same.  Since (re)valuation in both realms follows the same symbolic 
process, highlighting the similarities helps to better explain the overall process by 
which systems of values are created.  As such it helps to illuminate what Burke’s 
overall theory of valuation is.   
In the remaining chapters, I turn to Burke’s ten key terms for moral and 
aesthetic (re)valuation to unpack his overall theory.  I also attempt to extend Burke’s 
theories to account for the how changes in communication technologies implicate his 
theory.  In chapter four I discuss the collective po ms of socio-economic 
organization, which is Burke’s way of highlighting the implications that the 
organization of a society’s productive forces has on the values of the order and its 
individuals.  The structure and order it provides society affects virtually all parts of 
our lives, and “occupational psychoses” suggests that this will include valuation as 
standards from the economic realm are transferred to other aspects of people’s lives.   
In chapters five and six I examine frames of acceptance, rejection and 
transition, which represent the overall attitude held by individuals and social orders.  I 
argue that there are three differing ways the frames can be understood—attitudinal, 
heuristic, and rhetorical.  This tripartite distinction illuminates subtle differences in 
the way Burke uses the terms, and it helps alleviat some of the problems others have 
identified with the comic frame in particular.     
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In chapters seven through nine I explore the relationship between symbols of 
authority, word magic, and identification.  These three chapters illustrate the practical 
relationship between moral and aesthetic valuation as I examine how we symbolically 
instantiate our values, and how social phenomena such as popular culture can 
implicate this process.  In chapter ten I discuss the ways in which people disconnect 
from the values of a social order via alienation, and in chapter eleven I examine how 
they reconnect with others through the process of repossession.    
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Chapter 2:  Orientations, Ethics and Language 
 Values are what Burke refers to as dialectical terms—symbolically 
constructed ideas that are not found in nature.  Instead they are purely human 
constructs that arise out of our lived experiences and the symbols systems that we use 
to express them.  As such, it is necessary to examine the way in which humans form 
an understanding of their world and the relationship between symbol systems and 
ethical choices.  Since these aspects are prior to the creation of values—the hortatory 
admonishments of right and wrong, and good and bad—I will first outline Burke’s 
theoretical perspective on these issues so a deeper und standing of (re)valuation can 
occur.  As language using, social beings, it is impossible to discern valuation outside 
of the context of language and society because it i at the intersection among the 
individual, culture, and language where values are formed.  In this chapter, I examine 
orientations and the ethical aspects of language to fl sh out this intersection in order 
lay out the scenic background of (re)valuation.   
Orientations 
 Orientations are central to the process of valuation because they provide the 
meta-understanding of the world that allows for evaluations to be made and 
categories to be created.  One’s “orientation is the sum of all we know; the 
meaningful construction of the world embodied in our knowledge of it” (Carrier 
"Knowledge" 50).   One’s orientation is derived from a sense of relationships that 
have been established by previous experiences, which subsequently shapes one’s 
understandings of the world, drives one’s future actions, and leads to judgments of 
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right and wrong (Burke P&C 18), and it ultimately “affects the means we select to 
achieve our ends” (Blankenship, Murphy and Rosenwasser 5).  As such, a person’s 
orientation shapes how she understands and evaluates a situation and the response she 
will enact in response to it.  An individual acts to shape her orientation by the choices 
and judgments that she makes; however, the orientato  has its own power and 
follows a logic of its own.  While an individual always retains an element of choice, 
the force of one’s orientation pushes her toward paticular decisions and valuations.  
“[T]he vast network of mutually sustained values and judgments, makes it more 
difficult for them to perceive the nature of re-orientation required, and to select their 
means accordingly” (Burke P&C 23).  As such, one must view an orientation as being 
actually existing because its concomitant values shape one’s future behaviors (23).   
 In some respects, an orientation can be thought of as a “schema of 
serviceability” (Burke P&C 21) that provides a roadmap for traversing the physical 
and social environment.  Consequently, those things that make one’s life easier are 
frequently adjudged as having moral worth (21).  This evaluation of the serviceable as 
a moral good provides the first glimpse at the way in which one’s orientation can 
precipitate conflict within the social sphere, since what is serviceable for the 
individual does not necessarily equate with that which is serviceable for the social 
order.  One does not have to work too hard to see this phenomenon in our 
contemporary society.  Consider the ways in which our s ciety valuates the making of 
money.  The individual person or corporation frequently prioritizes the attainment of 
wealth over what is healthy for the environment or other members of society (23).  
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This can cause conflict between the individual and the social order, but it can also 
cause internal discord within the individual as well, as one’s orientation 
simultaneously pushes him in potentially incompatible directions.  This contradiction 
necessitates a symbolic means of resolving the tension and presages the need for a 
(re)valuation to occur.   
 Implicit within each orientation is “a vocabulary of ought and ought not, with 
attendant vocabulary of praiseworthy and blameworthy (Burke P&C 21).  These 
hortatorical lexicons are molded by the individual to fit one’s perception of the “good 
life” (29), which is always influenced by elements both intrinsic and extrinsic to the 
person.  When the individual’s interpretation of events is at odds with the broader 
social milieu, he will linguistically alter the categories constructed by his orientation 
in order to “socialize” his own interpretations (36).  “The individual must socialize 
his desires: bring them into conformity with the collective orientation” (Carrier 
"Knowledge" 51).  Hence, the individual constantly negotiates between his own 
orientation and the pressures that the social orientatio s have on his understandings of 
the hortatorical assumptions implicit in his value system, and it is via these 
vocabularies that revaluations occur.       
 Orientations provide the means through which people interpret and understand 
both self and society.  Each act of interpretation necessitates making judgments, and 
consequently orientations are “inescapably ethical” in nature because valuation is 
inherent in judgment (Burke P&C 257).  The ethical aspect of orientations is 
furthered by the interaction between a person’s moral codes and the actual choices 
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that she makes in her life.  The underlying attitudes form the range and quality of 
one’s observations and actions, hence limiting the perception of viable alternatives 
(176).  It is through this limiting of choices that an orientation can become a “self-
perpetuating structure” and why it is “basically ethical” (262).  This is not to say that 
orientations are stable and unchanging—they are not.  What it does mean is that 
orientations have a force on the individual and the social order, and they are difficult 
to change radically under normal circumstances because “[a]n orientation is largely a 
self-perpetuating system, in which each part tends to corroborate the other parts” 
(168).  Hence, an orientation is generally able to wi hstand challenges to it by a 
process of casuistic stretching, wherein one symbolically alters circumstances so that 
they can be accounted for by the present system (ATH 230).       
 However, this does not mean that orientations are unchangeable.  While they 
are difficult to overhaul, each orientation “contais the germs of its dissolution” 
(Burke P&C 169).  This change can occur quickly when traumatic or positively 
memorable events occur that shake a person’s foundatio al beliefs.  Strongly negative 
or positive occurrences have the possibility to impl cate all or part of one’s 
orientation (114-5 note 1), and hence, it can dissipate rapidly under the pressure of 
newly emergent conditions and the contradictions that t ey expose.  History is rife 
with occurrences where a massive change of attitude emerged at a particular time and 
location as a response to a particular exigency.  The monikers used to label historical 
epochs illustrates this point.  Ages such as stone, bronze, and iron represent instances 
where the introduction of certain knowledge forms into human existence 
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fundamentally altered the daily lives of individuals nd consequently that of society at 
large.  At the level of the individual, experiences such as death of a loved one, the 
birth of a child, marriage, religious conversion, etc. can precipitate the same type of 
change.  People who experience these changes rapidly frequently feel a sense of 
becoming a new person.  A ritual dying and rebirth allows for a new self to emerge.   
 This sort of rapid transformation is frequently accompanied by a revaluation 
of one’s system of values, and “in this way individual pain may lead to radical 
evangelism, as the sufferer attempts to socialize his position by inducing others to 
repudiate the orientation painful to himself” (Burke P&C 114-5 note 1).  When this 
process is writ large on a societal level, eras of political and social tumultuousness are 
likely to emerge as the dominant value system fends off encroachments on its 
territory from the new interloper, which can lead to the rise of multiple forces 
competing to control the value system of the social order.  The sexual revolution of 
the 1960s and the subsequent rise in power of the religious right that began in the 
1970s are but two interrelated examples of this phenomenon in recent American 
history.21  The rapidity of change has the potential to lead to massive transformations 
in people’s lived reality and subsequently in the way in which they assess and 
evaluate the world around them.  This in turn alters he value assumptions of the 
status quo because as noted previously that which is serviceable is frequently granted 
                                                     
21 The fight over reproductive rights and access to abortion and birth control illustrates how a change in 
valuation can lead to a vociferous and sometimes violent backlash.  Abortion clinics have been 
bombed; clinic workers have been assaulted and killed; efforts have been undertaken to change 
abortion laws at all levels of government.  For a detailed examination of this issue see for example 
Celeste Michelle Condit, Decoding Abortion Rhetoric (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994).  
Randall A. Lake, "Order and Disorder in Anti-Abortin Rhetoric:  A Logological View," Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 70 (1984). 
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moral worth, and as the serviceable changes, one’s system of values will necessarily 
be altered.    
 While the above examples illustrate that orientations, and hence values, can be 
altered rapidly under certain circumstances, orientations also gradually evolve over 
time.  When a person’s orientation absorbs the shock of new revelations through the 
process of casuistic stretching, one’s orientation will necessarily evolve as one 
linguistically adjusts his understanding of self and society and of all their derivative 
relationships.  Many times this evolution is imperceptible as it is occurring, and 
people will not realize that they have become substantially different people in the 
process.  The symbols we utilize provide a means by which people can reconcile 
beliefs, values, attitudes and/or behaviors that are inconsistent with each other.  
However, this process necessarily alters how one evaluates the world as each new 
addition brings with it additional constraints on future actions and valuations, and the 
synergistic relationship between the differing elements of the orientation frequently 
results in unintended consequences in the symbolic and/or the physical realm of 
existence.  These irruptions further embroil one’s orientation, which is what makes a 
person’s understanding of the world evolutionary in nature.   
 For Burke, how one responds to these daily assaults on her orientations will 
have an effect on the qualitative nature of the change that ensues.  One can move to 
accept the new reality and adapt her belief structue in accordance with it and follow 
along with the general societal progression, or one can resist the change and attempt 
to return society to an earlier time, or the experience can precipitate a desire to move 
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into a direction that is different from the existing and pre-existing orientation.  In all 
situations, a revaluation is occurring.  The difference lies in the way in which the 
revaluation affects the person’s interactions with ot er people and the broader social 
environment.  In the first, the person is acting in accord with broader social trends and 
will likely have a strong identification with the social order and its symbols of 
authority.22  Alternatively the second will likely develop a sen  of alienation from 
the broader culture and will withdraw and/or wage a battle to return the social order 
to its previous state.  The fallacy of this act, however, is that the ideal state of the past 
can never be recreated.  The metaphor of not being able to put the genie back into the 
bottle to refer to the inevitability of the existence of nuclear weapons is just as 
applicable here.  Once an idea has been introduced into human existence, it will 
always remain a part of the social fabric.  Even when ideas or value systems 
seemingly disappear into history, remnants of them are usually present in the current 
cultural and symbol systems, which means they can reemerge at any point when 
conditions change.  In the final circumstance, the individual seeking an alternative 
change is similarly rejecting the current orientation and is alienated from the current 
order as well.23   
 According to Burke, if the conflict between those who wish to return to a 
previous time or to maintain the status quo and those who advocate a progression into 
a new era grows to a critical mass, it can rive the foundations of the social order, 
                                                     
22 Both identification and symbols of authority will be discussed at greater length in chapters 7-9. 
23 It is important to note that alienation is not necessarily a bad thing.  For Burke, it merely means that
one does not identify with the current social order and its ideals.  This phenomenon will be examined 
in greater detail in chapter 10.   
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which may cause the dominant social orientation to fragment.  When this occurs, the 
embattled factions will grasp on to differing elements of the previous orientation ( 
P&C 169) and attempt to retain the rights to the symbols of authority.  In the ensuing 
symbolic—and sometimes physical—conflict efforts are made to revaluate those 
symbols in order to give strategic advantage to one of the factions.  Efforts will be 
made to devalue those symbols controlled by the opposition, while amplification will 
be used concomitantly to buttress the strength of te symbols under one’s own 
control.    
 Regardless of the way in which cultural change occurs, cultural lag will be 
present (Burke P&C 179).  Cultural artifacts that were developed in response to a 
particular exigency can retain power long after the exigency has dissipated or been 
removed.  An orientation “may survive from conditions for which it was fit into 
conditions for which it is unfit” (179).  Even though it was once a positive force for 
humanity, the changing circumstances have rendered it obsolete and/or destructive to 
current circumstances.  “[I]t’s fossilized existenc may be prolonged, after it has 
become dangerous to the social body as a whole, if some group which profits by it 
controls the educative, legislative, and constabulary resources of the state” (179).  
The American obsession with gas-guzzling SUVs long after the harms of global 
warming were well documented is an example of the destructive potentialities of 
cultural lag that occurs when the monetary and statu  interest of some place the health 
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of the entire planet in jeopardy.24  In some instances, the cultural lag can be a result of 
the human tendency to be averse to change and a desire to maintain coherence within 
in one’s value system; however, it can also be a result of deliberate manipulations on 
the part of those in power.  Frequently, if a valuation is bad for society but beneficial 
to the controlling class, it will retain its power in society (Burke P&C 179).     
Conversely, elements of the prior symbolic order that did not retain their 
previous power in the revaluation do not disappear completely.  They are still 
embedded in the social fabric and have the potential to regain cultural currency at a 
later time.  Any later emergence, however, will alwys differ from its previous 
instantiation because the precise meanings of the lexicon can never be replicated 
outside of the social order from which they hail, and while “the expression of past 
eras survives in fragments” it is usually “without explicit reference to the situation in 
which it arose” (Burke ROM 111).  This imprecision in meaning is one of the ways in 
which revaluation occurs as following generations of people overlay new 
understandings on previous terminologies, and once rev red symbols can become 
repulsive to members of the social order or that which was once considered repulsive 
can gain social currency.  The profuse number of etymological analyses done by 
Burke in his writings illustrates the ways in which lexicons take on contrary 
                                                     
24 Studies indicate that the SUV is frequently seen as sign of social status.  See for example Jessie X 
Fan and John R. Burton, "Students' Perception of Status-Conveying Goods," Financial Counseling and 
Planning 13.1 (2002).  The Ford Motor Company has acknowledged that SUVs are harmful to the 
environment, but they have kept making them because they provide the most profit for the company.  
For further detail see Richard K. Olsen, "Living above It All:  The Liminal Fantasy of Sport Utility 
Vehicle Advertisements," Enviropop:  Studies in Environmental Rhetoric and Popular Culture, eds. 
Mark Meister and Phyllis Japp (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers 2002).  
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meanings.  Hence, the weighting of the symbols are altered over time, and their 
ethical orientation is altered.   
The Ethical Aspects of Language and Action 
 While there are a number of different definitions for both morals and ethics, 
and differing philosophical schools debate the distinctions between the two, Burke 
tends to use ethics and morals in a way consistent with two common dictionary 
definitions of the words.  One meaning of morals is the value system of a given social 
order.  When Burke discusses the emergence of the hortatory negative, he refers to it 
as tribal or the rules of conduct that regulates th given society.  Ethics, on the other 
hand, is consistently used to reference situations where a value-based choice needs to 
be made by an individual.  The critical element of b th for Burke is that they 
explicate standards by which human interaction should ccur.  Both are central to 
Burkean theory because with options comes the necessity of judgment and choice.  
Hence, ethics and morals are critical to motives, which, of course, is a significant area 
of inquiry for Burke.  Human motivation is driven, i  part, by the social order in 
which one is born and lives and by the subsequent choice making that necessitates a 
valuation.  Therefore, to understand Burke’s sociolgical world-view and its symbolic 
component, it is necessary to interrogate the relationship between ethics and morals 
and the symbol systems from which they arise.   
Critical to understanding the process of revaluation is seeing the relationship 
between one’s ethical code and the symbol system that is being used to express it.  
Language is central because without symbols one would only be able to express the 
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most rudimentary value claims, such as if you physically attack me, I will fight back.  
Those moral claims that represent societal value structures are only possible because 
of a symbol system that allows one to think of a world that is not yet extant and 
evaluate it as preferable or as worse to the status quo.  The great moralizers of the 
human race—religion, myth and ideology—are only possible because we have a 
symbol system that allows us to contemplate and express them.  While Burke does 
not challenge the existence of a higher power, his discussions of logology illustrate 
the way in which symbol systems are implicated in human understanding of a God 
figure, which is what provides its power as a moralizing force and why history is rife 
with conflicts over who controls the interpretation f religious texts and their 
corresponding symbols of authority.   
 Burke grounds much of his discussion of ethics and morals in the uniquely 
symbolic concept of the negative (ROR 18; LAS 10).  Burke details in great length 
the fact that the negative is not found in nature, and that many ideas that are a 
hortatory negative are linguistically turned into quasi-positives (LAS 11).  This 
linguistic construct is significant because the propositional negative, X does not exist, 
provides the intellectual basis for the hortatory negative, the thou shall not.  The 
hortatory negative is the foundation of the social order because it provides the 
framework through which relationships are established and conflicts are resolved.  
The moral and ethical codes arising from these hortat rical foundations define the 
boundaries of acceptable human action and proscribe punishments when those ambits 
are violated.  This linguistic construct begins the process of an actual physical 
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transcendence.  The social order25 becomes more than just the sum of its parts.  It is
not merely an aggregate of isolated individuals; intead, society becomes a force in 
and of itself as the social order transcends the individual.  The social order is not only 
deemed to be an instrumental good, it is also given a moral force of its own.  In some 
instances, this moral force is derived from the relationship between the social order 
and a God of some sort, and the moral order is religiously based.  However, in more 
secular societies the final level of transcendence does not end in a God figure, but 
instead an ideal of some sort.  In the former Soviet Union, communist ideology 
played this role while in the United States the ideals expressed in the constitution 
become the final arbiter of the relationship between the state and the individual.  In 
both instances, the ideal is more important than the physical manifestations of the 
social order itself.  When reality fails to materialize in line with the ideal, the extant 
world is deemed to be inferior and in need of altertion.  The ideal itself is not 
questioned because it is the foundation for the subsequent valuations.  Without the 
transcendent ideal, the system of morals would not have the same force to compel 
obedience from its adherents.       
 Depending upon the particulars of a given social order, the relationship 
between differing actors and systems can alter the way in which transcendence 
occurs.  In some orders, the leaders provide a transcendent step between the 
                                                     
25 When I refer to the social order, it can mean any social organization that has the actual and symbolic 
power to compel the individuals who operate within it to follow its dictates.  In contemporary society 
the dominant social order is the state, but historically it has taken a number of different forms, such as 
tribal, feudal, etc.  A similar process can also occur internally within minority sects within a larger 
social organization.  Groups such as cults can exact the same or a greater level of obedience from its 
members as a government can with its citizens.  On a smaller scale the family unit also has this power.        
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individual and the social order.  The transcendent movement occurs as follows:  from 
the individual, through the leader(s), to the social order.  At each level of abstraction 
greater power is imbued in the actor or system at the higher level.  Hence, the power 
of the social order is greater than the leaders’, which is greater than that of the 
populace.  Conversely, in some systems the leader is granted more status than the 
apparatuses of the social order itself.  It is because of the leader that the social order 
exists in the first place.  The foundation of the modern state of Saudi Arabia 
illustrates this point.  Multiple tribes were unified under one leader when King Ibn 
Saud married a daughter of each of the tribal leaders,26 and this gives the royal family 
ultimate control of the order itself.    
Historically the divine right to rule “granted” to European monarchies 
explicitly tied the moral force of the social order to a Godhead.  The transcendent 
order moves from the individual through the leaders to the state27 and finally to God.  
At each stage in this process a higher order of power is established.  The individual 
has the right to control his behaviors, the leader has the right to control the state, the 
state has the right to control the populace, and fially, God has the right to control the 
universe.  When the rights of the individual come into conflict with the higher social 
order, the transcendent nature of the expressed power relationship suggests that the 
individual will not likely prevail.  The logic of the moral social order “is the 
determination to preserve the race at the expense of th  individual” (Burke CS 23), 
                                                     
26 Georgina Vestey, "How Desert Tribe Took Islam's Sacred Cities," The Daily Telegraph September 
10 2004. 
27 The state and the leader are sometimes indistinct; for example, cult leaders such as Jim Jones and 
David Koresh are viewed as the supreme leader of the social order and the embodiment of the moral 
force of the order.   
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and consequently, the individual is symbolically (and sometimes literally) subsumed 
by the social order.   
 As powerful and consequential as the moral force derived from the hortatory 
negative is, the relationship between language and v luations extends to all aspects of 
symbol use.  The mere utilization of symbols requires valuation.  When we speak we 
always choose certain words over others.  While the plethora of words from which we 
choose are known as synonyms, each word carries with it a distinct connotation that 
can slightly alter how it is understood.  In addition, symbols are necessarily 
incomplete.  Because symbols are generic in nature—th y are abstract words that 
group similar things together under the same title—nuances of the specific situation 
are necessarily elided when it is translated into symbolic form that necessarily 
references more than a single thing (Burke ATH 248).  Richard Coe describes this 
process.  “For every abstraction is a sublation, which both conserves and transcends 
the concrete reality from which it was abstracted ("Defining Rhetoric" 45).  When the 
word “cat” is used in a sentence, one is free to think of any cat and its unique 
characteristics.  The particularities of the materil cat are transcended symbolically as 
it is transformed into an ideal cat.28  This process is fairly straightforward—the 
symbolic realm will always be an incomplete and/or distorted version of the material 
realm because substitution and abbreviation are an intri sic element of symbol use 
(Burke LAS 7).  At this base level, choices are constantly being made regarding 
                                                     
28 By ideal cat, I do not mean the cat that is the warmest and softest and purrs the loudest.  No value 
judgment is intended.  The ideal cat could very well b  the neighbor’s cat that yowls all night long and 
scratches at the walls.  The ideal cat is merely the cat that the listener/reader envisions upon 
hearing/reading the word cat.     
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which elements of the material realm to include in the transition to the symbolic, 
which necessarily makes it ethical.        
Once an ethical/moral claim is expressed linguistically, that claim remains in 
existence in the minds of those who have heard it and those to whom it has been 
relayed.  Even if they do not agree with the premis of the moral claim, the mere 
expression of it can alter how people interpret behaviors of the self and of others and 
of social phenomena.  This is one of the ways in which symbols can take on a force of 
their own that is distinct from the original context in which they were uttered.  This 
move is a means by which language is itself a heuristic device because it allows 
people to imagine a world that does not exist.  As such, any time an evaluation is 
expressed, it opens up the possibility that people wil  develop a new understanding of 
the extant world, which could be at odds with the originally expressed valuation.  
This is in part the reason why political actors work so hard to control how others 
“spin” their messages, which is another way of saying making an evaluation of the 
message under the guise of relaying it.  Consider the following hypothetical example.  
The Federal Reserve Board decides to raise interest rates.  This move is expressed in 
one newspaper headline as “Fed raises interest rate to stave off inflationary 
pressures.”  The second headline says, “The raising of interest rates by the Fed 
relieves Wall Street.”  In both of the examples, a number of interpretations could be 
made.  In both, one could determine that the Federal Reserve Board is a positive 
entity that is looking out for the well-being of the American public.  However, one 
could also interpret the former as expressing a negtive evaluation of the state of the 
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economy, and one could see the second as expressing a class bias wherein what is 
good for wealthy stock holders is necessarily good f r the American public, which of 
course could be positively or negatively evaluated.  Both headlines, while purportedly 
portraying objective descriptions of reality, clearly suggest valuations.   
 The above example illustrates an enigmatic element of symbol systems.  
While reporters strive to neutrally and objectively report reality, such a task is a 
linguistic impossibility.  This is the case for two reasons.  First, words are necessarily 
weighted and carry implicit valuations.  Second, descriptions of human action can 
never be neutral.  For Burke, action necessarily implies a choice to be made and 
carried forth to fruition.  Choice necessitates a value judgment; hence, action is never 
neutral.  It is always ethical.  Consequently, descriptions of human action will always 
imply a valuation because human action is by definitio  imbued with ethical decision 
making.  Efforts to ban books in public schools are best understood as an attempt to 
prevent exposure to valuations that are contrary in some way with the valuation 
preferred by the censors.  A common retort by those who object to book banning is 
that people’s values are not so loosely held that mere exposure to a different value 
system will cause them to be altered.  Both view points represent extremes that are 
not completely accurate.  Being exposed to new ideas oes not necessitate that one’s 
views will change.  However, it does present the possibility that one’s views could 
change.  The censor is fearful that a comparison between the two value-systems will 
cause his belief system to come up short, and the only way to prevent that from 
happening is by not allowing the new idea out into the open.  Parents who eschew 
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public school for religious or home schooling in order to protect their children from 
secular humanism follow this same logic.  If their children are not exposed to 
objectionable beliefs and behaviors, then they will be ess likely to stray from the 
faith of their parents.  The value system is protected by shielding it from competing 
systems of belief until it has had time to become more rigidly entrenched.  That at 
least is the hope, and it sometimes works; however, symbol systems are not that 
readily controlled, and as Burke would say, “It’s more complicated than that.” 
       The ethical aspects of language run much deeper than the initial decisions of 
what to convert to the symbolic.  The processes of substitution and abbreviation lay 
the groundwork for descriptors to take on a weighting, which is when seemingly 
neutral terms contain an implicit valuation (Burke ATH 240-242, 328).  Burke 
believed, and I concur, that language is always weight d (P&C 162) and “intensely 
moral” (177).  Even words that begin as mere descriptors take on an evaluative tone 
when the meaning of the symbols merge with people’s understanding of the referent.  
For example, garbage is a descriptive word that refers to human refuse; however, 
because refuse is frequently associated with that wich is dirty and valueless, the term 
garbage and associated terms such as trash take on negative connotations.  This 
linguistic move begets another transition in which the term garbage is expanded 
metaphorically to refer to people who are devalued in the eyes of others.  The phrase 
“white trash” is but the logical outgrowth of this process.   
The discussion in contemporary political discourse of “code” words illustrates 
how this process can be used strategically to send a message to a particular sub-group 
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while appearing neutral to those who are not privy to the valuation that is occurring or 
allows them symbolic cover to not acknowledge the valuation.  Many argue that when 
Ronald Reagan began his presidential campaign in Philadelphia, Mississippi—the 
location of the grisly murder of three civil rights’ workers in the 1960’s that inspired 
the film Mississippi Burning—under the banner of state’s rights, this process 
occurred.  At the time many in the larger nation did not understand (or perhaps did 
not care) that states’ rights, was being euphemistically used to express the message 
that the Reagan administration would leave race relations to be dealt with by the local 
communities.29  Given the history of how Jim Crow, lynching, knight riders, the KKK 
etc. were allowed to flourish in Southern states and the way in which the term states’ 
rights was used to prevent the federal government from ending the practices,30 his 
speech offered tacit support for the views of white supremacy that underlie the 
previous examples.  Hence, neutral vocabularies can function to obfuscate underlying 
valuations because much valuation is implicit in discourse without being expressly 
                                                     
29 The evidence that this was a deliberate effort to use racial tensions to encourage Southern Democrats 
to switch to the Republican Party is compelling.  The New York Times editorialist Bob Hebert points 
to a 1981 interview with Republican strategist Lee Atwater wherein he stated “You start out in 1954 by 
saying, ‘Nigger, nigger, nigger,’ ” said Atwater. “By 1968, you can’t say ‘nigger’ — that hurts you. 
Backfires. So you say stuff like forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff. You’re getting so 
abstract now [that] you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are 
totally economic things, and a byproduct of them is [that] blacks get hurt worse than whites.”  Bob 
Herbert, "The Ugly Side of the Gop," The New York Times September 25 2007.  That Reagan’s effort 
was purposeful is also supported by the historical ecord that then Mississippi Congressman Trent Lott 
was one of the people who encouraged Reagan to open his campaign in this location with message.  
See Jack White, "Lott, Reagan and Republican Racism," Ti e December 14 2002.  In 2005, Ken 
Mehlman, the Republican National Committee Chair, issued an apology for the party’s exploitation of 
racial strive to gain white voters in the South.  For a description of his apology see Richard Benedetto, 
"Gop:  "We Were Wrong" To Play Racial Politics," USA Today July 14 2005. 
30 The term states’ rights was historically used to disallow the federal government from preventing 
violence against Blacks in Southern States.  For a historical account of how it was used by Southern 
Senators in their arguments to stop federal anti-lyching laws from being enacted see David O. Walter, 
"Legislative Notes and Reviews:  Proposals for a Federal Anti-Lynching Law," The American Political 
Science Review 28.3 (1934). 
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stated or advocated (Burke P&C 254), which allows rhetors to send differing 
messages to different members of the same audience.     
Naming and labeling provides an easily observable manifestation of how 
weighted words operate, which is why Burke contends that the act of naming is 
necessarily a moral act ( ATH 342).  The names we give to things and/or people act to 
define them in a particular way, and the valuation implicit within the definition 
shapes how one views the relationship between the named and its social and physical 
environment (4).  The act of naming also alters the power relationship among the 
namer, the named, and the larger social environment.  History is rife with socio-
political conflicts whose genesis is a battle over what things or people ought to be 
called; these conflicts emerge when the differing names necessitate a different 
valuation be made.  A number of current conflicts illustrate this process and why it 
can elicit such a vehement response from those engag d in the linguistic struggle to 
determine what something/one ought to be called. 
Terrorist or freedom fighter; illegal alien or undocumented worker; marriage 
or civil union.  Each of these examples illustrates a rhetorical battle not only over 
which name to use, but also over how each pairing ought to be evaluated.  When one 
chooses a particular label, she also endorses the valu judgments implicit in the name 
being used.  Osama bin Laden is reviled by Western nations because he is an enemy 
of the state and of the people who is willing to slaughter thousands of innocents in 
order to settle a political grudge.  However, throughout much of the Muslim world, he 
is revered by many as a leader who is justly fighting an imperial power and defending 
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the God given rights of Muslims. Others reject the dominant labels and view bin 
Laden as a criminal who should be dealt with by the criminal justice system instead 
of the military.  The consequences of the choice of valuation could not be more 
serious.  Implicit in each valuation is an entelechial push that can fundamentally alter 
individual choices.  A Muslim who believes bin Laden is operating on God’s 
command is more easily swayed to strap explosives to his body and detonate them in 
a crowed area.  Conversely, many Americans so reviled him and what he stands for 
that they were willing to invade Iraq on the faintest of evidence that Saddam Hussein 
was working with bin Laden.  Value judgments always have consequences in the 
social and physical world because our behaviors are det rmined by the value 
judgments that we make.  The way we treat others, the way we treat ourselves, and 
the way we treat social institutions are all actions that are determined by our values.   
What the preceding analysis illustrates is that our being is deeply infused with 
valuations.  Our orientations determine how we understand the world, which always 
involves valuing some things at the expense of others, and the language we use 
always expresses a value judgment.  The purpose of this chapter was to outline at a 
meta-level that we are necessarily ethical beings who cannot escape making value 
judgments.  This, however, is not sufficient to explain how individuals and social 
orders develop particular, expressed moral codes that are used to compel particular 
behaviors and attitudes.  Before my analysis moves to this primary question, a second 
meta-level analysis is necessary—the relationship between moral and aesthetic 
valuation.  Burke equates the two processes, and in the ext chapter, I examine the 
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ways in which our moral judgments are influenced by the aesthetic appeal of 
symbols.   
Chapter 3:  The Relationship between Moral and Aesthetic Valuation 
Burke’s writings about valuation discuss a variety of contexts in which 
(re)valuation can occur, and in many cases he uses hi  examples interchangeably 
among the realms.  This is to a large degree becaus B rke does not see a significant 
distinction in the symbolic aspects of those things that are valuated based upon a 
moral/ethical system and those that are based upon aesthetic appeal.  In fact, he 
believes that “one may reasonably expect to the find the same symbolic factors” in 
play in the ethical realm as in “the realm of the aesthetic” (Burke P&C 254).   
Aesthetical values are intermingled with ethical values—and the ethical is the 
basis of the practical.  Or, put more simply:  our ideas of the beautiful, the 
curious, the interesting, the unpleasant, the boring are closely bound with our 
ideas of the good, the desirable, the undesirable—and our ideas of the 
desirable and undesirable have much to do with our attitudes towards our 
everyday activities. (Burke PLF 201)       
Burke saw the same linguistic processes at play in both spheres of symbol use.  
Artistic expression is always related to the real world in one way or another.  It may 
be a reproduction or an ideal, but all art expresses a sense of what the world is or 
what it could be, either positive or negative.  As such, one would expect the symbolic 
valuation of the aesthetic to follow a similar path s that of ethical valuation.  Burke 
states the relationship as life being an informal art (P&C 254).  People are drawn 
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toward pieces of art because they appeal to them; pople are also drawn to other 
people because they appeal to them.  Hence, “social life, like art, is a problem of 
appeal” (264).  While one can logically construct a ompelling case that matters of 
ethics are primary to matters of aesthetics, at a purely symbolic and motivational level 
they function in a similar way.  Michael Feehan argues the entire purpose of Burke’s 
theory of dramatism was an effort to create a united th ory of “his aesthetic and 
political perspectives” ("Dramatism" 405).         
 Burke supports this connection between the moral and the aesthetic by 
drawing upon the theories of Cicero—a classical rhetorician.  Analyzing Cicero’s 
three offices of the orator—to teach, to please, and to move—he argues that the 
relationship between the aesthetic and the rhetorical has long been recognized (SOM 
37-8).  A rhetor must always be mindful of “keeping his audience sufficiently amused 
so that they will continue to be an audience” (38).  However, this basic understanding 
of the second office is insufficient in Burke’s mind, and it “must be greatly expanded 
beyond so rudimentary a notion of the pleasurable” (38).  Since humans are “the 
typically language-using species,” we have the capaity to take an “intrinsic delight in 
the sheer exercising” of our linguistic capabilities (38).  As such, the idea “that the 
solving of problems in physics can be ‘beautiful,’ or that there can be something 
‘aesthetic’ in ‘science,’ would seem to involve our proposal for widening the scope of 
Cicero’s second office to include the sheer delight n symbolic unfolding for its own 
sake” (39).  Hence, one frequently finds aesthetic appeal in that which is meant to be 
rhetorical, and the conceptual slippage that exists in symbol systems suggests that this 
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same phenomenon occurs in the reverse—from the aesthetic to the rhetorical.  This 
overlap of the poetic and ethical is best explained by two elements of Burke’s theory:  
pieties and form.  
 Pieties  
Burke extends the notion of piety from the religious context to explain 
systems of relationships that delimit that which we understand to be good from that 
which we understand as bad.  As such, pieties are the building blocks of an 
orientation and explain what goes with what and what goes against what (P&C 74, 
76, 204).  They define friend and foe, likes and dislikes, pleasure and pain, etc.; 
hence, pieties lay the framework for all systems of evaluation, including at the 
subconscious level.  They infiltrate and guide our very being in such a way that 
people make implicit valuations without being cognizant of the mental feat being 
completed (P&C 75).  From Burke’s perspective, this process is the same in the realm 
morals and aesthetics, which is what allows for the slippage between the two (1). 
While not all pieties implicate one’s core being, the choices we make are always 
driven by our sense of the pious and the impious.  Because pieties are foundational, 
they shape the potential alternatives that one can choose from in any given situation.  
This generative element of pieties illuminates the force that they have on all human 
interactions.  While the ramifications of pieties in the aesthetic realm are seldom as 
consequential as those in the ethical, challenges to them can cause as distinct physical 
and emotional responses as when one’s ethical system i  contested.   
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 One’s pieties can be traced to experiences and interactions that she has had 
during her existence, and interactions with others of the same value system work to 
reinforce and perpetuate one’s pieties (Burke P&C 78-9).  As such, they are always 
tied to a part of one’s past in some way (74).  While this provides one a sense of 
stability in interacting with the world, it can become problematic when one’s pieties 
become so calcified as to be unable to respond in a helpful manner to new exigencies.  
A formula for evaluating circumstances may become outdated and harmful when 
used in a world that is no longer consistent with one’s value assumptions.  The failure 
of one’s pious system of beliefs to adapt to newly emergent exigencies can lay the 
groundwork for a sense of alienation from the broader society, which can also 
precipitate a revaluation of one’s values.   
 People are emotionally vested in their pieties even sometimes when they have 
become pathological.  When the utilitarian reality of one’s existence contradicts one’s 
pious value system, it can be painful, both physically and/or emotionally (Burke P&C 
74).  The desire of many to maintain a deep tan year-round long after the connection 
between skin cancer and sun exposure had been well-documented illustrates this 
point.  In spite of the fact that tanning carries with it a substantial risk, many still feel 
“healthier” when they are bronzed.31  In this example, the desire to stay consistent 
with one’s aesthetic preference for being golden brown can literally bring death and 
disease to the physical body.  Pieties seem beneficial or at least necessary to their 
holder, but in reality they can either guide or misguide one’s choices (P&C 76). When 
                                                     
31 To see the magnitude of this phenomenon see Karen Spri gen, "Dying to Be Tan," Newsweek June 
28 2005. 
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one’s pieties overwhelm what is healthy for the physical or mental health of their 
holder, significant angst can result because pieties ar  a “yearning to conform with 
the ‘sources of one’s being’” (69), and a need for a revaluation may ensue.   
 Any revaluation of values is necessarily impious because it challenges one’s 
value system, even if the value in question is seemingly inconsequential (Burke P&C 
80).  It is impossible to predict with any degree of certainty what effect a minor 
modification to one’s pieties can have on the system as a whole.  This is significant 
because it suggests that a change in one’s aesthetic judgments could affect in 
potentially profound ways a person’s broader orientation, which is part of the reason 
Burke does not draw clean distinctions between ethical and aesthetic valuation.  He 
contends that pieties respond to “analogies of situation or relationship” and not to the 
object or person being evaluated (148).  This suggests that our evaluations of lived 
experience and artistic expression are closely related.  One may be drawn to works of 
art that challenge contemporary notions of the aesthetic because he is or has a desire 
to be rebellious in his own life.  Hence, what in the realm of art is judged as 
aesthetically pleasing might be deemed in one’s exit ntial reality as an ethical act of 
fighting an unfair system.  For Burke, the line betw en the two will never be neat and 
distinct; rather it will always be a blurry shade of gray.   
…truth in art is not the discovery of facts, not an addition to human 
knowledge in the scientific sense of the word.  It is, rather, the exercise of 
human propriety, the formulation of symbols which rigidify our sense of poise 
and rhythm.  (Burke CS 42)         
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This leads Burke to see transference between the two realms and argue that it is 
probable that something that is aesthetically pleasing will be adjudged as morally 
correct and vice versa.  As such, the aesthetic realm always has political implications 
(114).  It is at this point that “we come upon the centre, where rhetoric and poetic 
coalesce, where the intrinsic radiance of an aesthetic object has social implications in 
its very essence” (SOM 18).  The religious right’s campaign to denigrate Hollywood 
as a den of iniquity illustrates this principle.  Because the beautiful stars of popular 
culture are deemed aesthetically pleasing, the fear of conservatives is that 
Hollywood’s supposed liberal leanings will undermine the traditional value structure 
of America, i.e. the nation’s orientation.   
 This interrelationship between the realm of the aesth tic and of the ethical is 
further clarified by Burke in his essay “Literature as Equipment for Living” (PLF 
253-262).  Literature becomes a way to expose different types of attitudinal responses 
to differing social circumstance.  It charts myriad social experiences and provides the 
auditor with strategies for dealing with similar types of occurrences when they are 
encountered in her actual life (253-5).  Artists are frequently inspired by “extra-
aesthetic tensions in the social order” (SOM 45) as a source for the content of their 
works.  Consequently, the genius of “symbol using, heads in the thou-shall-nots of the 
ethical, proscriptions shaped with regard to the giv n social order and its 
corresponding kinds of ownership, expectancy and obligation” (45).  Hence, “all such 
‘values’ provide material for ‘free’ use in a work of art” (45).  As such, artistic 
expression is frequently one of the first places where discord within a value system is 
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expressed symbolically, and it provides a venue in which to explore the possibility of 
a new order.  An intrinsic relationship exists betwen the aesthetic and the ethical as 
the form of the aesthetic can subsume that of the political (CS 113).   
 I believe that Burke was correct in his assumptions about the symbolic 
interrelationship between the differing realms of human symbol use, and 
technological changes in society have made this interac ion even more pronounced.  
“Technology is not something that is distinct from the environment or just another 
tool in our environment.  Technology is our environment” (Cathcart 289-90).  
Technological advances and new mediums of expression have magnified the number 
of fictional messages a person encounters on a daily b sis, and the line between 
fiction and reality is being further muddied.  Already thin supermodels are airbrushed 
to make their bodies fit an ideal type of the female figure while infotainment blurs the 
line between entertainment and news reporting.  Celebrity gossip is deemed more 
newsworthy than stories of pressing national concern if one examines the sheer 
volume of coverage the two types of news receive on cable news programs.32  This 
functional blending of the aesthetic and ethical has the potential to have severe 
repercussions on the social order.  When a belief has unacceptable consequences for 
an order, the “‘aesthetic can be a temporary way of using art to avoid the accurate 
contemplation of the non-aesthetic elements” (Burke SOM 14).  Not only do the 
formal symbolic overlays between the realms exist, a merging of the substance of the 
                                                     
32 According to survey data 87% of the public believes that too much time is devoted to coverage of 
celebrity gossip in lieu of hard news.  See The PewR search Center for the People and the Press, 
Public Blames Media for Too Much Celebrity Coverage, August 2 2007, Available: http://people-
press.org/report/346/public-blames-media-for-too-much-celebrity-coverage, July 21 2008. 
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two types of valuation is also occurring.  Consequently, it is necessary to understand 
style and artistic truth if one is to understand the process of revaluation. 
 For Burke, style and artistic proof are intimately intertwined concepts.  He 
argues that style is the ability to do the “right” thing (P&C 269-70 note 2).  What is 
aesthetically pleasing is that which conforms to the norms of the social order or 
challenges them in a socially acceptable manner.  When disagreement occurs over the 
aesthetic value of a work, there is frequently an underlying conflict regarding the 
moral and ethical as well.  When Andres Serrano’s “Pi s Christ,” which showed a 
crucifix submerged in urine, and Robert Maplethorpe’s r trospective, which included 
homoerotic and sado-masochistical imagery, created public controversy in the late 
1980s, the United States Senate deemed the works to be without artistic merit.33 
However, standard questions of style and aesthetics were not addressed.  Color, 
lighting, arrangement, thought provoking imagery, etc. were not mentioned.34  
Instead, the works were declared obscene and blasphemous.  While content is part of 
the aesthetic quality of any work, it is commonly evaluated on how well the content 
functions to express the ideas in the art.  However, in this example, the criticisms 
treated the aesthetic aspects of the work as if they were rhetorical.  In the view of the 
critics, the two were synonymous; because the pieces had an offensive rhetorical 
message in the view of the critics, they could have no aesthetic value.  The moral and 
the aesthetic were treated as one and the same.       
                                                     
33 For further detail on the controversy see Roy Shaw, "Hanging Judges," The Guardian December 2 
1989. 
34 For a detailed discussion of the elements generally inc uded in art criticism see Terry Barrett, Why is 
That Art:  Aesthetics and Criticism of Contemporary Art  (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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The above example illustrates the potential symbolic slippage between the 
realms of the moral and the aesthetic, and this phenom non requires further 
interrogation.  If the aesthetic and the ethical can be symbolically interchanged in the 
arena of pieties, it becomes imperative to understand how aesthetic proofs function as 
part of one’s orientation.  “Art, one of the nine cultural potentialities Burke attributes 
to mankind, thereby becomes one of the nine channels through which man can re-
individuate himself” (Gallo 36).  For Burke, all communication retains vestiges of the 
poetic (Burke CS 168), which allows aesthetic truths to bind together t e narrative of 
human life, and under certain circumstances they can be used interchangeably with 
truths dictated by one’s moral code.  The use of music to express spiritual 
transcendence in many religions is the ritualized combining of the ethical and the 
aesthetic.  One may enjoy a particular hymn because it fe ls uplifting as the ethical 
message and the rhythm of the song combine together syn gistically to create an all 
encompassing emotional, physical and intellectual experience.  The transcendent 
feeling of the moment is spurred by the symbolic merging of the aesthetic and moral, 
which for Burke is a formal quality.   
Forms 
Forms, which are the symbolic “arousing and fulfillment of desires” (Burke 
CS 124) are an element of symbolism that have historically been seen as part of both 
the aesthetic and the rhetorical.  As such, they help to illustrate the ways in which the 
purely symbolic affects our understanding and valuation of the external world and our 
overall orientation.  It has been noted that Burke’s expression of form can seem 
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confusing because sometimes “he seems to mean form in the sense of archetype or 
norm,” such as “universal patterns of experience” or “recurrent emotions” (Gallo 36).  
While at other times, he seems to “refer to architetural principles, frameworks or a 
skeletal structure” (36).  For Burke, these two elements cannot be separated; they 
work together to create the effect within the audience.  “Form is an act of giving 
shape to an idea; knowing what goes with what and how ideas modify and transform 
one another through arrangement” (Heath 397).  In other words, form gives rhetorical 
force to ideas through the artful manipulation of pieties.  As such, form “is not only 
aesthetic but social and psychological as well, even historical” (Sheard 295) and is 
shaped by “culturally imposed criteria for thinking” (Gronbeck “Celluloid” 41).   
The pieties that shape the implementation of forms are culturally specific and 
the nature of form will vary across culture and time.  However, the way they function 
psychologically remains the same.  Specifically, forms function similarly to an 
enthymeme wherein the audience “collaborates” in the creation of meaning (Burks 
261).  For Burke, forms function psychologically by creating expectations that the 
audience desires to see fulfilled (Rod 307).  Burke outlines four types of forms that 
are skeletal structures that need to be fleshed out with cultural particulars.  They are 
syllogistic, qualitative, repetitive, and conventioal.  In the first, the conclusions 
necessarily follow from premises already outlined; in the second, the presence of one 
quality puts one in a state of mind or prepares us for the transference to another state; 
the third is the consistent maintaining of the same principles under new guises, and 
the fourth refers to a situation wherein the form itself is what is rhetorically appealing 
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regardless of the content of the message (Burke CS 124-7). Each of these forms is 
utilized to construct a narrative of the subject at h nd, which increases its symbolic 
power by encouraging a particular progression of thug t based upon the form itself.  
The forms function by creating a sense of expectancy for how things should turn-out 
to be.  Consider the standard horror movie in America.  The horrific behaviors are 
almost always preceded by music, which creates a sense of anxiety to make the 
audience more afraid of the subsequent acts.  If the scary monster does not appear 
following the music, the audience may feel a sense of being let down.  Hence, 
formally charged symbols act not just by causing an expectation of what is to follow 
but also by creating a desire for a particular outcme (Burke SOM 47).35   
                                                     
35 Burke’s conception of form has been criticized by some as too limiting.  Cathcart notes that Burke 
based his exposition of the four types of forms largely from a written work that assumes a linear 
progression of thought Robert S. Cathcart, "Extensions of the Burkean System," Extensions of the 
Burkean System, ed. James W. Chesebro (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993). 298-99.  
However, he acknowledges that Burke’s notion still erve an important function and can be adapted to 
an increasingly visually driven world.  He argues that what makes dramatism as a theory especially 
applicable to a mass mediated world “is its focus on form rather than content alone to reveal the 
process of symbolic action” Cathcart, "Extensions of the Burkean System." 303.   
A second criticism of Burke’s theory of form comes from James Cheseboro who questions 
whether Burke’s notion of form can account for a non-Western audience.  He analyzes a speech by 
Pedro Albizu Campos and argues that none of Burke’s four types of form accurately represent the 
rhetorical maneuvers used in the speech James W. Chesebro, "Multiculturalism and the Burkean 
System:  Limitations and Extensions," Kenneth Burke and the 21st Century, ed. Bernard L. Brock 
(Albany State University of New York Press, 1999). 174-76.  Specifically, he argues that Burkes forms 
are too linear to account for the more spiral nature of Campos’ rhetoric (176-83).  I, in part, disagree 
with Cheseboro’s position.  Specifically, I believe qualitative form accounts for the spiral nature of 
Campos’s rhetoric because the qualitative uses one quality to prepare the audience to accept another 
quality.  He argues this form is not applicable because he moves from painting the audience as docile 
and then concludes by calling for a revolution, andhence, constructing the audience as powerful (174).  
It is important to remember that the functioning of form is reliant upon what the audience brings with 
them in interpreting the message.  It is possible that a non-western audience would view the spiral 
nature of the speech and the disjunction of the beginning and end as being connected in a qualitative 
way.   
However, even if I am wrong in this assessment, I think the general basis of Burke’s notion of 
forms as they relate to valuation are correct even in the face of Cathcart and Cheseboro’s criticism.  
Even if the four particular types of forms outlined by Burke are insufficient to account for a mass 
mediated world and a multi-cultural audience, the more abstract notion of the power of forms is not 
undercut.  It merely suggests that his theory needs to be expanded to include more types of forms; it 
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Symbols can be said to be formally charged when the power of the 
communicative act is increased based upon the form that is utilized.  When this 
occurs in artistic expression it is generally viewed as illustrating the talent of the 
artist.  However, the effects of form are not limited to the realm of the aesthetic.  
They also play a significant role in the realm of the rhetorical and can have the effect 
of pushing ideas and value judgments based upon the form in which they are 
delivered as opposed to their intellectual strength.   
 John Murphy illustrates this phenomenon in his discus ion of President 
Bush’s rhetoric following 9-11.  He argues that Bush ed the epideictic form to push 
policy decisions in a way that undercut critics’ ability to question the efficacy and 
moral value of the policies ("Mission" 617).  In many ways, the policy of preemptive 
war was anathema to traditional American values.  However, the rhetorical strategies 
used provided the means to make the transvaluation of values that occurred appear to 
be a logical continuation of the values that the doctrine repudiated.  This is one way 
in which the use of formally charged rhetoric can fcilitate the alteration of value 
systems within a social order.  By maintaining the pr ferred form, it is possible for 
the rhetor to alter the ideas being discussed in sig ificant ways without appearing to 
be offering revolutionary ideas, and as Weier argues “through the appeal of form a 
rhetor entices auditors to surrender to a text's structuring of reality” (247).    
 The use of form can also function to maintain value systems.  The use of 
rituals in religious ceremonies and the power found within those rites illustrates this 
                                                                                                                                                      
does not deny that formal aspects of communication play a significant role in the way in which 
symbols systems function to maintain and/or alter value systems.      
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point.  Even though sects of Christianity believe in the Bible and the God figure 
expressed therein, the form in which the values are expressed and promulgated vary 
significantly among denominations.  The stoic nature of a Lutheran church service 
can be appealing because of the feeling of calm it provides.  In contrast, a Southern 
Baptist revival can be appealing because of the outward expression of strong 
emotions.  Gronbeck argues that Burke’s conception of form redefines meaning to 
include “the kinds of understanding that are possible because of what audiences bring 
to” the encounter (“Tradition” 361-2).  As such, Burke’s conception of form suggests 
that those who prefer one form of religious expression over another are unlikely to 
change to a denomination that utilizes a significantly different form because it falls 
outside of their formal expectation of what a churc service should be, and when the 
formal expectations of the religious experience are met, it can help provide the 
continuity necessary to help people maintain their faith.   
 Formal appeal can also work to alter one’s value structures.  For example, 
some people feel alienated by the form of worship done in the church in which they 
were raised and seek out a church in which they feel more at home.  While this is 
sometimes a matter of church doctrine, such as whether or not a church is accepting 
of homosexuals, it can also be based upon the formal aspects of the church and the 
ways in which the beliefs are expressed rhetorically.  If the formal elements of 
worship lead a person to change denominations, there will likely be a concomitant 
alteration in the value system of the individual.  The appeal and draw of the form 
occurs in part through identification (Burks 262).  As will be explicated in greater 
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detail in chapter eight, identification with one aspect of a person, idea or activity can 
easily lead to identification with whole of the person, idea or activity.  As such, the 
draw of form can facilitate an alteration in values when a person identifies with an 
element unrelated to the value per se, but the identification allows the differing value 
stance to be viewed in a positive light.  The draw of the form can become so 
appealing that people actually crave the form regardless of the content of the 
message.  This has two significant implications for valuation that I will highlight.   
 In this chapter, I endeavored to explain the interrelationship between aesthetic 
and moral valuation in realm of pieties and form to illustrate the ways in which 
conceptual slippage can occur between the two realms.  In the remaining chapters, I 
turn to the key terms of moral and aesthetic valuation highlighted by Burke to unpack 
his theory of how values are formed and altered by individuals and social orders.  I 
will draw upon the theories outlined in chapters two and three to explicate the 
symbolic processes that undergird the functioning of the key terms.  The following 
chapters are organized to show how valuations move fr m the social to the individual 
and back to the social via symbol systems.    
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Chapter 4:  The Collective Poems of Socio-Economic Organization 
 By highlighting the collective poems of socio-economic organization, a key 
term which is central to understand the process of moral and aesthetic evaluation, 
Burke placed the interaction between the individual and the social order as a primary 
element in all valuation.  He was always cognizant of the interrelationship between 
the individual and the culture in which she resides b cause individual actions always 
have implications for the broader social order, andctions taken by social institutions 
always have effects on the individual.36  Moral valuation, specifically, prescribes a 
view of how the world ought to function and how peole ought to behave.  Hence, an 
underlying element of all moral valuation is necessarily social because it prescribes 
what people’s relationships with others ought to look like.  When Burke discusses the 
collective poems of socio-economic organization in relationship to valuation, he is 
referring to “the total frames of thought and action,” (Burke ATH 99) and “ the 
productive and mental patterns developed by aggregates” (111).  He breaks the major 
aggregates of Western civilization into the “roughly classifiable…heads of primitive 
evangelism (in the midst of Hellenstic decay), media val theocracy, Protestantism, 
capitalism, and socialism” (99).  In a sense, he is focusing on the ways in which 
humans have grouped and regrouped themselves throughout large swaths of history.  
This focus does not deny the import of individual actions; “the two emphases are not 
mutually exclusive, since the individual’s frame is built of materials from the 
                                                     
36 I do not mean to argue that the effects that occur are necessarily planned; what I do mean is that all 
actions have effects that go beyond the individual involved.  The social effects may be limited to the
person’s immediate relations, but people cannot live in isolation in a modern, industrialized nation.  As
such, one must always examine the interaction between the individual and the broader social 
environment.   
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collective frame” (111).  While these broad patterns cannot tell us exactly how any 
given individual will respond to a particular exigency, the abstractions allow one to 
see recurrent patterns of thoughts and behaviors (P&C 112, 219).  It could be argued 
that Burke’s breakdown of Western civilization is a bit esoteric, and one would 
probably have to agree with that statement.  However, what is important for the 
purpose of this analysis is the broader idea that the major organizing principles of a 
cultural era will have a significant impact on the way in which social orders and the 
individuals who comprise them will valuate the world around them.     
While much post-modern thought has rejected the notio  of universal 
categories, Burke’s thinking provides a means to rec ncile the criticisms of universal 
truths with a belief that recurring patterns of thought and behavior can and do exist.  
Burke suggests that while the particulars of any given value judgment will be distinct, 
the symbolic patterns and processes that are used while making and expressing the 
valuations tend to follow similar trajectories.  This notion is significant because it 
allows one to create categories of thoughts and processes that provide a more holistic 
understanding of valuations while at the same time recognizing that universal claims 
always have particular applications.  He notes that statistical trends illustrate generic 
motives that drive a particular social unit.  However, “the new causal interpretation 
obtained statistically will have the incongruous qualities of perspective, since it offers 
a generic motive distinct from the motives experienced by the members of migration 
as individuals” (P&C 219).  Hence, the motives of individuals within that 
demographic can be distinct from that of the aggregat .  However, it is the area of 
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overlap between the universal principle and the specific application that provides 
some of the greatest insight into the workings of human valuations.  A casual glance 
at the differing ways in which Christianity has been applied in its different 
manifestations illustrates this point.  While different denominations recognize the 
universal truth of the Bible, how those truths are negotiated when applied to specific 
situations is distinct.  In fact, a number of splits within Christendom have occurred 
because of disagreements about how the truth of the Bibl  ought to be understood as 
it interacted with the particular circumstances of the time, place, and populace.      
Similar to much postmodern thought, Burke rejects the notion of universal 
truths that arise from metaphysical inquiries (CS 48), but he does believe that certain 
universal claims can be made.  Burke believes that human existence has “‘progressed’ 
in cultural cycles which repeat themselves in essence (i  form) despite the limitless 
variety of specific details to embody such essences or forms” (48).  For example, 
every war over resources is necessarily particular in its application as the resource(s) 
in question may be different and varying cultural exp ctations regarding warfare and 
diplomacy will alter how the conflict is conducted.  However, the push to war over 
scarce resources is a universal possibility.  The foundation of universals, for Burke, 
are those things for which humans have inborn psychological potential (48).  This 
understanding of universal claims is important because it provides a means of 
understanding those elements of human behavior that can arise in any particularized 
cultural setting, which provides a systematic framework for analyzing and 
understanding the human condition in all of its manifestations.  Differing cultures will 
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always have distinct moral and ethical codes, but the genesis of those codes 
necessarily includes those elements of human existence that are universal.         
Because of the significance of this part of Burkean thought, it is necessary to 
unpack what elements of human existence that he sees as being universal in nature.  
Burke believes that patterns of experience that recur are universal.  These experiences 
include such things as moods, feelings, emotions, perceptions, sensations, attitudes, 
etc. (CS 149).  I do not mean to imply that a person’s emotional reaction to a situation 
is universal, but instead the possibility of having a similar emotional reaction 
provides its universality.  For example, whether one views the execution of a 
convicted murderer with satisfaction for justice being served or an abomination of 
state sanctioned violence is irrelevant to Burke’s notion of universality.  What does 
matter is that all people have the potential to have feelings of both satisfaction and of 
abomination.  Because we all have the potential to possess either of those feelings, the 
feelings themselves are universal; however, what causes either of those feelings to 
emerge in an individual is always a product of the particular situation (CS 150). 
Burke sees a constant interaction between the individual and the social order.  
While the particulars of each person’s life are distinct, the symbolic patterns that are 
used to shape and understand one’s experiences remain the same.  Symbolic patterns 
form from the interactions between people and their environment, and these patterns 
are frequently repeated, which provides the basis for a universal understanding of 
symbolic action (CS 151).  When individuals adopt extant cultural forms, their 
orientations are necessarily shaped by those forms (151).  While many cultural forms 
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can become and remain a powerful force in shaping one’s orientation, nothing 
guarantees that the pattern will move beyond the epmeral and influence symbolic 
action (152).  Nevertheless, when forms gain cultura  currency over an extended 
period of time, they come to be seen as natural (LAS 13) or in some situations as a 
dictate from a higher power.  For example, the enslavement of Africans was justified 
by some as God’s preferred order of human society, and this belief retained its power 
for over two centuries.  The notion that men were rightful leaders of the household 
and of society lasted for literally millennia and still retains its force in much of the 
modern world.             
Since for Burke the universal is always particular in its application, the 
significant question that arises is how do individual people and societies negotiate the 
universal forms with their specific circumstances?  While Burke provides a partial 
answer to this question, it is far from complete.  In his own works he examines 
cultural artifacts as a means to determine the underlying motivational states implicit 
in them because he believes that people’s understandings of the world can be 
determined in part by the symbols that they use to describe it, which is consistent with 
his belief that symbols are a verbal parallel to recu rent patterns of experience (CS 
152), and hence, the symbol itself is a formula that is utilized to provide meaning and 
cogency to a seemingly irrational and chaotic world (153).  But symbol systems 
evolve over time, and the constant push of the physical and social world can 
undermine the ability of our chosen form to retain its explanative and organizational 
power.  Nevertheless, the formal function of the symbol system can be analyzed at a 
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number of distinct cultural locations to understand the interrelationship between 
symbols, the human user, and the social systems in which they operate.  Burke argues 
that nine sites exist in which people reindividuate th ir specific experiences into 
cultural patterns wherein the external application changes, but the essence does not.  
The sites are as follows:  speech, tools, art, mythology, religion, social systems, 
property, government, and war (48).37    
At each of the aforementioned cultural locations, the individual is provided 
with an opportunity to define himself in relationship to his external world.  However, 
it must not be forgotten that the interaction between the individual and the cultural 
forms is not a one-way street.  The individual can h ve an impact on the broader 
culture, but his worldview will always be altered by the recalcitrance of the already 
existing order (Burke P&C 258).  I do not mean to claim that the individual c nnot 
alter the extant social order; history is replete with examples where individuals have 
had such effects.  What is important to note is that t e relationship is always 
synergistic.  While the form itself is not altered per se, its particular application is 
changed by the way it is understood and used by people at a specific time and 
location.  One way in which this occurs is via the educational system wherein 
universals are individuated and channeled into particular cultural constructs (CS 57).  
Under closed systems such as the former Soviet Union, N rth Korea, and China, the 
educational system is utilized to propagate one unifying vision of the world that 
justifies the actions of the current regime.  China has gone so far as to eliminate 
                                                     
37 These sites also provide the source for most of a given order’s symbols of authority, which will be 
examined in greater detail in chapters 7-9.  For now, it is sufficient to understand that certain cultural 
locations have a greater force on individuals than other sites might.         
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access to internet sites that call into question the values expressed by the 
government.38  However, even under these systems, the populous is not necessarily 
unified in its support of the regime.  But the ability to control access to ideas that are 
contrary to the regime’s interests does make it more difficult for oppositional ideas to 
be developed and expressed.39 
Part of the formal power of each of the nine cultural locations noted by Burke 
is that they each have the ability to channel people’s emotions.  For example, when 
the United States was attacked by terrorists on September 11, 2001, the nation as a 
whole responded in an emotional manner.  As a natio, we were afraid and wanted to 
exact revenge (justice) on those who perpetuated the atrocity.  These emotions were 
channeled into symbolic forms that shaped the natiol debate over how we ought to 
respond to the situation.  Burke argues when emotions are transferred into symbols, 
those symbols develop a generative force (CS 61), which shapes future 
understandings and actions.  The emotions following 9-11 merged into visions of who 
terrorists are and what they want to do to the United States and its citizens.  However, 
the symbolic instantiation was less than precise as the fear and anger following 9-11 
created an image of terrorists who could emerge from any locale in South or 
Southwest Asia and exact an unacceptable toll of lost American lives.  This symbolic 
                                                     
38 For more detail about China’s efforts to curtail access to the internet see Patricia Maunder, "The 
Great Firewall of China," The Age March 20 2008. 
39 Of course the fear of physical violence and repression plays a role in this phenomenon, but on a 
strictly symbolic level it is more difficult to devlop contrary ideas or responses to the regime without 
access to the multiplicity of ideas that have already been expressed on the subject.  A quick look at 
formative documents in the United States such as the Federalist Papers illustrates the way in which 
historical events that occurred in other nations shaped how our founding fathers understood promises 
and perils of a democratic regime.   
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instantiation is in part what allowed for a preemptive attack in 2003 on the nation of 
Iraq, which had no discernable connection to terrorist activity directed at America and 
as a secular state was unlikely to ascribe to the fundamentalist Islamic beliefs held by 
those who did commit the acts on 9-11.  One single act of terrorism, which killed far 
fewer people than such ordinary activities as driving a car or eating fast food do, 
allowed the notion of war as a last resort to be turned on its head.  This is not to say 
that no one in America had previously supported the idea of preemptive war, but what 
it does indicate is the emotional force that emerged after 9-11 was channeled in such 
a way that the idea gained presence.40  As Burke notes, new emotions and attitudes 
are not created in a social order, but the cluster of conditions present at a given time 
change the emphasis and hence the force of certain ideals (CS 121), and because each 
form stresses its own unique way of building the mental equipment by which people 
handle the significant factors of their times, the c ange in emphasis can have a 
significant effect on how people engage the world aound them (ATH 34).          
While this function of symbolicity may seem benign or even beneficial for 
helping humans order the external environment and their relationship to it, there is no 
guarantee that the consequences of this aspect of symbol use will be neutral or 
positive (Burke CS 151).  It is here that Burke recognizes the import of valuation of 
one’s extant world.  While humans are incapable of completely controlling the 
physical and social environment, we do have the capa ity to judge the ramifications 
of not only our actions but also our symbolically constructed understandings of the 
                                                     
40 I am using the term presence in the way expressed by Chaim Perelman and Lucy Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
The New Rhetoric:  A Treatise on Argumentation (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1971).. 
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world.  One of the ways in which social orders are lt red is via epideictic rhetoric 
that expresses a value judgment about the culture and/or the people in it.  This is not 
to say that change is necessarily a good thing.  In some instances, the change that is 
made can be even more destructive than the status quo ante.  In other instances, the 
alteration can be reinforcement or strengthening of already existing value judgments.  
Burke argues that all rhetoric is necessarily value lad n, and many rhetorical devices 
are merely a restatement of the dominant values in a culture.  He contends that 
Aristotle’s topoi are but the verbalized expression f the attitudes and values of a 
given social order (ROM 56).  However, even the most strongly supported cultural 
values can be altered over time.  I will now turn to a discussion of the ways in which 
the dominant values of a given order can and do change. 
Burke believes that all systems contain within them the potential seeds of their 
own destruction because of cultural byproducts (uninte ded consequences) (ATH 
139), and of cultural lag, which occurs when the ori ntations that were good in the 
past fail to keep up with newly emergent exigencies (P&C 47).  The import of this is 
significant; value judgments never operate in a vacuum, and sometimes the reality on 
the ground undermines the ideals of the value system.  An obdurate reality exists that 
pushes back against our valuations and has the potential to change not only the value 
system but also us as individuals (255).  The overarching attitude of the individual 
and/or of the social order is open to change, and when a shift occurs from one attitude 
to another a revaluation of values has occurred (ATH 37).  However, the transition 
from one value frame to another is not necessarily easy or painless.  When a 
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revaluation is underway, those loyal to the dying belief structure will respond in order 
to preserve it.  In some instances the response is symbolic, but a brief perusal of 
history illustrates that violence is frequently thechosen method of preserving the 
system (134).  However, if violence is to be avoided it is important to understand the 
symbolic responses to a decaying order.  
Burke argues that two symbolic responses tend to emerge during these times 
of disarray:  casuistic stretching and “prayer” (ATH 134).  In the former, people 
attempt to expand their current frame of reference i  order to account for the 
exigencies that undermine their orientation.  In some instances this stretching can be 
positive; during the fight for civil rights, the orientation of many Americans did not 
allow for African Americans to be thought of as equal, and for the civil rights 
movement to be successful, the attitudes of many needed to be stretched to include 
African Americans as full humans and citizens.  In this way the rights of the 
constitution, which in its original manifestation defined Blacks as 3/5 of a person, 
was stretched to encompass people of all racial backgrounds.  I do not mean to imply 
that all American’s frames were stretched in this po itive way; racism is still alive and 
well.  What is important though is that when the frame was stretched, it was done in 
such a way as to not destroy the original value system present in the constitution.  It 
merely redefined who was able to have access to the rig ts posited in it.  However, in 
other circumstances the stretching that occurs has the potential to destroy outright the 
orientation or turn it into a twisted caricature of its former self.  History is rife with 
cultures that have disappeared.  While some elements of the social orientations may 
   
  69 
remain in subsequent cultures, the orientation as a unit was eliminated.  In other 
circumstances, the stretching allows the orientation to remain extant, but with 
significant modifications to it, which in some instances leads to a complete reversal of 
the orientation itself.   
In the latter, secular prayer, an effort is made to reiterate the value of the 
frame through symbolically formalistic actions.  Inreligions, ritualistic acts help to 
establish the import of the religious doctrine and help people remain loyal to it.  
Burke metaphorically extends this concept to refer to cultural practices that take on a 
ritualistic role in the maintenance of a cultural vue.  For example, reciting the 
pledge of allegiance is a ritualistic act intended to instill civic pride in the populace.  
In secular prayer, people attempt to symbolically create the world as they want it to 
be, and in some instances they are bureaucratized and formalized as in legislation 
(ATH 321).  This process is one way in which elements of previous frames find 
themselves woven into a new orientation.  In some instances, the fragments of past 
orientations remain dormant until new exigencies ari e that call for their 
reemergence; in other instances, the shards are appopriated by the new orientation to 
serve its purpose (CS 71).  When a new orientation gains dominance, it does not 
magically appear out of thin air; instead, it emerges like the fabled phoenix bird from 
the ashes of the old frame.  When society moves into a new “act,” the drama of the 
past is always rewritten (ATH 111), but any new cultural construction is built upon 
the existing cultural material (112).  Burke’s analysis of St. Augustine’s transition 
from a pagan rhetorician to a Christian teacher exemplifies this process.  Augustine 
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did not disavow the rhetorical practices he advocated s a pagan; he merely turned 
them toward the new end of serving God (ROR 43-171).  While the rhetorical 
principles did not change, the value judgment regarding how they ought to be used 
was altered.   
As societies evolve over time, the underlying values n cessarily change in 
spite of the fact that people search for an “immovable rock” on which to build a 
structure of certainties (Burke P&C 173).  The symbolic act of casuistic stretching 
allows for members of a community to believe that teir values have remained 
unchanged in spite of significant alterations to the overall orientation of the 
community.  The old vocabulary of values becomes a “eulogistic covering” for the 
new norms that are being established (ATH 142), and the symbols of authority from 
the previous regime are appropriated in an effort to strengthen the new orientation 
(141).  This act can occur in a number of ways.  The symbol of authority can be 
borrowed in its current form so that which was previously good remains good, or the 
symbol can be castigated so that which was previously seen as positive is now viewed 
in a negative light.  The means used to spread Christian ty illustrates this point.  The 
newly emergent religion needed to counteract the pagan beliefs that existed if the 
Christian doctrine was to be spread.  In some instances, Christians co-opted pagan 
rituals by redefining their meaning.  For example, agan marriage rituals which were 
family sanctioned were slowly transformed over a period of three centuries to move 
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the locus of control of the rite to the church, giving significant power over the social 
order to the church.41 
While the above valuation has had significant ramifications for millennia, not 
all shifts of valuation are as meaningful.  In some circumstances the change that 
occurs is trivial because the overall scene has not changed (Burke ROM 105).  At the 
end of radical reconstruction and after the United States constitution had been 
amended “guaranteeing” legal equality to African Americans, the overall structure of 
the slave owning states did not change significantly.  While in the past African 
Americans had been legally enslaved, Jim Crow laws functioned to reestablish the 
same sort of social hierarchy that existed in the ant bellum South (Marable 41).  Even 
though the nation as a whole had adjudged African Americans as deserving of 
equality under the law, the existential reality in the South for many was not that 
different from the days of slavery.  Many were still exploited for their labor; lynching 
and other forms of punishment were used to demand certain codes of conduct, and 
Blacks were systematically denied access to the political process in order to advocate 
for change.  This is not to say that many African Americans did not act to change this, 
but it illustrates the way in which revaluations can occur at the symbolic level without 
significantly altering the extant social practices.   
Overall, the collective poems of socio-economic organization refer to the 
major organizational principles of a social order.  They provide the meta-level order 
in which people operate.  However, in every localized social order the values will be 
                                                     
41 For a detailed explanation of this process see Donald Gelp, Committed Worship:  A Sacramental 
Theology of Converting Christians (Collegeville, MN: Liturigical Press, 1993). 
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instantiated in different ways based upon the exigencies faced and the ways in which 
individuals and the orders respond to them.  In the next chapter, I turn my focus to 
frames of acceptance and rejection, which are attitudes held by individuals and 
through their aggregate the order itself.  The frames refer to the way in which 
individuals valuate the order and the way in which the order valuates individuals.  
The frame operate at a lower level of abstraction tha  do the collective poems, and as 
such, can be altered more readily.   
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Chapter 5:  Frames of Acceptance and Rejection 
The collective poems of socioeconomic orientation are Burke’s attempt to 
understand the dominant motivations that organized society in different eras; they 
focus on “the productive and mental patterns developed by aggregates” (ATH 111).  
However, valuation cannot be understood by looking solely at these holistic patterns; 
one must also examine the individual strategies people use in understanding and 
interacting with the social order.  One of the means that Burke used to gain insight 
into this is the heuristic use of literary genres to outline the ways in which different 
outlooks on the world shape our understanding of events and how we react to them.42  
Commonly known as frames of acceptance and rejection, they represent “the more or 
less organized system of meanings by which a thinking man gauges the historical 
situation and adopts a role in relation to it” (5).  “The poetic or dramatic 
metaphor…stresses man’s nature as a moral-ethical animal and takes into account the 
drama of choice which the self necessarily experiences in its quest” (Rueckert Drama 
52).  The frames represent this drama as we use them to assign meaning and to 
subsequently determine the attitude we have toward the physical, intellectual and 
social world in which we live (Burke ATH 34), and it is from this meaning that 
valuation flows because we judge others based upon the attitudes we hold (92).   
                                                     
42 This area of Burke’s writings overlaps with the con ept of generic criticism.  He used literary genres 
metaphorically to encapsulate differing attitudes toward the world.  I follow his lead and utilize the 
same approach.  I see the literary categories as heuristic devices that can be used to analyze social and 
individual valuation.  I view these categories as heuristic and not ontological.  See Robert C. Rowland 
(1991).  “On generic categorization,” Communication Theory, 1, 128-144. 
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  Burke’s use of genre is not meant to create a calcified system of 
categorization; instead, it is meant to provide a lns through which we can gain 
insight into people’s motivations and subsequent behaviors.  Inherent in motivations 
are valuations.  Hence, I believe these heuristic devices can also illuminate value 
discourse and formation.  Burke divides the frames into three broad categories—
acceptance, rejection and transitional—based upon the way they coach individuals to 
respond to the exigencies of their day.  The frames ar  necessarily social in nature; 
they are built by “overt or covert acts of transcend ce” that connect the individual to 
society (ATH 106).  As such, they represent the ways in which indiv duals valuate 
society and the way the social aggregate judges the individual.  In frames of 
acceptance, people accede to the legitimacy of the social order and its symbols of 
authority.  In contrast, frames of rejection are anti-social in that they stress “a shift in 
the allegiance to symbols of authority”43 (21) and the value structures they represent.  
Transition frames represent those times when social rders are in flux and symbols of 
authority are openly contested and a revaluation of values is occurring.  
While the collective poems point to the dominant organizing principles within 
a given era (Burke ATH 111), frames of acceptance and rejection illustrate the value 
assessments made by individuals within the social order toward the dominant world 
view expressed by the order itself.  In both the individual and the social, the frames 
are not mutually exclusive, and elements of all of the different types can frequently be 
seen in all individuals and social orders.  What maters is which frame has emphasis 
                                                     
43 It is important to note that anti-social does not ecessarily imply bad.  If the social order is 
destructive, being anti-social could be viewed in apositive light.  When I use the phrase anti-social I 
only mean that it is contrary to the values of the current order.   
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(57) because it represents the core values of the order, and when a shift from one 
frame to another occurs it represents “a basic ‘transv luation of values’” (37).  In the 
field of Communication Studies, the greatest focus of tudy has been on the 
acceptance frames of comedy and tragedy.44  However, the examination of the other 
frames has been sparse.  A couple of articles have examined the burlesque,45 and one 
scholar has called for the addition of additional literary categories to better flesh out 
the applicability of the frame.46  Rueckert is the only scholar to attempt to examine 
the frames as a holistic amalgamation of attitudes that could be held, but he only 
devotes five pages to give a cursory examination of the attitudes that they represent 
("Kenneth Burke and Structuralism" 52-56).  I believe this has precipitated a couple 
of difficulties in understanding the full meaning of Burke’s theory.  First, by only 
examining comedy and tragedy as a pair tragedy has been treated as a frame of 
rejection instead of a frame of acceptance, which is how Burke saw it.  Griffin in his 
groundbreaking application of Burkean thought to social movements argues that 
                                                     
44 See for example Edward C. Appel, "The Rhetoric of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.: Comedy and 
Context in Tragic Collision," Western Journal of Communication 61.4 (1997).  Denise M. Bostdorff, 
"Making Light of James Watt:  A Burkean Approach to the Form and Attitude of Political Cartoons," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 73 (1987), A. Cheree Carlson, "Gandhi and the Comic Frame:  "Ad 
Bellum Purificandum"," Quarterly Journal of Speech 72 (1986), A. Cheree Carlson, "Limitations on 
the Comic Frame:  Some Witty American Women of the Nineteenth Century," Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 74 (1988).  Adrienne E. Christiansen and Jeremy J. Hanson, "Comedy as Cure for Tragedy:  
Act up and the Rhetoric of Aids," Quarterly Journal of Speech 82 (1996).  Gregory Desilet, "Nietzsche 
Contra Burke:  The Melodrama in Dramatism," Quarterly Journal of Speech 75.1 (1989).  Leland 
Griffin, "A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of Social Movements," Critical Responses to Kenneth 
Burke, 1924-1966 (Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 1969).  John M. Murphy, "Comic 
Strategies and the American Covenant," Communication Studies 40 (1989). Kimberly A. Powell, "The 
Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching:  Strategies of a Movement in the 
Comic Frame," Communication Quarterly 43.1 (1995). 
45 See Bostdorff, "Political Cartoons."   Edward C. Appel, "Burlesque Drama as Rhetorical Genre:  The 
Hudibrastic Ridicule of William F. Buckley, Jr.," Western Journal of Communication 60 (1996). 
46 See Camille Lewis, Romancing the Difference:  Kenneth Burke, Bob Jones University, and the 
Rhetoric of Religous Fundamentalism (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2007). Camille K. Lewis, 
"Publish and Perish?  My Fundamentalist Education fr m the inside Out," KB Journal 4.2 (2008). 
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“movements are tragic” (472), and engage in a “symbolic rejection of the existing 
order” (465).  Murphy continues this line of thought and argues “rhetoric from this 
perspective becomes a means for eliminating the social rder and substituting a new 
one” (“Comic” 270).  Appel presents an argument to justify the placing of tragedy as 
a frame of rejection.  Drawing a distinction between the rhetorical and the poetic he 
argues “rhetorical tragedy treats the opponent as a ‘kill.’  Such discourse is 
thoroughly exclusionary” (“Burlesque” 279).  Given that Burke placed the tragic 
clearly as a frame of acceptance (ATH57), these representations are problematic.  In 
this section I will do two things to help fill in the wholes in our understanding of 
Burkean frames and to offer a framework to help clarify the frames, which I believe 
will resolve the problems presented by Appel et al.  First, I will outline the distinction 
between frames of acceptance and rejection and how values are central to them; 
second, I argue that one should view the frames in three distinct ways—attitudinal, 
heuristic/critical, and rhetorical—which will clarify the ways in which individuals can 
be operate in differing frames at the same time.  Discussion of the transition frames 
will occur in chapter six.   
Frames of Acceptance & Rejection 
All frames shape our relationship with other people.  They prepare us to not 
only to be for or against people, ideas, and actions, but they also tell us how to be for 
or against (Burke ATH 4).  “Frames are the symbolic structures by which uman 
beings impose order upon their personal and social experiences” (Carlson "Ghandi" 
447).  The words we use to describe this ordering are weighted with implicit value 
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judgments that suggest the appropriate actions to be aken.  Burke gives priority to 
frames of acceptance because of his belief that they best balance the needs of the 
individual and her relationship with the social order while avoiding irreducible 
simplifications that fail to account for the complexity of the material and social world.  
Burke’s mantra of “It’s more complicated than that,” which is sprinkled liberally 
throughout his dialogue “Prologue in Heaven,” best sums up the import he found in 
accepting the complexity of human existence (ROR 273-316).  While humans may 
desire simplicity and attempt to achieve it via myriad rhetorical maneuvers, simplicity 
necessarily elides the motivations, valuations, and behaviors that underlie human 
existence.  Hence, partiality and incompleteness is characteristic of rejection frames, 
while the move to completeness and complexity undergird frames of acceptance 
(ATH 22).  This is not to say that a complete understanding of the world will be 
attained; that is something that is beyond human capacity at this time.  What it does 
indicate is that grappling with the complexity of human existence is a necessary 
prerequisite to the existence of a humane social order.   
The differing frames contain within them world views that are imbued with 
values, which provide a systematic means of evaluating one’s world and his 
relationship to it.  While retaining fluidity, thes systems of judgment do place 
constraints and conditions on those who operate within them, and they define how we 
understand those who do not ascribe to the same set of values as we do.  Burke sees 
acceptance frames as being more humane because of the way in which they 
encourage us to valuate other human beings in a sympathetic light.  All value systems 
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attempt to judge that which is “right” from that whic  is “wrong,” and their linguistic 
expressions necessarily contain hortatory admonishments.  When these 
admonishments clash with each other, the entelechial push of moral indignation can 
cause fractures in the social order.  Consider the history of the three Abrahamic 
religions.  All three religions claim the same historical roots and worship the same 
god; however, history is rife with violent conflicts hat have killed innumerable 
people in an effort to establish a single, primary f ith to which all others must ascribe.  
In eras in which these conflicts occur, the dominant frame is one of rejection in which 
heretics and infidels are deemed as less than human, and the transcendent beliefs that 
would allow for a more peaceful coexistence are not present.  Frames of rejection are 
necessarily anti-social in that they exclude some people not only from the immediate 
social grouping but in some instances also from the human race.  Burke traces this 
phenomenon as it occurred in Nazi Germany in his essay “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s 
Battle” to illustrate the consequences that can occur when dehumanization is 
systematically practiced by a social order, and he attempts to sound a clarion call to 
ensure such a travesty would not be repeated (Burke PLF 164-189).         
Burke’s frames of acceptance and rejection can be und rstood in three 
different ways by which they implicate epistemology—attitudinal, heuristic/critical, 
and rhetorical.  The first points to the attitudes h ld by members of a social order and 
by their aggregate and bureaucratization, the order its lf.  As such, the frame one 
ascribes to provides an epistemological foundation by which one gains knowledge 
about and understanding of the world; the frame provides the worldview through 
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which all aspects of life will be understood, and ultimately, how one should evaluate 
it.  From this perspective, each individual will operate in relation to the different types 
of attitudes represented by the varying frames, which necessarily affects the 
valuations they make.  If one is making value judgments within an acceptance frame, 
the valuations that stem from this operational attitude will be different than if one 
were within a frame of rejection.  However, it is important to note that all individuals 
have the capacity to operate within any of the frames depending upon the particular 
exigencies that she is facing.  Consider the question of political parties.  It is not 
uncommon for a member of one party to reject out-of-hand any policy that is 
proffered by operatives of the competing party.  In this instance, the individual is 
operating from within a frame of rejection.  Neverth less, the same individual may 
very well operate within a frame of acceptance in most of her life, and it seems 
probable that each individual will have a dominant frame from which they approach 
the world.  However, because people can sometimes have distinct identities that are 
operational in different contexts (a manager who is horribly mean to her staff, might 
be a kind-hearted mother), it is also probable that differing frames will be operational 
in different contexts.  Human beings and the enviroment in which we live are 
necessarily dynamic, and consequently, value systems will always be in flux as we 
encounter situations for which our values have not prepared us and as we are forced 
to reevaluate past circumstances in view of new information or ideas.  While most 
prefer to believe that their values are stable and enduring, the reality is they never are 
because we can never anticipate all of the circumstances in which we are forced to 
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offer an evaluation.  As such, values are necessarily situational and contextual 
because we are applying imperfect frames to a continually emergent world that 
cannot be neatly categorized and evaluated.   
 The second way in which frames of acceptance and rejection should be 
understood is as heuristic/critical.  The frames are heuristic devices that provide 
critics insight into how societal values are created, disseminated, and altered via 
interactions among disparate individuals.  As Burke argues, humans are driven by a 
sense of order, and we attempt the improbable—a schema through which all human 
behavior can be understood (LAS 3-24).  One of the ways in which this occurs is by 
categorizing eras based on those things the categoriz r deems to be significant.  The 
emphasis chosen pushes the receiver of this information to come to a particular 
conclusion about the era.  It is often said that history belongs to the victors because 
the dominant valuation of events will be filtered through the value system of the 
winning party, and in many instances, the symbolic value of the historical event 
becomes more significant than the facticity of the ev nt itself.  Myths are 
symbolically constructed that create a narrative, which instantiate a particular 
perspective of shared values.  These symbolic maneuvers provide the appearance of 
continuity in the value system as the narrative provides a seamless presentation of 
historical events.  This act elides the ways in which our understanding and enactment 
of values are both consciously and unconsciously altered over time.  From a symbolic 
perspective, any rendering of history is necessarily revisionist because some things 
will be valuated as worthy of inclusion while others things will not be, and any 
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understanding will necessarily be incomplete.  However, this does not deny that 
efforts to categorize human history serve a heuristic function by allowing one to see 
the consequences of particular value judgments.  It i  in this process that Burke’s 
frames of acceptance and rejection add to our understanding of values.  Each frame 
provides a value laden lens through which we can gai  knowledge of human 
symbolic action.    
 The third way in which frames of acceptance and rejection should be 
understood is as a type of rhetorical invention.  The frames we utilize function as a 
means of invention that shapes the rhetorical strategies utilized by rhetors.  When a 
rhetor adapts a particular frame as a means of invention, she will construct arguments 
that differ from ones that would have been found if us ng a differing frame.  When 
the audience is operating within a frame of acceptance, then a skilled rhetor will look 
for transcendent rhetorical choices that attempt to bridge gaps among people.  
However, if the audience is operating within a frame of rejection, the rhetorical 
choices will be factional and descendent in nature as the rhetor attempts to create and 
exploit divisions.  Even from this perspective, theframes clearly overlap as invention 
is an aspect of epistemology.  However, for the purpose of clarifying the differing 
uses of the frames, it is useful to consider them as separate categories.  While one’s 
epistemological groundings will always shape how one constructs and understands 
arguments and emotional appeals, a rhetor can choose t  create rhetoric that utilizes 
strategies that are contrary to his own view of the world in order to more effectively 
persuade others to believe a particular idea or take a certain action.  Hence, the rhetor 
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my find it expedient to temporarily operate within a different frame than he normally 
would in order to best reach his audience.           
 This way of analyzing the frames helps to resolve what Appel saw as the 
problem in Burke’s conception of frames.  He contends that William F. Buckely, Jr.’s 
public rhetoric in relation to liberals was burlesque, which is a frame of rejection, but 
in his personal life he had many close friends who ere liberals (“Burlesque” 277).  
This leads him to argue the Burlesque should be seen as a mediator between comedy 
as acceptance and tragedy as rejection.  This move, h wever, creates less clarity in 
Burke’s purpose.  While there is a clear difference i  the way in which comedy and 
tragedy accept, Burke’s main point is that both of these frames ultimately accept the 
social order; they just have different ways of comprehending and subsequently 
dealing with the problems that inevitably arrive.  My conception allows one to see 
that Buckley operated within the tragic frame of acceptance—he scapegoated liberals 
while at the same time recognizing their fundamental humanness; however, he used 
rhetorical devices that publicly rejected the values presented by liberals.  This 
framework allows for a more nuanced understanding of the difference between one’s 
value system and the way in which one’s rhetorical choices can and do deviate from 
it.  In the following section, I will explain each of the frames using the framework 
that I have established.  My goal is to create a bro der understanding of all of the 
frames and to illustrate why all of the frames should be the focus of rhetorical 
scholarship.       
Frames of Acceptance 
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Burke lays out three literary genres that represent attitudes wherein “the 
element of acceptance is uppermost:” the epic, the comic and the tragic (ATH 43).  
While he valuates all acceptance frames as superior to those of rejection, he does not 
see them as being equal to each other.  In all three, a balance between the individual 
and the social order exists that allows for the functioning and maintenance of society.  
However, he believes that the most humane of the three is the comic (42) because the 
comic calls for a worldview that deals sympathetically with the foibles of others and 
provides the basis of identification with others in the social group.   
The progress of human enlightenment can go no further than in picturing 
people not as vicious, but as mistaken.  When you add that people are 
necessarily mistaken, that all people are exposed to situations in which they 
must act as fools, that every insight contains its own special kind of blindness, 
you complete the comic circle, returning again to the lesson of humility that 
underlies great tragedy.  (41)   
Hence, the comic frame deals with the complexities of life and avoids 
oversimplification that turns humans into caricatures that preclude identification.   
The comic as an attitudinal frame values humans qua humans and avoids the 
construction of enemies out of those who differ from neself.  Instead of enemies, one 
has worthy opponents.  It is tolerant of other persctives and recognizes the variation 
of values that exist within a culture.  While “comedy seeks belief” it does not do so 
“at the price of banishing doubt and question” (Duncan 406).  One can disagree with 
others, but this disagreement recognizes the rights of others to disagree with him as 
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well.  In short, it stresses “man in society” (Burke ATH 170), and aids in providing 
“important cures for the composition of one’s life, which demands accommodation to 
the structure of other’s lives” (174).  “Social orde s develop problems no matter how 
good the intentions that idealize them” but from a comic perspective “these problems 
do not make social orders so evil in themselves that they must be completely tossed 
aside” (Carlson "Ghandi" 446).  Instead, the indiviual works within the system to 
alter it while recognizing that others have a right to do the same.          
As an epistemological/heuristic device, comedy entreats the critic to take a 
panoramic view of that which is being analyzed.  The goal of comedy from this 
perspective is to avoid creating pigeon holes that elide a complete understanding of 
people and events.  Most importantly it must be noted that Burke believes that ll 
people should be critics in their daily lives.  “The comic frame, as a method of study 
is a better personal possession…than the somewhat empty accumulation of facts” 
(ATH 170)47 because it is what helps foster a “mature social efficacy” (171) that 
makes for a more humane social order.  Ultimately, “the comic frame should enable 
people to be observers of themselves, while acting.  Its ultimate would not be 
passiveness, but maximum consciousness.  One would ‘transcend’ himself by noting 
his own foibles” (171),48 which allows him to be more forgiving of others.  Finally, 
its openness allows for the recognition that values do and must change as social 
exigencies mandate.  Instead of creating a calcified system of values, it aids in the 
modification of values when the current system is no longer productive for the order.  
                                                     
47 Italics in original. 
48 Italics in original. 
   
  85 
Hence, “it might mitigate somewhat the difficulties in engineering a shift to new 
symbols of authority, as required by the new social rel tionships that the revolutions 
of historic environment have made necessary” (173).         
As a rhetorical device, one who employs the comic pers ective will attempt to 
utilize strategies that help create positive identifications that allow for transcendence.  
The goal of the rhetor is to build bridges between factions that highlight similarities 
while also respecting individual differences.  Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “I Have a 
Dream” speech is a good example of the rhetoric being framed within a comic 
attitude.  His rhetoric attempts to bridge differenc s and to create an understanding of 
the United States that allows all citizens an equal place within it.   
The tragic, while still sympathetic to others, is a frame that is narrower than 
that of the comic.  “Tragedy deals in crime—and anyincipient trend will first be felt 
as crime, by reason of its conflict with established values.  But tragedy deals 
sympathetically with crime…we are made to feel thathis offence is our offence” 
(Burke ATH 39 note).  From the attitudinal perspective, those who operate within a 
tragic frame are necessarily suspect when new ideasand things emerge within the 
social order, and they may view those who generate or participate in the new ideals as 
being bad for society.  This can be seen in generational shifts wherein members of the 
older generation view the younger members of society as bringing calamity to the 
order, and they frequently work to prevent the new ideas from taking hold.  As a 
general rule, the view is not that the youth are bad; instead the new elements they 
bring to society are bad.  Those who operate within t e tragic frame tend to be 
   
  86 
resistant to change and only come to it grudgingly.  The acceptance that arises from 
the tragic may be slow to come to fruition, but the acceptance ultimately comes as 
“the tragic catharsis temporarily or even partly solves (or resolves) an intolerable 
conflict and thus enables one to ‘resign’ himself to himself and life by enabling him 
once again to ‘accept’ both” (Rueckert Drama 54).49   
From a heuristic perspective, the tragic lens suggests that the critic should 
place an emphasis upon those cultural factors that are viewed with suspicion.  The 
newly emergent aspects of the social order are the areas in which social discord is 
likely to emerge when members of society are resistant to change in or new 
understandings of the order.  As such, the points of contention allow the critic to 
highlight those areas in which value change is occurring or has the possibility to 
occur.  In any situation the fit between the indiviual(s) and the norms of society is 
going to be imperfect, and “tragic ambiguity” wherein “a growing trend is at once 
recommended and punished” will arise (Burke ATH 29).  The mixed messages 
present in tragic ambiguity are fodder for a social ritic who is attempting to 
understand rifts in the social order and how they might alter its underlying values and 
purpose.  From this perspective, “the critical analysis of ‘tragic’ motives is in essence 
                                                     
49 It should be noted that one of the reasons some scholars have looked upon the tragic frame as one of 
rejection is because of the potential for harm thatarises from tragedy.  While a tragic view accepts the 
social order, one may engage in behaviors to protect it that ultimately end in harm to it.  The Vietnam 
War is an example of this process.  Many who supported and implemented the war believed that it was 
necessary to maintain the United States as a democratic nation; however, the war ultimately 
contributed to deep fissures in the American society and the death of tens of thousands of people.  It is 
because of this potential outcome of a tragic frame that some misapply it as a frame of rejection.  The
key point is the attitude held by individuals.  The goal is not to destroy the order; the goal is to preserve 
it, but one’s terministic screens and their entelechial push can inadvertently lead to its destruction.     
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‘comic’” (348-9) because it provides the critic with greater clarity of what the 
motives are. 
Rhetors will frequently find that tragic ambiguity s serviceable as a source of 
invention.  As the fissures emerge within the value system, rhetors can capitalize 
upon them in an effort to evoke changes in the order.  In this way, “‘tragic ambiguity’ 
may also be ‘prophetic’” (Burke ATH 190).  It provides an opening into the value 
system wherein a rhetor can symbolically construct a new image of what the values 
ought to be.  In this way it “may also serve as the strategic way of recommending a 
trend which will later attain its ‘bureaucratic embodiment’” (190).  Hence, an 
alteration in the order can be rhetorically coached using the weaknesses present 
within the order itself. 
The final acceptance frame is that of the epic.  Burke does not spend 
significant time discussing this genre because the worldview is one that arises “under 
primitive conditions” (ATH 35).  Specifically, it is based in a warrior culture that 
“‘accepts’ the rigors of war by magnifying the role of the warlike hero” (35).  It is a 
worldview that helped members of a warrior society accept the realities of their 
existence by promoting “the attitude of resignation” (37).  “The social value of such a 
pattern resides in its ability to make humility and self-glorification work together” 
(36).  The attitude found within this frame is one that allows the individual to come to 
terms with his “personal limits” (ATH 37) by realizing that “even god-like men have 
their personal and human limitations” (Rueckert Drama53). 
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While Burke does not see this attitude present in sig ificant amounts in 
contemporary culture, it can still serve as a heuristic device to understand elements of 
one’s culture.  Burke contends that the epic fails to erve its proper role when it 
becomes purely secular because it allows the “non-hero to make his identification 
with the hero complete,” which precludes humility and “approaches the risks of 
coxcombry” (ATH 36 note).  Hence, it provides a means to understand rhetorical 
choices wherein the rhetor strongly identifies with “glories” of war fighting in spite of 
the fact that he never engaged in combat himself.  Since the United States invaded in 
2003, many pundits and politicians have exhibited this sort of mentality as they 
attempted to justify the war and the ongoing occupation of sovereign nation.50  In 
their discourse surrounding the Iraqi conflict, many men who evaded the draft during 
the Vietnam War through educational deferments and enrollment in the National 
Guard rhetorically identified themselves with the troops who were actually in combat.  
Even though they never faced the risks of war fighting hemselves, they rhetorically 
identified themselves with the troops in such a wayas to bolster their own 
reputations.  This suggests a value system that prioritizes image over reality and the 
willingness to use others as a means to a personal ends regardless of the consequences 
for the other.  It turns an acceptance frame into oe f rejection as it allows people to 
only accept others based on the sacrifices that they are willing to make for them.    
                                                     
50 Consider President George W. Bush’s landing of an airplane on the deck of a naval warship to 
celebrate the “Mission Accomplished” in Iraq after he fall of Saddam Hussein.  While he never 
participated in battle, he was rhetorically identifying himself with the military personnel who had 
actually engaged in combat, taking their glory for his own.    
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The above example also illustrates the way in which the epic can be used as a 
rhetorical strategy.  Through the process of identifica ion one attempts to link himself 
with the glory and sacrifices of others.  Politicians frequently find it expedient to rely 
on this sort of rhetorical strategy.  Consider the us of images of firefighters 
following 9-11 by Rudolph Giuliani in his effort to gain the Republican nomination 
for president in 2008.  Michael Dukakis attempted to increase his image as 
commander in chief material by posing in an army tank.  It is important to note that as 
a rhetorical strategy, this sort of suasion by identification is only workable if the 
audience members accept the connection.   
Frames of Rejection 
 Contrary to frames of acceptance, rejection frames ar  attitudinal systems 
wherein disassociation from the symbols of authority of the system occurs.  When 
this happens, many who attempt to “reject a given symbol of authority, eventually get 
shunted into all sorts of ‘anti-social’ attitudes” (Burke ATH 99-100).  Consequently, 
they reject all or part of the values of the social order; in some instances, they 
withdraw from the order, and in others they attempt to convince people that the order 
is bad and should be changed in a particular way.  This is not to imply that rejection 
frames never have a use—they do (107); in some circumstances, one of the rejection 
frames may best pinpoint the flaw within the system.  The problem, however, arises 
because rejection frames are necessarily partial in their orientation and “the methods 
of caricature do not equip us to understand the full complexities of sociality—hence 
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they warp our programs of action” (93).  Burke outlines three such frames that fall 
prey to this problem:  the plaint (elegy), satire, and burlesque.   
To begin, the plaint is a frame in which people become obsessed with the 
negative elements of life.  “Once a man has perfected the technique of complaint, he 
is more at home with sorrow than he would be withou it” (Burke ATH 44).  In other 
words, those operating within this attitudinal struc ure are incapable of accepting 
good things, which leads to choices that enable bad things to happen, and the cycle of 
negativity continues unabated.  The 1970s variety show Hee Haw had a recurring skit 
that neatly illustrates the worldview of the plaint.  A group of dejected men would 
sing the following song.  “Gloom, despair and agony  me; deep dark depression 
excessive misery; if it weren’t for bad luck, I’d have no luck at all; gloom, despair 
and agony on me.”  It is a worldview in which everything is always valuated in a 
negative light.  When bad things happen, it justifies the existence of the frame, and 
when good things happen, the only purpose is to make the inevitable fall that much 
more painful. 
One who ascribes to the worldview of the plaint will likely seek out the 
negative aspects of everything.  Critics can utilize this frame to analyze social actions 
to determine the ways in which social problems are a sult of overreacting to 
exigencies and failing to note the positive elements of circumstances.  The 
assumption within the plaint being that bad must exist in everything and everyone.  
As such, one is likely to gain knowledge in which the deleterious elements are given 
preeminence over the positive in every circumstance.  For example, a parent who 
   
  91 
operates within this frame is likely to see the potential bad things that could happen to 
children in everything and work to forestall them from occurring.  A child might 
break a bone while riding her bike, so bike riding would not be allowed.  A child 
might be abducted if allowed to walk to school by herself; therefore, the child is 
delivered to school.  The consequences of the elegy as a means of understanding the 
world is likely to result in overreactions to situaions that might well lead to worse 
consequences, which then further justifies the assumptions of the frame in the mind of 
the person operating from within it.  As such, the plaint creates a self-fulfilling cycle 
of negativity.   
As a means of invention it is important to understand the implications that the 
elegy has for rhetorical appeals.   
The elegiac, the “wailing wall,” may serve well for individual trickeries in 
one’s relation to the obligations of struggle—but if i becomes organized as a 
collective movement, you may feel sure that a class of people will arise to 
“move in on” it, exploiting it to a point where more and more good reasons for 
complaint are provided, until the physical limits of the attitude are reached.  
(Burke ATH 44) 
What this suggests is that as a rhetorical strategy i  is disempowering to the listener 
and provides a means for the unscrupulous to use the at itude as cover for their 
behaviors.  Consider the common refrain that all politicians are crooks and/or on the 
take.  If all politicians are dirty, there is not a substantial reason to prefer one over the 
other on their own merits, and it provides cover for p liticians when they get busted 
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for being corrupt because that is just the way politics are.  One cannot expect them 
not to play the game.  The rhetorical strategy of painting all politicians in the same 
light allows those who wish to break the rules to do so with virtual impunity when the 
listeners accept the rationale of the plaint.  When a rhetorician utilizes the plaint as 
part of strategic discourse, it is important to consider that which she is attempting to 
normalize and justify by the excessive focus on the negative. 
 Like the plaint, satire is a frame that miscalibrates the gauge by which people 
evaluate the world.  However, understanding satire s a rejection frame is 
complicated because as Burke himself notes “satire is as confusing as the plaint” 
(Burke ATH 49).  This confusion is furthered by Burke’s subtle shifting of his 
position on the role that satire plays in discourse and his reliance on satire in his later 
life to challenge technology, which he deemed to be the major problem of the day.  I 
believe that the schema of attitudinal, heuristic, and rhetorical that I have established 
to interrogate the frames helps to clarify the differ ng ways that satire can and does 
function.  As previously noted, Burke recognizes that any of the frames can be fruitful 
in limited circumstances, and this is one area where  clearly illustrates the 
exception when satire can function in a positive way.   
 As an attitudinal frame of valuation, satire allows individuals to scapegoat 
others for their own flaws.  Burke characterizes it as attacking “in others the 
weaknesses and temptations that are really within himself” (ATH 49).  While Burke 
notes that some instances of scapegoating can have a positive, cathartic effect on the 
social order, he draws a distinction between the creation of a universal scapegoat and 
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a factional scapegoat.  The universal scapegoat, such as Christ’s sacrifice, both 
condemns all people and allows for all people’s absolution.  Because it “accuses all 
men …and absolves them in the lump…There is no unfinished business…The 
experience is complete and final.  Hence it calls for ‘contemplation’” (189 note).  The 
factional scapegoat, on the other hand, “is closer to the strategy of satire” (188 note).  
The projection of one’s foibles onto others allows individuals to dissociate their bad 
behaviors from themselves, which necessarily alters the valuation of self and of the 
other.  As such, the satirical worldview creates a value system in which people are 
able to absolve themselves of guilt by transferring it upon others.  
 The satirical is likely to shape the understanding of events in ways that make 
the building of community difficult.  Because the holder of this view needs to find 
external scapegoats to absolve himself of his sins,he is likely to understand the 
external world as one filled with deviancy and sin.  The drive to find the perfect 
scapegoat is likely to infiltrate all of his actions.  “Since one’s offence has been 
transferred to the shoulders of the other faction, the ‘cleansing’ leaves one with a 
‘program of action’ beyond the ritual.  That is in some way he must act to weaken the 
other faction, the vessel charged with his own temptation” (Burke ATH 189 note).  
This suggests that the satirical worldview is one in which enemy construction is a 
central element that will influence all choices and ju gments made about the external 
world.  The problem with this is that it prevents one from meeting the world’s 
challenges directly with an honest assessment of the role that one plays in said 
problems.  Hence, the search for the eternal scapego t precludes one from actually 
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dealing with the deleterious parts of one’s behaviors and provides cover for the 
violation of one’s own value system.  The critic can utilize this frame to analyze and 
better understand circumstances in which the laying of blame in the social order is a 
rhetorical covering for one’s own weaknesses.     
 Satire as a rhetorical strategy, however, is somewhat different.  While dangers 
exist within this frame, it is in this area that Burke altered his assessment of the utility 
of satire.  I will first discuss the problems associated with satire as a rhetorical ploy 
and then outline the circumstances under which he beli ves that it is necessary.  At its 
base level, satire is a strategy that is beset with problems of understandability when 
people take the piece at its face value and do not rec gnize the satirical purpose of it 
(Burke OHN 54).  This has two potential ramifications.  The first is that some might 
believe that the rhetor is advocating the “outrageous” ideas present within the piece, 
and as a result, adjudge the rhetor as morally insuff cient.  Not only does this 
judgment render the satire as ineffective as a rheto ical device, it also weakens the 
ability of the rhetor to reach her audience using different tactics because of her 
seeming moral deficiency.  On the other hand, some may read the satire in a similar 
manner but reach a different judgment of it and see it as support of the idea that is 
being implicitly criticized by the rhetor but which a particular faction actually 
believes.  As such, the satirical piece can functio as a rallying point for the faction’s 
followers as it is co-opted to support conclusions with which the rhetor would never 
agree.   
   
  95 
 Nevertheless, Burke in his later life determined that these are sometimes risks 
that need to be taken because satire might “enable us to contemplate a situation to 
which we might otherwise close our minds, by self-dception, or by dissipation” 
(OHN 80).  Because some problems implicate all of us, people can be resistant to 
recognizing the problem and the ways in which they contribute to it (73).  As such, an 
“outright ‘indictment,’ which often encourages inattention or dissipation with regard 
to such an unpleasant subject” is unlikely to be eff ctive (86).  The purpose of satire 
from this perspective is to provide a means to break through people’s terministic 
screens and cause recognition of the problem as well as their complicity in its 
perpetuation.51   
 Like all other forms of communication, for it to be an effective means of 
social change, people have to be exposed to it.  As such, satire will always be limited 
in its scope by the ability to reach a large enough audience to matter.  While this 
problem is not unique to the question of satire, rhtors who rely on it need to be 
cognizant of this particular limitation.  Because it is not presented as “serious,” they 
may have greater difficulty reaching people.  However, this problem can be alleviated 
to a certain extent by the way the satire is packaged for consumption.  For example, 
the animated series South Park frequently relies upon satire as a means of social 
                                                     
51 For a contemporary example of someone who uses satire in his way see Derrick Bell is a Critical 
Race Theorist, and this satirical piece is found in his book Faces at the Bottom of the Well, Basic 
Books:  New York, 1993.  This essay attempts to illustrate the ways in which monied interests in 
society use racial divides to prevent all people from lower socio-economic strata from joining together 
in an effort to create a more equitable and just society.  He uses satire to soften the edges of his 
argument that all people are implicated in racial problems in our nation and to expose the ways in 
which people are manipulated by the issue of race. While I believe Bell’s essay to be a brilliant use of 
satire, the fact that many readers of this book mayhave never heard of it, illustrates an additional 
problem with the use of satire as a rhetorical device.   
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criticism.  The show debuted in 1997, and new episode  are still being created.  Part 
of the reason the show is as successful as it has been is that its commentary is woven 
together with a variety of humorous devices that are appealing to people independent 
of the satirical elements.  While it offers significant social criticism through a satirical 
lens, the show is presented in an animated format that makes it less threatening to 
viewers.  It also surrounds its criticisms with simple humor that one would expect to 
hear from seventh graders, i.e. toilet humor.  Hence, it has been packaged in such a 
way as to entice viewers who may not be interested in their criticisms to watch the 
show anyway.  This example illustrates the way in which satire can be enhanced by 
being combined with other rhetorical forms.   
 Like the plaint and satire, burlesque also limits one’s understanding of the 
world by creating a terministic screen that prevents one from having a holistic 
perspective.  The burlesque focuses only on the “externals of behavior, driving them 
to a ‘logical conclusion’ that becomes their ‘reduction to absurdity’” (Burke ATH 
54), and “deliberately suppresses any consideration of the ‘mitigating circumstances’ 
that would put his subject in a better light” (55).  The burlesque functions by creating 
caricatures and treating them as if they are complete representations of people and 
events.  As an attitudinal frame, the burlesque precludes an accurate valuation 
because of its narrow focus on people’s foibles and disallowance of any effort to 
understand the reasons behind people’s behaviors.  Thi  focus on externality elides 
the motivations and value assessments of the one bei g judged; by deflecting the 
reasons behind other people’s behaviors, the burlesque necessarily establishes the 
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other as morally deficient and the self as morally superior.  It allows one all of the 
rights associated with the values of the social order without having the obligation to 
let others have the same rights.  As such it is “partisan” and incomplete (55).   
 The burlesque relies upon strawperson arguments—a misallocated 
synecdoche.  It establishes people’s quirks and foibles as the entirety of the person, 
“suppresses any acceptable reasoning behind actions” (Bo tdorff 46), and 
subsequently determines that this proves the person a  a whole is flawed.  While the 
burlesque can be useful at points to highlight the flaws of a person or a system, it can 
only be edifying if one makes an effort to understand that which is illuminated is 
casting shadows upon other relevant details.   
It does not contain a well-rounded frame within itself; we can use it for the 
ends of wisdom only insofar as we ourselves provide the ways of making 
allowances for it; we must not be merely equal to it, we must be enough 
greater than it to be able to “discount” what it says.  (Burke ATH 55)  
Consequently, the burlesque should only be used with great caution because it has the 
potential to misjudge the situation in ways that prevent any sort of true understanding 
of events.  “The methods of caricature do not equip us to understand the full 
complexities of sociality—hence they warp our programs of action…making cynical 
self-interest the most logical of policies” (103).  Hence, one who understands the 
world using the burlesque is also likely to utilize t as a rhetorical strategy as a means 
of creating factions that are exploitable (92).  A critic can use this lens to uncover 
those rhetorical strategies that create factions and preclude transcendence.       
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 As a rhetorical strategy, the burlesque relies upon debunking to sway 
audiences (Burke ATH 93), which “makes co-operation difficult, since it sees 
utilitarian motives everywhere.  The ‘debunking’ frame of interpretation becomes a 
colossal enterprise in ‘transcendence downwards that is good for polemical 
disintegrative purposes” (92-3).  The goal of a rhetor relying upon the burlesque is to 
use division in order to prevent groups that may otherwise have been allies from 
joining forces to reach common goals.  An example of the use of the burlesque in 
contemporary political discourse is that of political pundit Ann Coulter who relies on 
caricatures of liberals and Democrats to strengthen  base of the Republican Party.  
Consider her statements regarding four 9-11 widows who had been highly critical of 
the Bush administration’s handling of terrorist threats.  She accused them of enjoying 
the deaths of their husbands and labeled them the “Witches of East Brunswick” in 
order to delegitimize their political power.52  In essence, she created a polemic 
caricature of the women, and then used the caricatue to elide the arguments that they 
were making.  It was an ad hominem attack that was con tructed to change the focus 
from the criticisms that they were making by undercutting their personal ethos.  
Burke notes that the purpose of the caricature is to advance one’s cynical self-interest 
(93), and Coulter was not an exception to the rule as she was using the attacks to sell 
her book Godless: The Church of Liberalism.53           
                                                     
52 For further details about her attacks see “Ann coulter Attacks 9/11 Widows,” CBS News May 11, 
2008 5-11-08 <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/06/07/entertainment/main1690954.shtml> 
53 Many blogs across the political spectrum have a tendency to fall into this same sort of rhetorical 
pattern as those who have differing political beliefs are frequently dismissed and made fun of for the 
beliefs that they hold.  For example, many liberal blogs use the phrase wing-nut to refer to 
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 While the dominance of acceptance frames helps maintain a cohesive social 
order, when rejection frames become widespread the symbols of authority of the 
order are necessarily weakened, and the society can become factionalized as “they 
arrive at a sect-within-a sect-within-a-sect” (Burke ATH 101).  When this occurs, the 
social order can be viewed as being in a transitional frame, wherein the symbols of 
authority are in flux and open to change.  During this ime period competing factions 
will engage in competition over the authoritative symbols and what they mean.  
Burke uses two literary categories to interrogate this process:  the grotesque and the 
didactic, which I will discuss in the following chapter. 
                                                                                                                                                      
conservatives, and the term wing-nut welfare is used to denigrate the work of conservatives who work 
in conservative think tanks and lobbying firms.   
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Chapter 6:  Transition Frames 
When frames of rejection gain critical mass, they will necessarily undercut the 
existing symbols of authority and their underlying values.  However, frames are 
recalcitrant and the values present in the frames of rejection will not neatly replace 
the extant values and their authoritative symbols because “the ways in which such 
symbolic patterns behave when released into a socio-economic texture may take 
surprising twists” (Burke ATH 88 note).  An interregnum will exist in which value 
systems fluctuate and competing factions will fight over what the values ought to be 
and what symbols of authority will represent said values.  These are the eras 
represented by the transitional frames of the grotesqu  and the didactic.   
The literary genre of the grotesque represents a situ tion in which the auditor 
is both repelled by and attracted to a person, idea or object.  As a transitional frame, 
the grotesque54 emerges in eras “marked by great confusion of the cultural frame, 
requiring a radical shift in people’s allegiance to symbols of authority” (Burke ATH 
58).  They are simultaneously drawn to the symbols of authority and have a desire to 
reject them.  The grotesque is not the cause of the cultural confusion, but it arises as a 
result of the fluctuating values of the social order.  Because the value system is 
unstable, it is an attitudinal frame that “gives more prominence to the subjective 
elements of imagery than to the objective, or public elements” (60).  In a sense, the 
social order lacks a clear master-purpose that guides and structures the thoughts and 
                                                     
54 For a good explanation of the grotesque as it relaes to literary criticism see Edward Watson, 
"Incongruity with Laughter:  Kenneth Burke's Theory f the Grotesque," University of Windsor 
Review  (1969).  Watson uses Burke’s notion of the grotesqu  and it provides a good background view 
of the genre.   
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behaviors of the individual (P&C 253 note 1).  As a result the individual is left to his 
own devices to shape his responses to the broader social order.  These individual 
choices will tend to manifest themselves in ways that are best understood by 
examining the relationship between the grotesque and the mystical.  Burke correlates 
the grotesque frame with mysticism (ATH 57; P&C 112), which is also equated with 
purpose (GOM 128).   
In eras where mystical thought gains dominance, the social order is unable to 
provide people with a satisfactory explanation thatprovides one with purpose or 
meaning to life.   
…mystical philosophies appear as a general social manifestation in times of 
great skepticism or confusion about the nature of human purpose.  They are a 
mark of transition, flourishing when one set of public presuppositions about 
the ends of life has become weakened or disorganized, and no new public 
structure, of sufficient depth and scope to be satisfying, has yet taken its place.  
(Burke GOM 288)     
As a result, people look beyond the public structure in order to find meaning and 
purpose for their lives.  One common way in which this act is manifested is by the 
reliance upon ideology as a guiding principle (ROM 110).  Humans are “moved by a 
sense of order” (LAS 15), and when the superstructure of the order is fragmented and 
fails to provide a sufficient meaning and organization o one’s life, the pull of 
ideology is strengthened because it creates a master frame through which the world 
can be understood and organized.  Even when the ideology is largely inconsistent 
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with the apparent facticity of the world, it gains i  power because it creates a system 
of valuation that provides structure and meaning to one’s life.  It is a master system 
that explains how things should be, and it creates a “unity of the individual with some 
cosmic or universal purpose” (GOM 288).   
 Ideology, however, is frequently inconsistent with the actual functioning of 
events in the world, which requires individuals to lose focus on the external world in 
order to maintain belief in the suppositions of the id ology.  “It confronts the here-
and-now with a concept of a beyond” (Burke ATH 73), and it “makes for passivity” 
within the frame (75).  As such, the grotesque is marked by the passive acceptance of 
ideological precepts, which provides the individual with the perception of a firm 
grounding that the social order itself is unable to pr vide.  The incongruities between 
the ideological precepts and the actual are further masked by a focus on the trivial 
(61).  “A vast entertainment industry has been erect d for those who prefer the last 
solution, asking that ‘distraction’ be converted from ill-omened to good-omened 
connotations” (61-2).  Others resolve the issue by a focus on the material (62).  
Consider President George W. Bush’s admonition after the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001 that people should go shopping.  The goal was to take focus off 
of the failure of the administration to prevent theattacks and to allow them to pursue 
policies such as invading Iraq without garnering public opposition.  This facilitated 
flimsy justifications for the war by encouraging a focus on the material elements of 
one’s life.  This push to the trivial allows people to acquiesce to that which would 
otherwise be met with consternation.  Hence, the indiv dual focus on the trivial allows 
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for the passive acceptance of the teleological push of t e ideology by preventing 
facticity from interfering with the ideological narr tive.   
 As a heuristic device, the grotesque frame aids the critic in understanding the 
ways in which value change is occurring in a social order.  By looking for markers of 
ideology, its passive acceptance, and an increased focus on the trivial, one can gauge 
the relative stability of an order’s system of values.  It suggests that one should follow 
Burke’s admonishment previously discussed that looking at the seemingly trivial 
elements of a culture is necessary to gain a full insight into the values of the order.  
This idea will be discussed in greater detail when examining the concept of symbols 
of authority, but for now it is sufficient to keep in mind that cultural values are 
expressed in a variety of venues and that at points, the seemingly trivial elements 
provide the greatest insight into how revaluation is occurring. 
 As a rhetorical strategy, a rhetor is likely to capit lize upon two particular 
elements.  First, she will probably engage in the us  of rhetorical smoke-and-mirrors 
in an effort to strengthen the belief in the underpinnings of the ideology and to ensure 
that a focus on the trivial sufficiently distracts the audience from noticing internal 
inconsistencies or truly evaluating the consequences of the policies the ideology 
endorses.  It is in the realm of rhetorical strategy that the grotesque and the didactic 
become somewhat indistinguishable.  As will be explained below, the didactic is an 
active frame that coaches “the imagination in obedience to critical postulates” (Burke 
ATH 75).  As such, the rhetor who capitalizes on an audience’s passive acceptance of 
ideology is operating within both the grotesque andthe didactic in that she is 
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capitalizing upon the audience’s grotesque framing by actively coaching the attitudes 
present in their ideological precepts.  Hence, she i  manipulating the audience’s 
grotesque framing by using a didactic rhetorical strategy.  To better illuminate this 
overlap, I will now move to a discussion of the didactic proper.   
 The didactic, according to Burke, is synonymous with propaganda (ATH 75); 
however, it is important to note that despite common perceptions of propaganda as 
being a negative force, Burke does not weight it inthat manner.  Instead he sees it as 
a principle form of hortatorical discourse.  “It must have a definitive hortatory 
function, an educational element of suasion or inducement; it must be partially 
forensic.  Such a quality we consider to be the essntial work of propaganda” (PLF 
277).  As such, it is an active rhetorical form utilized to coach into existence a 
particular system of values, which can be used in both a positive and negative 
fashion.  It is without question that propaganda has istorically been used to promote 
terrible value systems.  Burke’s analysis of Hitler’s rhetoric is but one example of 
this; however, the first definition in Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 
defines propaganda as “information, ideas or rumors deliberatively spread widely to 
help or harm a person, group, movement, institution, nation, etc.” (1549).  This is the 
way in which Burke uses the term with a recognition hat propaganda can be used 
ethically or unethically and can serve either good r bad ends.  While I understand the 
deep distrust of the notion of propaganda because of ome of the ways it has been 
historically used, for the purposes of this analysis, I will discuss it in the way Burke 
intended it to be understood.   
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 As such, the grotesque and the didactic are closely related, and in some 
instances almost indistinguishable.  Burke discusses this conundrum in detail in A 
Grammar of Motives, and his discussion indicates that the key difference between the 
two is the attitude held by the user of the rhetorical forms.  He connects the grotesque 
to the mystical, and the didactic to propaganda, which e correlates to the agency 
element of the pentad, which is aligned with a pragm tic understanding of the world 
288-290).   
…even one adopts a rudimentary pragmatist view of art, as in advertising or 
propaganda, he has but moved the Agency-Purpose ambiguity a step farther 
along:  for we then have to decide whether the financial or political structure 
which such applied art serves is to be classed as Agency or Purpose.  Thus 
with the Hitlerite cult of the State:  was it crass pragmatism (in using the 
philosophy of the State purely as a rhetoric for inducing people to acquiesce in 
the designs of an elite) or crude mysticism (in genuinely looking upon the 
power and domination of the State as the ultimate end of social life)?  (290)  
Hence, if the rhetor believes in the underlying ideology of the propaganda, he is 
operating within the grotesque; however, if the rhetor is merely using ideological 
precepts in order to influence the public’s valuation of events and people, he is 
leaning more toward the didactic:  It functions as a difference in attitude.     
 As an attitudinal frame, the didactic is active in that people who work within 
this frame have a strong sense of values and believe that it is their responsibility to 
convince others to accept the same value frame.  Th “incentives behind evangelism 
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and education or propaganda” are the same (Burke P&C 81).  The distinction between 
this and the mystical-grotesque is merely a matter of focus.  In the grotesque, the 
emphasis is on the ends of the ideal, whereas in the didactic, the focus is on the means 
of attaining the ends.  This distinction is important.  An integral part of the didactic is 
the use of secular prayer in order to achieve one’s d sired goals.  The attitude is 
actively coached both within oneself and externally toward the other.  “‘[S]ecular 
prayer’ involves ‘character building’ in that one shapes his attitudes, the logic of his 
life, by the co-ordinates he chooses, and one shape his actions with reference to the 
judgments that follow from the co-ordinates” (ATH 326).  Hence, the didactic attitude 
is necessarily the active counterpart to the more passive grotesque.  One does not just 
accept one’s condition; instead, one actively works to change the self and if necessary 
the social world in which he lives.   
 More than many of the other frames, Burke has a strong focus on the means of 
propaganda and the necessity of the critic to understand the ways in which 
propaganda works both as a pathological device but also as a social corrective.  In this 
section, I will discuss the both the heuristic application of the didactic as well as its 
related rhetorical strategies.  Because Burke largely discusses these two realms 
simultaneously, it is easier to analyze them at the same time.  In his analysis of Mein 
Kampf, he details a number of the propagandist techniques us d by Hitler to achieve 
his final solution.  He notes that the “ideal act of propaganda consists in imaginatively 
identifying your cause with values that are unquestioned” (PLF 73 note 6).  In this 
way, the didactic uses word magic to connect the value one wishes to insert into the 
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extant value system, and the process of identification makes it difficult to separate 
them once they have been connected because any attack on the newly inserted value 
is perceived as an attack on the existing, closely h d values.  While this strategy is 
not guaranteed to work, when it is successful, it is difficult to alter after the fact 
because the values may not be easily delinked.       
 A second way in which propaganda functions is through “the power of endless 
repetition” (Burke PLF 186).  An example of this in contemporary America rel tes to 
the public’s understanding of the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda in the lead 
up to and immediate aftermath of the United States’ invasion of the country.  A 
survey conducted by the University of Maryland and the Program on International 
Policy Attitudes found that in January 2003, prior to the invasion of Iraq, the majority 
of those polled believed that Saddam Hussein had been directly involved in the 
attacks of 9/11 (Kull 1).  With more refined questioning, the poll conducted in 
February 2003 found that only one in five believed that he was directly involved in 
the attacks, but the majority believed that he had a significant relationship with al 
Qaeda (1).  More importantly, after the fall of Baghdad, about half of the respondents 
believed that evidence had been found in Iraq proving a close relationship between 
Hussein and al Qaeda (3).  While none of these belifs are factual, the Bush 
administration and their proxies repeatedly made the connection by either direct 
statements or more subtle allusions that indirectly tied the two entities together.  The 
result was that large numbers of people believed to be true connections that had been 
proven to be false.  Hence, repetition provides a me ns to alter how people 
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understand the extant in ways that are contrary to the best available evidence.  As 
Burke notes, Hitler effectively utilized this strategy to reach the ends of the Third 
Reich.  However, the danger posed by this is magnified n the contemporary era 
where technology and the 24 hour news cycle has vastly increased the ability for 
ideas to be extensively repeated, magnifying their propagandistic power.  This 
supposition is supported by the same study, which found that people who received 
their news information from television were the most likely to have these erroneous 
perceptions of the relationship between Iraq and el Qaeda (Kull 18).  This increased 
rapidity in the transmission of information has further implications for non-traditional 
areas of value discourse such as popular culture, which will be examined in greater 
detail when I discuss symbols of authority.  Hence, th  ability of the propagandist is 
much greater in the present era than it was in the past, which increases the likelihood 
of more fluctuant value systems.         
  Closely aligned with repetition is the use of bombardment as a means of 
muddying discourse, which makes it more difficult to discern fact from fiction.  
When one does not have a good argument to support a sition, a multiplicity of 
flawed arguments can be used.  “If only there be enough of them kept running 
through the headlines, an valanche of arguments” can signal a “quantitative mode of 
propaganda” (Burke PLF 151).  This works symbolically by creating the impression 
of where there is smoke there must be fire.  Even when none of the arguments is 
good, it creates the perception that something is am s when a constant barrage of 
attacks is made against an idea or a person.  This effect is magnified by current 
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communication technologies.  The advent of blogs makes this tool of propaganda 
easier to utilize.  The common practice of blogs linking to each other allows a 
message that originated from a single source to reach masses of people, and when 
enough blogs have connected to the story, it is frequently found to be newsworthy by 
traditional news organizations, which furthers the reach of the message.  The 
symbolic power of this tactic cannot be understated.  Once a critical mass has been 
reached, the entelechial drive of the messages are able to affect how people 
understand and valuate the world.   
 The fourth aspect of propaganda that Burke outlines s the “materialization of 
a religious pattern” (Burke PLF 166), where the devil is “materialized, in the visible, 
point-to-able form of people with a certain kind of ‘blood’” (167).  While Burke 
wrote of this in the context of Hitler’s characterization of Jews, this same practice can 
be seen in much of the discourse that surrounds the war on terror that arose after the 
attacks on 9-11.  The war was framed as one of goodagainst evil; the enemies were 
characterized as evil-doers, and a vast array of terrorist organizations were succinctly 
lumped together under the heading of Islamo-fascist.  Because evil is all 
encompassing and all powerful, any means necessary to fight it becomes morally 
acceptable, and anyone who materially embodies the key characteristics of the evil-
doer will always be suspect.  From this emerges policies that are on face anathema to 
traditional American values; preemptive war, extraordinary rendition, torture, secret 
detention facilities, suspension of habeas corpus, spying on Americans, etc. are all the 
entelechial outcome of the framing of the war on terror and the nature of the enemies 
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it embodies.  While no actual connection existed betwe n Iraq and the 9-11 attackers, 
the materialization of the enemy in all Muslims ensured that the two would be 
valuated as one and the same in the extant because they had been identified with each 
other symbolically.    
 While all of the examples used to illustrate the pr vious points about 
propaganda are negative, this does not mean that propaganda cannot be used for 
positive ends.  Propaganda has taken on negative connotations because of the ways in 
which it has historically been used to reach ends that were fundamentally anti-human 
in nature.  However, the good use of the didactic is not usually recognized.  To 
illustrate my point, I will turn to an example from y home state of North Dakota.  
When the state legislature initially passed a law requiring the mandatory use of 
seatbelts, it was widely disliked, and the populace ov rturned it through a popular 
referendum.  The legislature again passed the same law, which was again overturned 
by the voting public.  However, the third time the law was passed, the public let it 
remain on the books.  During the several year period between the initial passing of the 
law and the final acceptance of it, the state engaged in a large public relations 
campaign outlining the necessity of the law.  Even though the safety data and the 
long-term implications for federal highway funds were all known at the time the laws 
were initially overturned, the constant repetition of the ideas via public service 
announcements seemingly altered the way in which the public valuated the laws, 
moving from an attitude of rejection to one of acceptance.   
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 While Burke largely focused on the negative aspects of propaganda, he did 
outline one area where he elucidated the positive or the corrective use of propaganda, 
which is in the area of the aesthetic.  The “relation between art and propaganda…is a 
vital one” because “aesthetical values are intermingled with ethical values—and the 
ethical is the basis of the practical” (PLF 201).  “Probably for this reason, even the 
most practical of revolutions will generally be found to have manifested first in the 
‘aesthetic’ sphere” (201).  What this indicates is that the aesthetic is the realm of the 
imagination, the realm in which people are able to first visualize a social order and/or 
value system that is not yet in existence, and oncea  alternative vision is released 
into the social texture, it has the possibility of changing people’s attitudes toward the 
extant order because when an “orthodox rhetorical weighting is poetically undone, 
then a tiny verbal revolution has taken place.  And a vigilant orthodoxy might choose 
to be outraged at this implied threat to the given social order” (SOM 42).  As such, 
the aesthetic has the possibility of serving a corrective function when the values of the 
social order have become imbalanced (PLF 276).   
 Burke analyzed the necessity of art as a social corre tive in the context of a 
capitalist system that he perceived as having created n imbalance in the social 
network.  While he saw the potential for art to counteract this, he also recognized that 
art can be used to maintain a flawed order.  It is important to keep in mind that the 
didactic is a form of rhetoric and as with all forms, it is amoral.  Hence, it can be used 
in ways that are beneficial for the social order and its constituent members as well as 
in ways that are deleterious for some or all of the order’s members.  If art “leads us to 
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a state of acquiescence at a time when the very basis or moral integration is in 
question, we get a paradox whereby the soundest adjunct to ethics, the aesthetic, 
threatens to uphold an unethical question” (Burke PLF 276).  The important 
distinction to be drawn is between art that that “crries the social patterns into their 
corresponding ‘imaginative’ pattern” which “tends to substantiate or corroborate 
these patterns” (276) because this art limits “itself to merely using the values which 
arise out of a given social texture” (277).  Hence, for the aesthetic to function as a 
corrective to the entelechial push of the current rgime it must emerge from outside 
the current value system.  Drawing upon currently accepted modes of understanding 
will most likely be co-opted by the existing system, which allows system to be 
reinforced and perpetuated.  
The role that art plays in social understanding of values will be further 
analyzed in the discussion of symbols of authority and their relationship with popular 
culture in chapter nine.  For now, it is important to note that current technology and 
the proliferation of messages transmitted via new mediums is likely to alter the ways 
in which valuations are formed and altered.  I will now move the discussion of 
valuation to symbols of authority, which are the iconic representations of the value 
system of the order.  When in a frame of acceptance, people pledge allegiance to the 
symbols of authority, and when in a frame of rejection, the symbols of authority are 
no longer acceptable to members of the order.  In frames of transition, the 
authoritative symbols are contested.  In chapters sven through nine, I explore the 
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notion of symbols of authority and the ways in which they change over time based 
upon the attitudes held by members of the order.   
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Chapter 7:  Symbols of Authority 
  At their core, the collective poems of socioeconomic orientation trace the 
value hierarchies of a culture.  Every society is ordered.  Hierarchies exist and value 
judgments are made regarding people, places, events, ideas, etc.; if these orderings 
are to be created and maintained, a sense of authority needs to be vested in the system 
itself, and symbolic representations of those bases of authority are established.  These 
“symbols of authority” represent, on a societal level, the aggregate of attitudes toward 
“rulers, courts, parliaments, laws, educators, constabulary, and the moral slogans 
linked with such” (Burke ATH 329).  The symbols reflect the value code of a social 
order and function to iterate and reinforce it.  The symbols of authority can be 
officially ordained and enacted such as the United States Constitution, or they can 
emerge from unofficial channels like popular culture.  While some symbols are 
maintained for an extended period of time and give the appearance of being static, the 
reality is that “counter” symbols constantly challeng  and compete with those that are 
dominant.  Hence, symbols of authority are best understood as fluid constructs that 
are altered by competition among symbols, which is pu hed by changes at the 
individual and social level.  While Burke is largely concerned with the symbols of 
authority of societies, it is important to note that all social groupings no matter how 
small contain them.  As such, each individual is likely to pledge allegiance to a 
variety of symbols of authority that may well come into conflict with each other.  
This pressure is, in part, what ensures that the value ridden symbols will not remain 
static.   
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 For Burke, society is an amalgamation of individual motivations that are 
frequently in conflict with each other (ATH 264) but are pulled together because of 
the interdependence of the human condition (234).  The process of identification 
occurs when people perceive that they have overlapping interests (ROM 20).  It is this 
act of identification that allows society to function because the individual is both 
transcended and preserved.  “In being identified with B, A is ‘substantially one’ with 
a person other than himself.  Yet at the same time he remains unique, an individual 
locus of motives” (21).  A healthy culture provides outlets for individuated interests 
while at the same time maintaining cohesion.  Rhetoric is a necessary element of this 
balancing act; both intentional and unintentional communicative behaviors can 
function to increase social cohesion via identification (20).  Hence, identification is a 
requirement of any social unit; without it, society would cease to exist.  However, it is 
a double-edged sword; its dialectical counterpart is division.  The line between the 
two is often blurry (25), and as identification increases, division necessarily follows 
as greater identification with one element leads to greater separation from that which 
is contrary to that which with one is identifying (34).  This idea will be explored in 
greater detail when I discuss alienation.  For now, I ant to highlight the relationship 
between social cohesion, identification, and symbols of authority.  It is identification 
that imbues symbols of authority with their power.  If people do not identify with 
particular symbols, they have little power over the individual.  Identification is a 
necessary element of persuasion (xiv), and people will not grant fealty to authoritative 
symbols without it.       
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The authority symbols of a given social order are represented linguistically in 
the conventional forms of its era (Burke CS138-40), and it is important to note that 
“the conventional forms demanded by one age are as solutely shunned by another” 
(139).  Hence, the interrelationship between the value expressed and the form that it is 
expressed in is a significant element of the power of authoritative symbols.  The form 
of the message may be as important as the message it elf because the form can be 
compelling irrespective of the message that it encapsulates.  Every social unit has 
preferred forms, and their use functions as a means of ingratiation that facilitates 
identification and hence, persuasion (P&C 50-1).  The form leads to acceptance of the 
idea because of the appeal of the form itself on an aesthetic level (ROM 59).  The 
previous analysis of the interaction between aesthetic and moral valuation takes on 
import when examining the ways in which symbols of authority function rhetorically.  
Consider the example of lynching.  When acts of lynchi g were at their highest, 
horrific acts of barbarity were seen by many Americans as an acceptable response to 
conflicts emerging from the renegotiation of race relations that arose after 
emancipation.  It was not uncommon for ministers to upport tacitly and in many 
instances explicitly the act of the lynch mob.55  The message of the righteousness of 
torturing and killing Blacks is inconsistent with te precepts of the teaching of Jesus.  
However, because the approbations were emitted from “men of God” in the form of 
sermons, members of the lynch mob could justify their b haviors as fulfilling God’s 
wishes.  In addition, the common assessment that lynching was a necessary remedy 
                                                     
55 For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between Southern churches and lynching see 
Walter White, Rope and Faggot (New York:  Arno Press 1969).   
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when the judicial system was unable to provide justice to the aggrieved allowed the 
lynch mobs to rhetorically borrow the symbols of authority from the rights embodied 
in the law.  The message had greater rhetorical force because of the form it took.  
Acts of barbarity that should have been viewed as beyond the purview of a civilized 
society became not only socially acceptable but also pproved.  Lynching moved 
beyond the somber act of hanging a person to festival  of bloodlust and torture 
wherein entire communities would celebrate the torture, killing and burning of 
numerous Black people.  The act of lynching was turned into an aesthetically pleasing 
recreational event.56  Because lynching was given moral authority, the act itself 
became aesthetically pleasing.   
 The interaction of form and content and the transfer o  valuations between the 
moral and the aesthetic realms take on increased import in contemporary society.  
Historically, symbols of authority were largely derived from social institutions that 
were unlikely to change rapidly such as religion, legal systems, government forms 
etc.  However, in contemporary society the potential sources of authority symbols 
have expanded exponentially as the emergence of information technology allows 
information and ideas to be transmitted globally within a matter of seconds.  The 
leveling of the world, which has occurred as a result of technology and a globalized 
economic system that guarantees cultures cannot exist in isolation, ensures that 
distinct value systems with their accompanying symbols of authority are forced to 
                                                     
56 For a more detailed discussion of the festival-like aspect of lynching see Phillip Dray, At the Hands 
of Persons Unknown (New York:  Random House 2002).   
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compete with each other in a way that was not previously possible.57  When the 
competing symbols interact with each other, they cannot help but be altered as new 
variables enter into the system.  The resultant change could be a relative 
strengthening of one set of symbols of authority vis-à-vis the other, or it could mean a 
merging of the two systems wherein both absorb elemnts of the other, or numerous 
other permutations.  Nevertheless, neither grouping will remain unaltered.   
 This phenomenon is magnified by a concurrent decentralization of power 
within the social order.  Historically allegiance to the church or to the state suggested 
that the most powerful symbols of authority emanated from formal institutions.  
However, in a contemporary, multicultural society these assumptions can no longer 
be held to be true.  The notion of a set of universal authority symbols within a social 
order is no longer a given.  I do not mean that historically there were never competing 
symbol systems.  What I do mean is that the competing symbols were distinct in a 
very narrow sense of the word.  Consider the case of the Protestant Reformation.  
Even though there were significant disagreements regarding specific Church 
doctrines and who had the ability to access the Bible and hence, God, the competing 
symbols of authority were still constrained by the history of Christianity and the 
words of the Bible.  While it is true that the ramifications of the Reformation were 
significant, at the time when the symbols of authori y shifted, the movement in 
church doctrine itself was somewhat minor.  People sti l looked to churches and to the 
Christian God as the source of authority.  While th reformation lead to social conflict 
                                                     
57 For an in depth discussion of this issue see Tyler Cowen, Creative Destruction:  How Globalization 
is Changing the World’s Cultures (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2002).   
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the number of factions at the time were limited.  However, in contemporary America, 
a consensus no longer exists about the sources of authority.  While religion is still a 
powerful source, the competing religions do not agree on the ultimate source of 
religious authority, i.e. there is a disagreement about the nature of God (if one exists), 
what documents express the will of God, and how those documents should be 
interpreted and understood.  This incongruity is magnified by the strength of other 
cultural factors, such as elements of popular culture hat do not explicitly proclaim a 
value system but embody value claims, which can provide sources for emergent 
symbols of authority.   
 It is my belief that the increased fluidity of symbols of authority in 
contemporary America has magnified two problems.  The first is that individual 
identity is increasingly fragmented as the competing symbols of authority push 
people into myriad directions, which makes it difficult to reconcile the fragmentation.  
This can facilitate a focus on ideological and virtual valuations that permit the 
individual to symbolically reconcile that which is irreconcilable in the extant world.  
While this may be an effective means to resolve cognitive dissonance, it has the 
potential to lead to problems when decisions are made based upon ideologies that are 
at significant odds with the extant.  Second, the social order is implicated because 
fewer enduring symbols of authority exist.  This makes it more difficult to identify 
strongly with society, which increases the risk of alienation.  In the next section, I will 
trace the path that has precipitated these conditios.        
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Sources and Systems of Symbols of Authority  
 
 Burke argues that historically there have been three key sources of authority 
that are based on distinct rationalizations:  magic, religion, and science (P&C 44).  
They “are alike in that they foster a body of thought concerning the nature of the 
universe and man’s relation to it” (CS 163).  Derivative from this, they provide—at a 
minimum they have been construed as providing—a macro-foundation for societal 
valuation in that they offer explanations of the human condition and its relationship to 
the broader physical and spiritual realms.  I believ  these three still retain power in 
contemporary society, and I will provide a summary of each, and explain how their 
interactions with each other have shaped value discour e in America.  I will also 
argue that “word magic,” Burke’s conception of the magic of language, plays an 
increasingly important role in the ways in which values are formed and disseminated 
in the contemporary era.  As the complexity of the social and physical environment 
has increased, our reliance on the power of language h s also increased.    
Magic 
 Initially, Burke believes that certain social forces developed, in part, as a 
means to organize and rationalize the social order because they provide macroscopic 
explanations of the extant world.  The first is magic, which attempts “the control of 
natural forces” for human benefit (P&C 59).  The central core of historic, nature-
based belief systems is that nature could be channeled to the benefit of humans using 
different magical incantations and rituals.  For example, natural forces such as rain 
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and drought were believed to be the result of favor or fury caused by human behavior, 
and if humans enacted the correct magic, they would be able to corral the forces of 
nature.  While the role of magic no longer plays a dominant role in most modern 
cultures, its presence is still visible in contemporary America.  People frequently have 
superstitions that play a role in how they conduct themselves in a personal and public 
way.  Many high rise buildings eschew the number thirteen; even though the 
buildings have an actual thirteenth floor, the use of the number is frequently avoided 
as the buttons in the elevator move from floor twelve to fourteen.  Athletes commonly 
have rituals they perform or superstitions they enact in the belief that their 
performances depend upon them.  Some players will not wash their socks in between 
games while on a winning streak, while baseball fans d players will frequently not 
mention the fact that a pitcher is pitching a no-hitter in order to avoid jinxing him.  
Entire mythologies have been constructed that explain why certain professional sports 
teams are unable to win their respective national ch mpionship.  The Boston Red Sox 
finally overcame the curse of Bambino in 2005 when they won the World Series, but 
the Chicago Cubs are still suffering under the curse of the billy goat.  Even in the 
world of competitive academic debate—a community that prides itself in research 
and rational argumentation—superstitions are engaged.  When I was a competitor, 
hotel room keys where previous debaters had stayed wh n they excelled at the 
national tournament were passed down to be carried for luck by the next generation of 
debaters.  Debaters from a rival school worked to keep the “debate gods” happy, so as 
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not to suffer their wrath, which was usually expressed in an early exit from the 
tournament for the offending team.     
 While the preceding examples are somewhat different f om the original 
expressions of magic found in pre-monotheistic belief structures, they still serve a 
similar function of providing a symbolic outlet for that which cannot be control.  
Luck is an inherent part of life; sometimes circumstances are fortuitous and 
sometimes they are not.  Just as many historical cultures attempted to control the luck 
of natural happenings, many modern day superstitions attempt to control those things 
that are necessarily out of one’s control.  Fans canot actually affect whether or not a 
pitcher can maintain a no-hitter by not saying it ou l ud, but the belief in the 
superstition provides an outlet to channel their hopes and frustrations.  The Chicago 
Cubs and the Boston Red Sox have consistently had loy l and supportive fan bases in 
spite of less than stellar performances from their respective teams; this is in part 
because of the superstitions surrounding their clubs.  Magical beliefs can provide an 
outlet for emotions that cannot otherwise be as readily mollified, and hence, they 
remain as a force in modern society.         
Religion 
In the second rationalization of religion, the desir  is to control and channel 
human forces (Burke P&C 59).  While religions offer metaphysical explanations for a 
plethora of human questions, one of their practical effects on individuals and social 
orders is to provide a moral code that contains within it a system of discipline and 
reward.  Monotheistic religions are frequently conceptualized metaphorically as a 
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family unit wherein the Godhead is a father-like figure who simultaneously provides 
discipline and love.  Burke argues that this linguistic transference of words from the 
secular to the sacred is necessary because it is the only way in which individuals can 
understand a god figure, and this transference provides a rich tool of analysis to 
interrogate human motivations (OHN 172-209; ROR 1-42).  This assumption holds 
equally true for the understanding of valuation because the Godhead represents the 
pinnacle of values; the words that are used to describe God are derived from those 
things we find valuable, and the words used to describe Satan illustrate the inverse.   
For Burke, symbols for the sacred and profane are but two sides of the same 
coin (ROM 256), which allows for conceptual slippage between the two realms and 
has significant consequences for questions of valuation within a society.  
Monotheistic religions are necessarily hierarchical n nature and provide the value 
system that justifies said hierarchy.  This corresponds with the structured nature of the 
social order, which privileges some over others.  Hence, a dialectical motivation 
exists behind the “convertibility between terms for s cial hierarchy and terms for 
theological hierarchy” (232).  This linguistic phenomenon can push symbol users into 
an entelechial trajectory where symbols are thoughtlessly converted in a way that 
supports certain social hierarchies while rejecting other means of ordering society.  
The Godhead in the three major monotheistic religions is presumed to be a male, 
which seamlessly corresponds with the assumptions of the patriarchal societies from 
which they emerged.  The father figure becomes the central authority symbol in both 
the realm of the sacred and the profane, and hence, is the final arbiter of valuations.  
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The entelechial properties of symbol systems guarantee that certain valuations will 
seem “natural” and beyond question until the linkage to the sacred is broken. 
Furthermore, the convertibility of symbols between the sacred and the profane 
can be done purposively to provide greater force to partisan valuations (Burke ROM 
299).  Religious beliefs have been used throughout istory to justify hierarchies and 
their enforcement by any means necessary.  Religion s used politically via the 
process of identification, which allows secular goals to be conflated with sacred 
decree in an effort to make them beyond question (299).  Religion has at points in 
history been used as a trump card to justify some of the most egregious and horrific 
actions perpetuated by humans.  From jihadist suicide bombers to preachers inciting 
lynch mobs, the history of religion is rife with manipulations that move it from “a 
good device into a bad device” (P&C 249).  I do not mean to imply that religion is 
necessarily a negative social force; it certainly has many positive aspects for 
individuals and social orders, but it is important to note that the transference of 
authority symbols between the sacred and profane ca and does lead to the profaning 
of the sacred.  Consequently, an examination of the rhetorical trajectory of any 
religion will find instances of transcendence upward nd downward as ideals move 
between the sacred and the profane.   
Science 
While religion remains a dominant source of valuation, the third 
rationalization of science has constructed a trajectory that is also a powerful force in 
society.  Science, according to Burke, rationalizes society around attempts to control 
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technology for human benefit (P&C 59).  The scientific revolution provided a 
rationalization, which attempted to explain human exist nce based upon that which is 
observable within the natural world.  The consequence of this was a worldview 
wherein an entelechial push suggested that actions should be taken merely because 
we could.  The research that led to the development of uclear weapons is an example 
of this phenomenon.  While the final push of the Manh ttan project was undertaken 
as a result of a particular political judgment in the ime of war, the scientific 
groundwork had already been done.  The rationalization of the scientific frame 
changed the nature of authority symbols.  As technological advances occurred, they 
were valuated based upon the usefulness of the end product (CS 63).  Hence, the 
combustion engine was positively evaluated because it made traversing the United 
States significantly easier; however, the overwhelming positive associations of the 
automobile has had significant unintended consequences.  Urban centers were 
designed to allow for easy movement of traffic, which helped to facilitate white flight 
to the suburbs, the development of exburbs, and a phalanx of other issues such as 
global warming and a seriously underdeveloped mass tr n portation system.  What 
ultimately became a destructive force emerged as a symbol of authority as a result of 
the entelechial push of the rationalization of scien e.   
The entelechial push of the scientific revolution ctributed to an increased 
secularization of society’s standards of valuation, ncluding of the ethical, the 
religious and the aesthetic (Burke P&C 45) as rationality “brings forward demands of 
its own” (149).  Scientific inquiry became a good in its own right; educational 
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systems demanded excellence in the science curriculum; the nation’s resources were 
turned toward technological developments from NASA to DARPA.  A moon landing 
and the internet58 are but two of the advances made from these scientific pushes, and 
both breakthroughs were symbolically wrapped in a clo k of valuation.  The United 
States had to reach the moon because if we did not the Soviets would beat us there.  
The internet was developed to facilitate military communication, which was 
necessary if we were to remain a world superpower.  In the former example, it was 
imperative that the United States reach this pinnacle of space exploration before the 
Soviet Union because it was our duty and right to do so.  The Soviet Union was a 
totalitarian nation that was dangerous and the protection of the free world 
necessitated that the United States reach the moon first.59  In the latter, a valuation 
was made by America that we needed to be a world superpower, and consequently, 
we funded our military at rates that far surpassed th  rest of the globe to reach that 
goal.60  The internet is but one of the technological discoveries that had a dual-use 
benefit that was derived from this expenditure of resources.  For decades, America 
embraced the entelechial pull of the scientific rationalization. 
Word Magic 
                                                     
58 For further detail about how U.S. Defense Advanced R search Projects Agency (DARPA) laid the 
groundwork for today’s internet see Histories of the Internet, February 5 2008, Internet Society, 
Available: http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/cerf.shtml, July 24 2008. 
59 For a brief history of the space race between the United States and the Soviet Union and how it was 
valuated in the U.S. as a necessity to preserve the free world see Going to the Moon:  The Apollo 
Mission, July 16 2008, StarWrite.org, Available: http://ww.starwrite.org/apollo_missions.html, July 
24 2008. 
60 In 2008, the United States accounted for 48% of glbal military spending.  To see the break down 
see Anup Shah, World Military Spending, March 1 2008, Global Issues, Available: 
http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsTrade/Spending.asp#InContextUSMilitarySpendingVers
usRestoftheWorld, July 24 2008. 
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Underlying the three rationalizations is symbol useand what Burke refers to 
as “word magic.”  Each of the rationalizations uses language to construct an 
understanding of the universe and humanity’s place within it.  Without language none 
of the rationalizations would exist; as such, they cannot be understood without first 
understanding the role of word magic in the formation of human value systems.  
Burke borrows the term “magic” metaphorically and uses it to explain the way 
language adds elements to human existence that are outside of the material and 
sensory.  Values are necessarily derived from word magic because they are ideals that 
are not found in nature (Briggs 369-72).  The manipulation of symbol systems 
provides a means by which social orders are constructed and maintained, and as such 
this expanded view of magic becomes the central ration lization as it pertains to value 
questions—without it values would not exist.  I will first discuss the basis of word 
magic, and then I will explain its implications for valuation. 
 Traditional magic functioned as a matter of decree (Burke PLF 5), and it is the 
act of decree wherein language becomes word magic.61  “The magical decree is 
implicit in all language; for the mere act of naming an object or situation decrees that 
it be singled out as such-and-such rather than something-other” (5).  However, it is 
important to draw a distinction between naming thatwhich is extant, i.e. the physical 
world, and naming that which is a uniquely human costruction.  While naming that 
                                                     
61 Burke argues that a distinction between false magic nd true magic exists.  False magic is that which 
pretends to change “the laws of motion” Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley, University 
of California Press, 1969). 65, while “‘true’ magic prevails outside the realm of motion, in the area of 
more-than-motion that we call action” Burke, GOM.65.  Hence, magic is a misunderstanding of 
physical processes, whereas “word magic” is the ability of humans to use language to imagine that 
which is not in a way that allows for the creation of new ideals and material products (technology).   
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which exists in nature does shape our understanding and can provide value 
assessments of that which is named, Burke draws a distinction with that which is an 
entirely human construct.  “This enables us to equate magic with novelty” (GOM 66), 
which is found in “every human act; for each act contains some measure of 
motivation that cannot be explained simply in terms of the past, being to an extent, 
however tiny, a new thing” (65).  Hence, language is “magical” because it can create 
something out of nothing.   
 One such construct is the negative, which is a critical element derived from 
human consciousness; “there are no negatives in nature,” and “this ingenious addition 
to the universe is solely a product of human symbol systems” (Burke LAS 9).  The 
negative has two significant aspects; the propositional negative—it is not—and the 
hortatorical negative—thou shall not.  The former provides the basis of scientific 
inquiry while the latter establishes the ability to m ralize and is foundational to 
religious and ethical thought (421).  Science is baed on observation and 
classification, which requires the ability to establish that something is not something 
else.  Mathematics, which provides the basis for much physical science, is also 
dependent upon the existence of the zero and negativ  numbers.62  Moral inquiry 
requires an understanding of the ideal—that which is not.  Without the negative, 
moral claims that are tribal in nature, such as the Ten Commandments, could not 
exist.  While simple “moral” claims exist in nature, they are actions that merely 
                                                     
62 Ed Appel argues that the entire theory of relativity is completely dependent upon the notion of the 
negative and  human ability to conceptualize that which is not.  Edward C. Appel, "Implications and 
Importance of the Negative in Burke's Dramatistic Philosophy of Language," Communication 
Quarterly 41.1 (1993). 
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indicate that thou shall not do that to me—such as when one cat claws another for 
attempting to steal its food.  These claims, however, differ drastically from morality 
that arises from a social order.  Morality in this sense is dependent upon 
universalizing the claims and having them turned back on the individual, and is only 
possible with abstract thought that is derived from the negative (439).  Taken 
together, these two aspects of the negative provide the foundation for modern society.  
The technological innovations that make modern life possible could not exist without 
first having developed the concept of the negative and the complex social structure in 
which we reside are dependent upon the bureaucratization of the hortatory negative.       
 Moral law is by its nature founded in the negative because it constrains natural 
impulses (Burke LAS 442), and it is through these constraints that complex social 
orders are developed.  Burke believes that morality is implicit in language, and as the 
symbol using animal, humans are driven to seek a mor l structure of some sort.  He 
argues that the logical end-point of language is in“justice,” “a kind of completion 
whereby laws are so universalized that they also apply to the lawgiver” (LAS 440).  
However, the ideal of justice and morality is founded in language, which is never an 
exact match of the extant.   
But though we say that universalization, or following-through-to-the-end-of-
the-line, comes easy to language, we should add two qualifications:  (1) The 
orderly perfection of such thoroughness, in art or th ught, brings up strains 
intrinsic to the medium; (2) morally, a further strain arises when we attempt to 
embody in practice what we have conceived of in priciple.  (LAS 440) 
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Hence, that which is based in symbolicity will not always be able to come to fruition.  
Consequently, moral systems seldom—if ever—match the ideals they espouse, and 
their bureaucratization will necessarily be unjust as the moral decrees of the order are 
followed and enforced inconsistently.   
 At their base level, moral decrees will never be consistently followed by all 
members of society.  For some, the compulsion of biolog cal drives will not be 
constrained by the morals of the order.  For others, the symbols of authority of the 
order will not provide a compelling reason to not engage in “immoral” behaviors as 
other motivations outstrip the ability of the social order to impel individual 
adherence.  However, it is important to note the rol  that word magic plays in 
preventing the culmination of the moral order.  While language proper may push 
toward justice, human use of language impedes the ability of language to actually 
reach its entelechial fruition.  One way this commonly occurs is through the use of the 
propositional negative via definition to undermine th universalization of the 
hortatorical.  Historically many of the greatest atrocities of human behavior have 
occurred because certain segments of the population were defined as not being a 
member of the human tribe.  African Americans were determined to be incapable of 
moral thought because they were driven by the sensuous; derived from this 
definitional maneuver was the necessity to tightly constrain their actions and 
behaviors, which justified slavery and in the post-War South, lynching and Jim Crow 
laws.  Native Americans were similarly defined as “savages” who needed to be 
properly educated in moral thought.  Burke’s essay “The Rhetorical of Hitler’s 
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Battle” outlines the rhetorical process that Hitler and his minions utilized to define the 
Jews as not only “not human” but also an evil threat to “real humans” (PLF 164-189). 
 In particular, dialectical terms that are resistant o transcendence are one 
means by which the propositional negative—albeit with h dden rhetorical 
weightings—precludes the universalization of the hortat rical to include all members 
of social order.  Consider, for example, the linguistic construct of good versus evil.  
The Oxford English Dictionary notes that “evil” as  “word is the most 
comprehensive adjectival expression of disapproval, dislike, or disparagement” (n.p.).  
Given the symbolic weighting of the word, when a person is defined as evil, it is 
unlikely that he will be considered as part of the community to whom the hortatorical 
negative ought to apply.  When President Bush initially labeled all al Qaeda members 
as evil-doers and framed the War on Terror as a battle between good and evil, he was 
presaging the tactics and policies that would likely emanate from his administration.  
Extraordinary rendition, mass jailings and torture were the logical derivatives of his 
rhetorical choices.  Once defined as evil, terrorists could not be considered part of the 
civilization that created such things as the Geneva Convention; hence, they were not 
deserving of the protections proffered by the treaty.  As God, the ultimate good, 
banished Satan, the ultimate evil, the evil in the world must be expelled, and since 
evil knows no boundaries, the “good” cannot be constrained by rules that “evil-doers” 
will not follow.  To do so would render good impoten  against evil.   
 This is but one example of how the use of the propositional negative—without 
acknowledging its weighting—can undercut the ability of the hortatorical to reach its 
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completion in justice.  However, the hortatorical system can also use the propositional 
negative to further its own ends by defining something that in reality is an “ought 
not” as an “is not.”  I believe that many historical and contemporary conflicts 
between religion and science can be illuminated by examining the conflation of the 
propositional negative with the hortatorical negative and vice versa.  In the next 
section, I examine the interacting trajectores of the rationalizations and word magic to 
illustrate this point.                           
The Interacting Trajectories of Word Magic and the Rationalizations 
 It is not uncommon to view human existence as a linear progression that 
moved from primitive magic, to religion, to science.  However, this view is overly 
simplistic in its assessment of human motivation and values, to which Burke 
acknowledges that he too succumbed.  “Rather than thinking of magic, religion, and 
science as three distinctly successive stages in the world’s history, the author would 
now use a mode of analysis that dealt with all three aspects of motivation ‘forever 
born anew’ in the resources of language as such” (P&C lix).  Therefore, I will analyze 
the trajectories of the rationalizations and the way in which symbol systems have 
shaped our understanding of them and the conflicts which emerged from them.      
One of the most significant aspects of the scientific revolution—from the 
perspective of valuation—is the ability to create, gather, shape, and transmit 
information.  Manipulating63 and transmitting information has always played a large 
role in shaping the moral code of a society.  For an extreme example consider Nazi 
                                                     
63 By manipulating information I mean any effort undertaken to shape how others understand and/or 
evaluate the information being presented.  Hence, I am including everything from traditional rhetoric 
to outright fabrication.   
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Germany.  Hitler mastered the use of propaganda and the symbolic manipulation of 
authority and anti-authority symbols.  The swastika was prominently portrayed in all 
realms of one’s existence, the presence of goose-stepping troops parading down the 
streets, and doctors who transferred the moral status of their profession to efforts at 
eugenics and human experimentation, all displayed th  power and control of the Nazi 
regime.  As Burke outlines in “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s Battle,” the enactment of 
Hitler’s system of valuation could only lead to death nd destruction.  Much of 
Hitler’s power was established via anti-authority symbols, those symbols which 
marked people who were viewed as not worthy of membership in society.  The Jews 
were forced to wear a yellow Star of David.  These images aided in establishing a 
social hierarchy that demarcated who was considered human, and hence, worthy of 
being treated as such; they also delimited who was deemed to be not only less than 
human but anathema to the existence of “real” humans, d hence, deserving of 
extermination.  These symbols of authority and anti- u hority helped Hitler and the 
Nazi party implement a new value system.  One of the ways in which his regime was 
able to do this was to control access to information and what could be said in public 
and private.  This allowed the symbols to be deployed without being contested.  They 
had absolute authority; any word to the contrary was met with swift and violent 
reprisals. 
Technological advances, however, have changed the operating environment 
significantly from the World War II era.  The internet, cell phones, digital imaging, 
blackberrys, web sites such as Youtube and Myspace, etc. have all made it easy to 
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gather, record and transmit information in a matter of seconds.  The rapidity by which 
information can be transmitted has altered systems of valuation around the globe and 
increased conflict among competing symbols of authority.  While Burke outlined 
three key rationalizations for societal authority symbols, he did not mean to imply 
that the rationalizations were mutually exclusive.  Each provides its own trajectory 
that advances based upon its entelechial underpinnings and by its interaction with 
other systems and phenomena.  “By definition human ‘Bodies That Learn Language’ 
go on being born anew, to experience the creative magic of the world, the personal 
extensions of religion, and the pragmatics of knowledge (science);” however “the 
character and relative proportions of such ingredients will vary greatly in different 
cultural situations” (P&C 307).  At points in history the competing systems of cience 
and religion have coincided with great ease; at other times they have come into open 
conflict, and word magic has played a role in each of t e battles.  Consider the 
scientific theory of evolution.  When Darwin first unveiled it, it was met with much 
fear and uncertainty.  The famous Scope’s Monkey Trial in 1925, which challenged 
the teaching of evolution in public schools, illustrates the degree to which some 
would go to prevent the theory from being disseminated.  The fear was that it would 
undermine belief in God as creator of the earth.  However, as time went on many 
people found a permutation of the two principles that allowed them to operate in 
harmony with each other.  God was the creator, but evolution was the mechanism that 
was used to carry out God’s plan.  At these points, the standard for valuation is 
consistent between the two frames; the phenomenon of evolution is merely an 
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example of the greatness of God.  The agonistic relationship between the two ideas 
was symbolically transcended, and the two systems operated in concord with each 
other.   
This type of verbal transcendence is critical to understanding how revaluation 
occurs in society.  Dialectical terms, which are agonistic to each other (Burke GOM 
33-5) or apply to “fictitious” entities such as the law (ROM 184), are at their root 
ethical because they have moved beyond mere description and require judgments to 
be made (53-4, 185).  When seemingly inconsistent pri ci les cease to be opposites, 
verbal transcendence has occurred (ATH 337).  In the above example, different 
understandings of how the world originated were joined together into one system of 
valuation through transcendent rhetoric.  When transce dence happens, the 
underlying ideas and values are necessarily altered in the process (ROM 314), and a 
certain level of discounting has to occur to explain why the apparent inconsistencies 
are no longer relevant (ATH 328).  When successful, transcendence allows for the 
creation of a stable source of valuation.   
However, what appears to be transcendent may not be.  Divisions can be 
rhetorically masked, which can give the appearance of unity, even when the divisions 
still exist in the extant world (Burke ROM 45).  Hence, that which can be 
symbolically transcended can also be descended.  The symbolic merger of science 
and religion was maintained because the two systems both benefited from the 
relationship.  It meant that the belief in God did not prevent one from enjoying the 
benefits of modern knowledge and technology.  The advent of the automobile and 
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electrification were seen by many as a gift from God, an example of humankind using 
God’s generosity to better our condition.  Even so, the relationship proved not to be 
sustainable as the pace of scientific development outstripped society’s collective 
ability to adapt its standards of valuation to the alt rations, and scientific discoveries 
again became agonistic to many people’s religious beliefs; the unlocking of the 
human genome along with the genomes of a plethora of other animals called into 
question the uniqueness of the human species.  It i more difficult to place oneself in 
an exalted position when only five percent of one’s DNA is distinct from that of a 
chimpanzee.64  When these sorts of incongruities became overwhelming for some, a 
religious backlash against scientific thought re-emerged,65 and the two systems waged 
symbolic battle against each other, as both sides att mpted to control the key symbols 
of societal authority.     
During the last two decades of the 20th century, and still continuing today, a 
plethora of religious organizations began a concerted campaign to undermine the 
legitimacy of evolution.  Complaints lodged with local school boards led a number of 
districts to stop teaching evolution altogether as a part of their science curriculum and 
in some instances discussions of creationism were add d.  A new rhetorical strategy 
was unfurled as the gains of the movement were lost as courts struck down these 
moves as a violation of the constitutional mandate of separation of church and state.  
Because creationism was rejected as a result of itsclear religious underpinnings, anti-
                                                     
64 For an explanation how this percentage was derived se  Roy J. Britten, "Divergence between 
Samples of Chimpanzee and Human DNA Sequences Is 5%, Counting Indels," PNAS 99.21 (2002). 
65 I do not want to imply that specific rhetorical choices from religious activists did not play a role in 
this backlash.  They certainly played a significant role, but my argument is that this rhetoric gained 
presence when scientific discoveries began to seem incompatible with some people’s core beliefs.   
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evolutionists developed the concept they referred to as Intelligent Design.  Its 
precepts suggest that the earth and its inhabitants are o complex that the only rational 
explanation is that there is a designer of some kind.  Because those who could not 
reconcile scientific discoveries with their religious faith were unable to justify their 
beliefs to the broader society with a religious argument, they altered their discourse to 
construct a scientific basis for their counter to the heory of evolution.  In spite of 
legal setbacks, the movement continued to alter the public’s understanding of 
evolution.66  In 2007, during the first Republican Party debate of the 2008 presidential 
primary, three of the ten candidates indicated that t ey did not believe in the theory of 
evolution (Seelye 10).  At the same time, the Answers in Genesis ministry opened a 
creationism museum in Kentucky that had visual representations of dinosaurs 
coexisting with humans in our present form in its effort to spread the belief that the 
earth is only six-thousand-years old.67  Part of this conflict emanates from competing 
negatives, as some believe that a reliance on the propositional negative (science) will 
undermine the power of the hortatorical negative as defined by certain religious sects.  
At the time of writing, this battle between religious fundamentalists and scientists is 
far from over.  Nevertheless, this conflict illuminates the way in which symbolic 
ideals are rhetorically altered when intransigence exists within the social order.  
                                                     
66 For a discussion of how the belief in evolution has declined as a result of religious belief see Jon D. 
Miller, “Science Communication: Public Acceptance of Evolution,” Science 313.5788 (2006). 
67 Ken Ham, the museums founder, makes it clear that for him, the only legitimate science is science 
that is grounded in biblical readings.  “Why would any Christian want to take man’s fallible dating 
methods and use them to impose an idea on the infallible Word of God?  Christians who accept billions 
of years are in essence saying that man’s word is infallible, but God’s Word is fallible!”  See Ken 
Ham, A Young Earth--It's Not the Issue, January 1998, Answers in Genesis, Available: 
http://www.answersingenesis.org/docs/1866.asp, July 24 2008. 
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Efforts at revaluation are generally met with resistance at first; however, the 
dialectical process allows for, albeit does not guarantee, the rhetorical rebirth of an 
idea that emerges from the ashes of its previous instantiation; however, the re-
emergent idea will necessarily be altered in the process.   
A second area in which the trajectories of religion and science have battled is 
in the area of sexuality.  As we have gained scientif c knowledge about sex and the 
ways in which the procreative aspect of sex can be curtailed, open battle has been 
waged between the two trajectories.  The sexual revolution would not have been 
possible without the development of the pill and other forms of birth control.  Sex 
outside of marriage has always occurred, but it historically carried a much greater risk 
for those who engaged in the act—for women in particular.  When these disincentives 
were minimized by scientific discovery, the valuation of sexual activity was altered, 
and the turn of the 21st century is rife with rhetorical battles emanating from 
conflicting views of how sexual activity should be valuated by society.  Images of sex 
and sexuality infiltrate every aspect of popular culture.   
As is noted on Madison Avenue, sex sells.  It is used to punctuate and make 
more desirable everything from beer and automobiles in advertising, to musical 
performances and movies.  Significantly, these venues represent both male and 
female sexual desires, and women frequently are shown t  have—although not 
always by any stretch of the imagination—sexual agency.  However, the notion of 
female sexual agency is contrary to many traditional social values that emanate from 
a male-headed nuclear family and subsequently, changes the nature of symbols of 
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authority.68  On a symbolic level the push for abstinence only education is an effort to 
restore lost authority symbols; it has very little o do with solving problems such as 
teenage pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections.  Multiple studies have shown 
that abstinence only programs are rife with misinformation about the nature of the 
roles of men and women in society as well as how safe and effective varying forms of 
birth control are, and it has not shown to reduce the occurrence of sex among teens.69  
In spite of its failure to actually change the sexual behavior of teenagers in a positive 
way, many still support the program because it represents the “correct” valuation.  
Hence, a scientific perspective of sexuality is being eschewed by some to force a 
religious conception of sexuality.        
Burke argues that sexual courtship is necessarily infused with motives of the 
social hierarchy (ROM 218).  It defines the rules of who can date and marry whom 
and what sexual behaviors are acceptable.  A part of the symbolic element of 
abstinence only education is to restore the rules of courtship, which support a 
particular societal arrangement.  The elaborate rituals that correspond to certain 
segments of the abstinence only movement illuminate this.  One such example is the 
purity ring ceremony, in which young girls are asked to pledge to their fathers that 
they will remain virgins until they marry, and the girls make this pledge publicly 
                                                     
68 Historically sexual agency has been denied to women in America.  Tracing the history of rape laws 
in America illustrates this.  Married women could not be raped because their husbands had a right to 
sex as part of the marital contract; women who dressed provocatively or knew their attackers were 
deemed to have been asking for it, unmarried women who had had previous sexual relations were 
commonly seen as unrapeable because they had lost their virginity outside the bonds of marriage.  For 
a detailed discussion of this see Susan Estrich, Sex and Power, Riverhead Books:  New York (2001).   
69 See for example  "Abstinence-Only Fails to Stop Early Pregnancies, Diseases," USA Today July 30 
2007.  Michael W Widerman, Understanding Sexuality Research (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001). 
pp. 82-89 
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during rituals that closely resemble a wedding.  Vows are given, and their fathers give 
them bands, which look like wedding rings.  What the pledges and ceremonies 
functionally do is to remove sexual agency from the female.  It is no longer their 
choice to have sex when and if they desire; instead, their fathers are willingly given 
the authority to demand sexual purity until the women are given in marriage to their 
husbands.70  This move restores the male figure as the ultimate head of the family 
structure and reenergizes a traditional symbol of authority, which has been losing its 
social force as the nuclear family has been diminished in actuality.   
This symbolic act is important for some versions of Christianity since much of 
our understanding of the Christian god is based upon a metaphorical application of 
the traditional family structure, where the father figure has ultimate authority.  When 
the nature of the family is altered, the metaphorical transference to the realm of 
religion will likely change the understanding of the religious code itself.  This is also 
the source of much of the opposition to same sex marriages.  Arguments that it will 
destroy the family make little sense when considere lit rally.  Two men or two 
women marrying in no way impedes a heterosexual couple’s ability to have marital 
bliss.  But when one considers the symbolic import of the traditional nuclear family to 
one’s metaphorical understanding of the Godhead, same sex marriages do undermine 
a particular vision of what Christianity ought to be.  The physical family is not 
undermined, but the spiritual family is.  This particular valuation implicates not only 
sexuality; it also suggests a preferred form of Christianity and as a derivative, a 
                                                     
70 For a fuller description of the ceremonies see Jennif r Baumgardner, "Would You Pledge Your 
Virginity to Your Father," Glamour February 7 2007. 
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particular social order.  As scientific studies increasingly illustrate that homosexuality 
has a biological element,71 some religious organizations have done their best to 
enshrine anti-gay marriage decrees in state laws and co stitutions with the hope that 
this maneuver will ensure that homosexuality is viewed as immoral even if it is 
definitively proven that it is more than just a life-style choice.     
On a symbolic level, sexuality will remain a focal point as competing value 
systems come into conflict with each other.  From the perspective of some religious 
thought, it is necessary to control sexuality.  Multiple studies indicate that the 
Christian religion has long sought to define the circumstances under which sex was 
acceptable (DeLamater 263).  Burke’s theory suggests that one possible reason for 
this is how it implicates transcendence.72  One symbolic value of religion73 is that it 
provides a means of transcendence, which allows people t  escape the realities of the 
world.  It allows people to envision a world that is not polluted by human 
shortcomings, and it encourages people to look for guidance outside of the realm of 
the physical world in which we live.  Controlling sexuality can be seen as a necessary 
element if God is to be the exclusive source of transcendence because sex is a 
mechanism that facilitates actual physical transcendence, which is not dependent 
upon remaining loyal to a religious order and its rules.  Sex provides a physical union 
                                                     
71 See for example Michael W Wiederman, Understanding Sexuality Research (Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth, 2001). 
72 I am not arguing that this is the only reason why sexuality has been controlled.  Multiple factors such 
as social cohesion come into play, but Burke’s theory suggests that from a value perspective that 
transcendence likely plays a role in the effort to control sexuality.   
73 In this discussion of religion, I am making no claims about the actual existence of God.  I am 
attempting to illustrate the way religion functions on a symbolic level.  Hence, when I discuss 
transcendence in this context, I do not deny the possibility of a literal transcendence to heaven. 
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between two people, and an orgasm allows for a fleeting moment a sense of being 
both within and outside of one’s body.74  The French illuminate this phenomenon by 
their euphemism for the orgasm:  la petit mort—literally, the little death.  This 
expression recognizes the transcendent, spiritual aspect of sex that can occur 
irrespective of one’s religious beliefs and whether or not one is married when the sex 
act occurs.  Furthermore, sex provides a means for the individual to transcend his or 
her physical being and to provide the possibility of immortality.  When sex results in 
conception, a new being is formed that is both partof and separate from its parents, 
and the perpetuation of one’s DNA through procreation allows a part of oneself to 
live indefinitely as long as reproduction continues to occur.  This ability to reach an 
immortality of sorts through purely earthly activites has the potential to undermine 
the desire to reach transcendence in the spiritual ealm, and hence, it can diminish the 
strength of the appeal of the religious belief, which provides a motivation to tightly 
constrain sexual activity.  It is to only occur in relationships that have been blessed by 
God, which situates the physical transcendence as part and parcel of the spiritual 
transcendence that the religious belief allows.   
Consider the case of the Catholic Church, wherein priests are expected to take 
a vow of celibacy and are never allowed to marry, and nuns wear a ring on their left 
hand expressing their symbolic marriage to Christ.  These constructs reflect the 
danger that sexuality poses to the power of the church.  It is believed that the special 
                                                     
74 For a fuller discussion of the effort of some branches of Christianity to limit the physical pleasure of 
sex see J. Lo Piccolo and J. Heiman, “Cultural Values and the Therapeutic Definition of Sexual 
Function and Dysfunction,”  Journal of Social Issues 33 (1977). 
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relationship between the priest and God would be undermined if he were allowed to 
have sexual relations with another human being because physical transcendence can 
undermine the focus on spiritual transcendence.  The status of the nun symbolically 
places marriage in the spiritual realm and represents the highest order of marital 
relationships.  To be truly married to God, one cannot also be married to a human 
being, and the spiritual transcendence that occurs from religious devotion is 
represented as of a higher moral order than the physical transcendence that occurs 
from sex.  Given that sex is a biological necessity, the Church carefully proscribes the 
circumstances under which it is acceptable for it to occur.  It must be blessed by God 
through the rite of marriage.  At some points in history, even within the bounds of 
marriage, it was only permissible for the express purpose of procreation; in other 
times the pleasure derived from sex was seen as a gift with which God blessed 
married people.  In all circumstances, sexual activity s tightly circumscribed to 
maintain spiritual transcendence as the pinnacle of human existence.  
Traditional views of masturbation also support thissupposition.  For years, the 
common appellation for the act was self-abuse.  This title only makes sense if one 
views it from the perspective of damage to one’s spiritual life.  The act itself does no 
physical damage and can cause immense amounts of physical pleasure.  In no way 
does it damage one’s physicality.  However, if one believes that a focus on the 
physical will undermine a focus on the spiritual, and if the spiritual is valuated as 
having greater import than the physical, the label makes sense.  One’s spirit is 
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damaged by the act, and hence, it is self-abuse.75  Given strong biological urges and 
the ease with which masturbation can be performed, it became urgent for the religious 
code to regulate it, and it was declared a sin.  However, the ephemeral, spiritual threat 
was not always enough to prevent people from masturba ing.  This weakness in the 
force of the religious admonition led to the creation and propagation of a number of 
myths that also outlined a threat masturbation posed to one’s physicality.  Going blind 
and mysterious hair growth on one’s palms are two of the most common.  Not only 
would a sinner become disabled, the rest of the community would see the visible 
marker of his failings.  This rhetorical maneuver is an instance of conflating the 
propositional and hortatorical negatives.  The “thou shall not masturbate” was 
rhetorically transported into the scientific understanding of the act.  This transference 
created a false interpretation of the act as a biolog cal phenomenon.   
From a scientific perspective masturbation can be seen as a means to gain 
sexual gratification without having to suffer the potential consequences of having 
actual sex.  However, this view undermines traditional views of sexuality proffered 
by many religions, and when it has been expressed it has been rhetorically rejected by 
many religious leaders.  For example, Joycelyn Elders, President Clinton’s Surgeon 
General, was forced to resign in 1994 after suggesting that masturbation should be 
taught in public schools as a means to prevent sexually transmitted diseases.  The 
normalizing effect that this would have on the act was anathema to some.  In a similar 
                                                     
75 For a discussion of how this view emerged within te Christian tradition from such figures as Paul, 
Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas, and how these attitudes evolved into views of masturbation as 
physically harmful  see Bruce McFarland, “Masturbation throughout History.” 2008: Jackinworld,.  
Available http://www.jackinworld.com/library/articles/history.html,  August 26, 2008 
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vein, Alabama went so far as to ban the sale of sex toys, which facilitate the pleasure 
of masturbation for many, especially women, in 1998.  While the strictures of the 
moniker “self-abuse” are no longer dominant, elements of the value system are still 
present and have a role in shaping public discourse about the topic and how it ought 
to be understood.                 
While the forces of religion and science are well established in contemporary 
society and are currently fighting for control of symbols of authority, magic as 
traditionally understood no longer has the strength of t e other two rationalizations.  
The force of the magical belief structure still exists in society, and I do not mean to 
underplay its significance because it does have important effects on society.  From a 
purely economic perspective, playing with the parano mal is a substantial industry.  
From tarot card readers to psychics, many Americans are willing to spend a portion of 
their resources trying to access the magical;76 virtually every newspaper in the 
country devotes several column inches to the daily horoscope.  However, in terms of 
its overall effect on the structure of society, it plays little role in contemporary 
America.  In comparison to the ramifications of science and religion, magic is but a 
minor player.  Nonetheless, this does not deny the possibility of primitive magic 
reemerging as a social force in the future.  However, when one conceptualizes magic 
as “word magic” its force is significant.  I will explore the continuing power of word 
magic in the following chapter.    
 
                                                     
76 I was unable to find an industry total for paranormal sales, but I did come across a number of 
websites that offered to sell me a tarot card reading for anywhere between $50-100.    
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Chapter 8:  Word Magic as Meta-Rationalization 
The ramifications of science and religion are enormous.  The contemporary 
era is rife with conflict between the two rationaliz tions, and one of the rhetorical 
strategies that has been utilized by both sides is an effort to control what information 
is disseminated and how that information ought to be framed, i.e. implicitly valuated 
with weighted words.  Efforts to control access to inf rmation have always existed.  
Consider the Catholic Church’s resistance to publishing the Bible in common 
vernaculars instead of exclusively in Latin, a move that diminished the power of the 
priesthood and the learned population to control access to God, and hence, the terms 
and conditions for valuation.  However, in the contemporary era access to information 
is harder to control, but at the same time, the desire to have information valuated for 
one has increased.  I believe that technological advances have set in motion an 
entelechial force that has emerged as a meta-rationalization that shapes the ways in 
which the preceding rationalizations function.  Many have long utilized the phrase the 
“information age” to represent the contemporary era, but I believe the effect that 
information dissemination has had on contemporary society goes far beyond what this 
moniker implies.  The name sounds much like appellations of earlier epochs, which 
were labeled with names such as the Stone Age or the I on Age.  These names 
indicated the types of tools that people used and discoveries that were made; 
however, in the information age, the implications of our tools go far beyond the mere 
furtherance of pragmatic human endeavors for a better life.  Instead, they provide for 
a completely new system of valuation.  As argued earlier, technology strongly 
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influences the social environment and provides the scenic backdrop of all valuations, 
and this environment has magnified the power of word magic.  In this section I 
explore Burke’s notion of word magic and what it means for the process of valuation 
in contemporary, technologized society.  Specifically, I argue that information 
dissemination and presentation have established a met -order in which systems of 
valuation are established and perpetuated in the realm of the virtual.  In order to prove 
this argument, I will first establish the human desire for rationalized systems, or in 
Burkean terms hierarchy and order.  Then I argue a virtual world has been created, 
which provides a basis for a valuation; then I contend this system has unfurled 
unintended consequences as its entelechial force has merged, which has functioned 
as both a tool used by the competing rationalizations and as a rationalizing force 
itself.    
One of the main reasons the major rationalizations t ok hold and were 
sustained is they established a universal account of the world; they provided stability 
and continuity in human relations and instituted a seemingly fixed system of 
valuation.77  A perusal of millennia of philosophic and theological thought illustrates 
the human desire for metaphysical explanations for biological and societal 
phenomena.  In these quests, answers to a number of questions have been sought.  
Two are significant for my project.  The first, what is the basis for human value 
systems?  The second, what should that value system be?  These queries illuminate 
                                                     
77 I do not mean that the value systems are universal and unchanging.  I only want to highlight that 
people seem to want universal systems that appear to be fixed.  In reality, the value systems do change 
and in some instances dramatically, but because the pac  of change is usually slow and the alterations 
are morphed to appear to be part of the larger system, the alterations can be imperceptible.   
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the pull that metaphysical explanations have on the human psyche, and the desire 
people have for structure in their existential being, which can provide pragmatic 
guidance in traversing the larger world.  I believe that one of the ways in which 
societal value systems are created is by the symbiotic interaction between the ideal 
that is expressed rhetorically and by the way in which the values are enacted in 
people’s daily lives.  Moral codes are expressed and codified, but the meaning of 
those codes is altered by the way in which they are enacted.   
For example, if the moral order says that premarital sex is bad, what this 
means will be expressed differently across cultures, which will in turn alter the 
valuations and subsequent actions it calls forth.  While the loss of one’s virginity 
outside the bonds of marriage is deemed morally deficient in many societies, the 
consequences for violating the moral code have varied considerably across cultures 
and time periods.  Today, women in parts of the Middle East, North Africa, and South 
Asia risk being publicly stoned to death for even the appearance of sexual 
impropriety.  Nathanial Hawthorne’s, The Scarlet Letter, illustrates the use of 
shunning and public humiliation as a means to enforce the moral code in early, 
puritanical America; Vice President Dan Quayle in 1994 bemoaned the decline of 
public morality when the television show Murphy Brown showed a single, career 
woman choosing to have a child out of wedlock, but the show was still wildly 
popular.  Each of these examples illustrates the diff ring ways in which the 
expression of a moral code can be enacted.  The instantiation of one’s valuation is 
always influenced by the broader symbolic and enacted value systems, which 
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includes the institutions and structures that support them.  This suggests that part of 
the entelechial push of a symbol system comes from the cultural tools available to it.  
Hence, in a society in which barbaric acts of violenc  are a standard means of 
punishing wrongdoing, stoning promiscuous women is a logical and emotional 
enactment of the larger value system.  Whereas, in a culture where the act of 
premarital sex is highly contested, as it is in contemporary America, efforts to enforce 
a particular moral code largely remain in the realm of the symbolic.  Outrage is 
expressed, but the morally induced consequences are comparatively small.            
Furthermore, policy implications are present within every value system.  
When one adjudges something to be harmful, it follows that one should do something 
about it.  The choice of what that something should be is based upon the interaction 
among the value system, the resources available and the actors involved in making 
the decision.  In much of Europe, drug abuse is expressed as a medical problem, and 
countries such as Norway view needle exchange programs as a partial medical 
solution (Kendall A19).  In the United States, we fight the War on Drugs, which 
means that we imprison drug users and use the military in drug interdiction efforts.  A 
particular value system does not guarantee that a cert in action will be taken, but it 
does prescribe the alternatives that will rise to the forefront, and the way in which the 
issues are expressed symbolically affects which alterna ive(s) will be chosen.  Few 
question that there are real negative consequences to drug abuse; however, the means 
to alleviate those deleterious effects all have different existential consequences.  This 
is not to say that a particular choice will always lead to the same result, but it does 
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mean that certain outcomes are more likely than others are as particular decisions are 
enacted.  It is this interaction between valuations a d their subsequent instantiations 
that gives the rationalizations their seeming continui y and stability.  This perception 
of continuity in thought in turn provides people with a sense of order because it 
creates a system of pieties, which provides a shorthand understanding of what goes 
with what and what goes against what.  However, in the contemporary era the 
rationalizations are in conflict with each other, and people are exposed to an ever 
expanding pool of symbols of authority from which to pledge allegiance.   
People and our various institutional actors have always attempted to control 
access to information and manipulate the way information that it is disseminated is 
understood, and this practice has been used as a means to perpetuate each of the three 
rationalizations—magic, religion, and science—that Burke outlines.  I believe, 
however, that the cultural byproducts of this process have led to the construction of a 
force that has become a new rationalization in and of itself.  A globalized economic 
system along with the ability to instantaneously transmit information around the 
world has created a virtual world of valuation wherein judgments are made about 
people, institutions, phenomena, etc. based on an ideological or aesthetic expression 
of the facts, and the line between reality and symbolicity is blurred to the extent that 
the perception of reality can have more rhetorical force than reality itself.  While this 
phenomenon has always existed to a certain extent, my argument is that it has taken 
on a greater force in the contemporary era as a result of technology and globalization.   
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Each of the rationalizations utilizes symbols of authority to perpetuate itself, 
and these symbols can be found throughout society.  Historically, the number of 
sources for symbols of authority has been limited by the technological capacity to 
transmit information and the constraints of the particular social order.  The first 
symbols of authority we learn to revere emanate from those who raise and care for us.  
Children understand instinctually that a social order exists when they bond with their 
parents, and in our early years, the authority symbols one responds to are limited.  
However, as we grow and gain access to broader segments of the world, we are 
confronted with a greater number of potential symbols that could become 
authoritative for us.  Historically, one could confront only a finite number of sources 
of these powerful societal ideals, and the vast majority emanated from social 
institutions such as one’s family, church, school, p itical party, etc.  However, in 
today’s world with the ability to transmit information instantaneously, the sources for 
authority symbols are virtually infinite, which makes it more difficult for social 
orders to retain shared values.  To illustrate this transformation I will first detail 
traditional sources of symbols of authority, and I will then illustrate the ways in 
which contemporary circumstances have disrupted traditional constraints on whom or 
what can be revered, which has significant implications for the social order. 
Authoritative symbols are iconic instantiations of the moral code that function 
by demarcating that which is right from that which s wrong.  They are part of the 
glue that holds a social order together because they symbolically represent that to 
which or to whom one is expected to pledge allegiance.  Social institutions are the 
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bureaucratization of the values of a social order (Burke ATH 225), and many symbols 
of authority emanate from them.  The organization itself is reified and evaluated 
based upon how well it implements the values of the ord r (P&C 209).  Once an 
institution becomes an object of valuation, it has the possibility to spawn symbols of 
authority that are symbolically transferred to the individual (209).  The black robes 
and cloistered nature of the United States Supreme Court help to establish an aura of 
certainty and moral force.  The court’s human members enact the power of valuation 
granted to the institution of the court, and their actions help shape the level of esteem 
with which the court is held by members of society.  The interaction between the 
institution and its constitutive membership shapes th  way in which authoritative 
symbols are understood and the moral force they hold in society.  
This influence, however, is not unidirectional.  Once an authority symbol is 
established it becomes a force in and of itself.  It displays for all to see an 
instantiation of the hierarchy of the social unit, which allows the symbol to develop 
an entelechial force of its own (Burke ROM 141).  Burke contends humans are driven 
by a sense of order (LAS 15); the desire to name, classify, and valuate vests a trong 
power in symbols of authority.  The hierarchic principle of the order is fulfilled when 
people willingly submit to it regardless of their place in the hierarchy (ROM 137).  
Consider the case of anti-suffrage women who vociferously defended their secondary 
social status.78  They were wholly invested in the extant hierarchy, and efforts to 
change the social order necessarily threatened their sense of self.  When one’s 
                                                     
78 For a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon see Susan E. Marshall, “In Defense of Separate 
Spheres:  Class and Status Politics in the Anti Suffrage Movement,” Social Forces 65 (1986).   
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personal identity is intimately intermingled with particular symbols of authority, 
efforts to alter them can be seen as an attack on the person herself.  Any time that a 
symbol of authority is tied closely to people’s personal identities, social discord and 
violence are possible.  “We thus begin to glimpse the dangerous ‘magic’ of 
terministic implications; frequently laden with more and more personal and 
institutional interests” (Blankenship 134).  The symbol(s) becomes an extension of 
the self and one’s preferred value system, which must be protected at all costs.  The 
entelechial push of symbols of authority can be seen in many of the conflicts around 
the globe. The entelechial push of authoritative symbols does not necessarily end in 
violence and polarization, but it can increase the force with which one supports or 
opposes certain valuations.   
The contemporary era is rife with sources for symbols of authority, and the 
increased complexity of daily life that has occurred as a result of globalization and 
technology—information technology in particular—has created an environment in 
which valuation is frequently based upon fleeting fragments of information that arise 
to the top of the massive store of information available.  Because of the vast arrays of 
information, many people seek a way to simplify it in order to place a value judgment 
on it.  Many people do not have the time or the inclination to read comprehensive 
news stories in major papers and magazines, or they do not have the ability to process 
the information in a meaningful way, so they turn to some other entity to condense 
the information for them and in many instances tell them what value they ought to 
assign it.  Consider the basic format of the cable news channels.  Much of what is 
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presented as news is merely an opinion piece being presented as raw data.79  As a 
consequence, we see the phenomenon that Comedy Central’s Stephen Colbert labeled 
as “truthiness.”  He argues that in today’s political environment opinions are 
presented and largely accepted as facts (Rabin n.p.), and consequently, valuations are 
constructed from a “virtual” reality as opposed to the extant reality.   
When I use the term virtual, I am engaging in an entir ly Burkean endeavor.  I 
am metaphorically borrowing the term virtual from the idea of virtual reality, which 
arose from the efforts of computer scientists to create a virtual world that could be 
experienced as if it were the extant world.  Virtual referred to a representation of the 
world that was so “real” that one could easily mistake it for reality.  While the 
concept was originally mostly explored in science fi tion novels and programming 
such as Star Trek: The Next Generation—where the characters would enter the virtual 
reality experience to better understand the extant world—progressions in technology 
have moved the idea of virtual reality into new realms of being.  For example, one of 
the new ways that the military is attempting to trea  those suffering from Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder is the use of virtual reality (Schaffer 5).  It allows the 
                                                     
79 I do not imply that cable news is the only source of the phenomenon that I am outlining, but it serves 
as an example of how people seek simplification of information and are desirous of letting someone 
else tell them what the value assessment of the issu ought to be.  For a studies that illustrate this 
phenomenon via an analysis of television news coverage of the war on terror see Return to Normalcy?  
How the Media Have Covered the War on Terror:  Justthe Facts, January 26 2002, Project for 
Excellence in Journalism, Available: http://journalism.org/node/286, July 24 2008.  Return to 
Normalcy?  How the Media Have Covered the War on Terrorism:  Difference between News Genres, 
2002, Project for Excellence in Journalism, Available: http://journalism.org/node/286, July 24 2008.  
For an analysis of the way in which television news programs narrowly delimit what issues are covered 
and the way in which the formatting of the programs undermines ability to have fact checking and 
edited reports see The State of the News Media:  An Annual Report on American Journalism:  Cable 
Tv, 2008, Project for Excellence in Journalism, Available: 
http://www.stateofthenewsmedia.com/2008/narrative_cabletv_contentanalysis.php?cat=1&media=7, 
July 24 2008. 
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individual to feel as if he or she is reliving the experiences that triggered the disease 
in order to learn how to control its consequences.  In all situations, the point of virtual 
reality is to provide a symbolic world that can be engaged in the same manner that the 
extant can.   
For the purposes of this analysis I am metaphorically borrowing the term 
virtual to describe a situation in which the way events and people are framed and 
represented has a greater impact on people’s valuations than what can be empirically 
shown to have occurred.  This is not to say that all valuations are done virtually, but it 
suggests that ideology and aesthetic valuation can alter the understanding of the 
extant in such a way that it is far removed from any notion of facticity.  Verbal 
manipulations have the capacity to transcend the empirical (Burke ROM 84).  Word 
magic, of which virtual valuation is a byproduct, “is not eradicable,” (ATH 323) but 
“the choice here is not a choice between magic and not magic, but a choice between 
magics that vary in their degree of approximation t the truth” (PLF 7).  In part, 
because people are drawn to a sense of order (LAS15), virtual valuations can become 
removed from reality as a perceived symbolic consistency is more important than an 
incoherent reality.  In a chaotic environment, valuation based in ideology can be 
appealing because it imposes order on an environment that cannot be ordered in the 
extant.  This virtual world of valuation both shapes and is shaped by society’s 
symbols of authority.  It is true that to some extent symbols of authority have always 
been transferred between the extant and the virtual world.  Any child who pined to be 
a lead character in a book has engaged in this process.  However, I argue the massive 
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influx of sources of authority symbols in contemporary America has magnified and 
accelerated this phenomenon.  In order to analyze this issue, I will move my 
discussion to secondary sources of symbols of authority that move beyond the three 
rationalizations, and illustrate the way in which virtual assessments have become a 
significant factor at all levels of society.     
Many sources of authoritative symbols are institutional and consequently, 
provide a long-term foundation for valuation because they represent the 
bureaucratized values of the social order.  These symbols tend to be enduring, and in 
their normal course of existence, change is slow and frequently imperceptible.  
Because of their staying power, the symbols emanating from these sources have 
significant interactions with the symbols derived from the three rationalizations.  Two 
common loci for these are the economic and legal systems, both of which follow their 
own unique trajectories.  At points in history, these trajectories have been conducive 
to the furtherance of one or more of the rationalizations, while at other points they 
have been contrary to them.  In a number of instances, onflicts between competing 
rationalizations have been waged using the institutions of the law and the economy.  I 
will now analyze the implications for the legal system, and in chapter nine, I explore 
issues related to the economic system.   
Legal System 
Engaging in a Burkean analysis of the Constitution, Meisenhelder argues “the 
law may be seen as a chart or a set of publicly-shared motives for interpreting actions 
and situations,” and “as it proliferates, it grows into a set of shared and accepted rules, 
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a grammar, for the imputation of meanings and motives to our experiences and 
observations” (48).  As such, it is in continual interaction with the rationalizations.  
The legal system has both shaped and been shaped by r ligion and science, and it is 
currently being altered by the information age and its “word magic.”  The law itself is 
the codification of moral precepts (47); it is deemed necessary for the maintenance of 
the social order to ensure people do not gain personal benefit from breaking the moral 
code (Burke P&C 186 note 2).  This claim in no way undermines the supposition that 
the legal system is always weighted in some manner; th  codified moral code of any 
given social order is likely to benefit some at the expense of others (Carrier 
"Knowledge" 55).  But, the power of symbols of authority is that they entice all 
members of society to accept the current system even if it is not in one’s best interest 
to do so.  Carrier (“Knowledge”) explains  
First, it provides a bond between the dominant and subordinate groups, as 
both are portrayed as participating in the hierarchical order grounded on these 
natural principles. This is what Burke…describes as the pastoral element, 
consisting of devices for transcending hierarchical differences and defusing 
class conflict by an inversion and celebration of the hierarchical principles 
underlying the social order.  Burke says the pastorl involves a reversal of 
values, whereby the subordinate are celebrated for the fitness with which they 
fulfill their subordinate positions….it provides a nobility for the subordinate 
by showing that in their subordination to the hierarchical principles they 
become equal to the powerful in society, who are powerful only because they 
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too subordinate themselves to those principles.  Thus t e pastoral provides a 
kind of unity and ironic equality across social classes, while confirming the 
subordinate in their subordination and the dominant in their domination.  
Second, organizing principles often are used to present to members of the 
society the view that all, even subordinate members, would be worse off if a 
different ordering principle, or none at all, were used.  Usually this is done by 
pointing out that the nonarbitrary, proper needs of ociety are served best if 
those who best reflect or embody the ordering principles of the hierarchy…are 
given positions of power.  (55-6) 
Granted the legal system has built-in means to compel acceptance of the moral order 
through the use of force and punishment, but social rders that are continued via 
voluntary submission are easier to maintain.  This is not to say that all members of the 
social order have to acquiesce to the law for it tore ain its legitimacy; however, a 
significant number of people must accept its symbols of authority for this to happen.   
The most powerful legal systems are those that can shed with ease those 
elements that have lost their authority among the public while maintaining the 
validity of the system itself.  Throughout much of American history, legal 
proscriptions against adultery existed; consequences such as being found at fault in a 
divorce hearing, while not ending the existence of cheating spouses, did work to keep 
the act discrete and out of public view.  However, the sexual revolution and the 
loosening grip of religion on the public lessened the degree to which adultery was 
condemned.  Some couples even engaged in it together as swinging became a 
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phenomenon in the 1970s.  While many anti-adultery aws still remain on the books, 
they no longer have moral force for many, and they ar  seldom prosecuted. 80   Hence, 
the only consequences faced by the cheating spouse are localized to his or her 
particular situation; the social order itself does little to prevent it from happening.  
Consider the impeachment proceedings for President Cli ton.  While the Starr 
investigation and the subsequent impeachment hearings certainly caused personal 
anguish for Clinton, he was acquitted in the Senate, and when he left office at the end 
of his second term he had high approval rating.  It was later revealed that the 
Republican House Majority Leader, Newt Gingrich, was engaging in an extramarital 
affair with one of his staff members while leading the charge to impeach Clinton.81  
In spite of this, he was still recruited to run forPresident in the 2008 election.82  
While many still believe adultery to be morally wrong, the legal system and the 
broader social order no longer deem it as worthy of societal punishment.  Instead, it is 
a personal failing that needs to be dealt with at an individual level.  While some view 
this shift as undermining the moral basis of America’s existence, it illustrates the way 
in which symbols of authority can fall from favor when people’s extant life no longer 
matches the ideal codified in the legal system.       
                                                     
80 Attorney Dirken Winlker notes “In more than 20 states, adultery remains a crime for which one can 
be prosecuted by the local district attorney. Although few people are prosecuted under those statelaws, 
the laws do remain on the books and occasionally district attorney offices will bring criminal adultery 
charges against a citizen. Generally, the statutes provide that punishment will be some jail time or a 
fine. Most cases plead out, however, and the most severe consequence to the "criminal" is the 
embarrassing publicity.”  See Dirken D. Winkler, Divorce Faq:  Adultry, 2008, Dinkler Law, 
Available: http://www.dwinklerlaw.com/CM/Custom/Divorce-FAQ.asp July 20 2008. 
81 For Gingrich’s acknowledgment of his affair and his justification for why it was not hypocritical to 
impeach Clinton while he himself was engaged in an extra-marital affair see "Gingrich Affair 
Coincided with Lewinsky Fight," Los Angeles Times March 09 2007. 
82 Gingrich ultimately decided not to run, but he frequ ntly appears as a pundit on cable news 
programs to offer his assessment of the political environment.   
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The interaction between religion and the legal system in the case of abortion 
illustrates what can happen to symbols of authority when they come into open 
conflict with each other.  Religion has historically influenced the shape of American 
jurisprudence and its subsequent symbols of authority.83  While much of moral basis 
of the American legal system can be traced to the Jud o-Christian ethic, the two 
systems do not always operate in accord with each other.  When the Supreme Court 
decided Roe v. Wade in 1973, its landmark ruling on abortion, the pro-life movement 
was energized and actively worked to undermine the legitimacy of the decision 
because it contradicted what some believed to be the law of a higher power—abortion 
is morally wrong and is a sin.84  The ramifications of this conflict are significant.  In 
order to dejustify the ruling in Roe, the rhetoric of the pro-life movement had to 
challenge the court as a symbol of authority, and for some the law itself lost its 
controlling force.85  God’s law was positioned as higher than the law of the state, and 
many who wished to end abortion chose to violate the law in their efforts to end it.  
Abortion clinics have been bombed, workers have been stalked and harassed, and a 
number of abortion providers and their staff have be n shot.  Paul Hill, who shot an 
abortion doctor and his escort in Pensacola, FL in 1994, justified his actions by 
stating, "The government is unjust because it does n t protect human life.  To the 
                                                     
83 For a historical analysis of the ramification of biblical precepts have in the legal system see R. H. 
Helmholz, "The Development of Law in Classical and Early Medieval Europe:  The Bible in Service 
of Canon Law," Chicago-Kent Law Review 70 (1995). 
84 See for example Condit, Decoding Abortion Rhetoric. 
85 For a detailed explanation of the number and types of criminal activities that have been directed 
against abortion providers see Violence Statistics, June 2008, National Abortion Federation, Available: 
http://www.prochoice.org/about_abortion/violence/violence_statistics.html, July 24 2008. 
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extent that we take part in evil, we must answer to God and may God have mercy on 
us all" (Thomas n.p.).     
The conflict between valuations based in particular religious precepts and the 
application of constitutional principles came into direct and repeated conflict in 
political and legal discourse, which continues to this day.  The entelechial push of the 
valuation of abortion as contrary to God’s law virtually guaranteed this violence 
would occur as a sense of alienation from the legal system combined with the 
imbuing fetuses with moral primacy led people to see aving them as the highest 
priority.86  Abortion discourse is an area of the legal system where the conflating of 
the propositional and hortatorical negatives is easily seen.  Efforts to define life as 
beginning at conception have been undertaken by the pro-life movement.  If the fetus 
is a living human being, then it arguably should have ll the rights of other human 
beings.  The use of the propositional negative is be ng used as a means to justify the 
hortatorical admonishment of not killing to be applied to the fetus.  Hence, by word 
magic that which is decreed as a human being provides the support for the 
hortatorical statement that abortion is morally wrong.   
 The rationalization of science has also had significant interactions with the 
legal system.  In some instances, the conflict, while being mediated in the legal realm, 
is really between religion and science.  From Burkean perspective “the Court, to act, 
must hierarchize the constitutional wishes, favoring some against others” (Wess  25), 
and the conflict between the rationalizations necessitates a choice.  As discussed 
                                                     
86 See for example Lake, “Order and Disorder in Anti-Abortion Rhetoric.” 
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earlier, the famous Scopes Monkey Trial and the more recent intelligent design cases 
explicitly valuate science as the preferred method of teaching how the natural world 
functions in public schools.  The rulings in these cases do not deny the possibility of a 
creator or even the benefits that might be derived from believing in a god.  However, 
they outline what is appropriate given the constitutionally mandated separation of 
church and state.87  In these instances, the courts create order by deciding what types 
of discourse are appropriate for given situations; they choose a hierarchy of the 
values.  This is one way in which the symbols of authority imbued in the legal system 
can overshadow the value claims emanating from the rationalizations.  The 
constitution is legally given a higher stature than either religion or science, wherein it 
can relegate the appropriate venues for the differing types of valuation that are 
derived from the rationalizations.  This example would seem to indicate that the legal 
system has more power than either religion or science.  However, this stance would 
belie the way both science and religion have shaped legal discourse in America.   
Science has had a substantial effect on American jurispr dence and the 
symbols of authority that emerge from it.  On many questions, the rationalization of 
science has used the legal system as a vessel to propagate itself and the valuations 
that flow from it.  For example, The Innocence Project was created in 1992, in part, to 
use the tools of science to ensure that our legal system was just, and that only those 
                                                     
87 The understanding of separation of church and state h s clearly evolved since its inception.  For 
example, prayer in school was once typical.  While t e first amendment has not been altered (the 
words are still the same), its application and our understanding of it has changed.  Burke’s theory 
explains that “the contextual exigencies, the Constiution-behind-the-Constutition” and “different 
circumstances may call for a different distribution of influences among various principles” Virginia 
Anderson, "Antithetical Ethics:  Kenneth Burke and the Constitution," JAC:  Journal of Composition 
Theory 15.2 (1995). p. 266.   
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who are truly guilty are punished.  By using scientific procedures, such as DNA 
profiling, not available at the time of conviction, the project tested the guilty verdicts 
handed down by numerous juries, and in a number of instances found the incarcerated 
to be innocent of the crimes for which they had been convicted.  These scientifically 
based exonerations illuminate significant problems with how juries are persuaded to 
believe a defendant is guilty or innocent.  As scientific study has advanced, it has 
surpassed previous ways in which guilt was proved in a court of law.  From 
fingerprints to DNA, science has consistently altered the way in which truth claims 
are evaluated in a court of law.  Eye witness testimony, which was at one time the 
gold standard for evidence in a criminal case, has been delimited by studies that show 
it to be highly unreliable under many circumstances (Fruzetti et al 18).  Even though 
the legal system can control scientific discourse in some ways, science has shaped our 
criminal justice system in innumerable ways.   
 In contemporary America, another force is also in play.  The representations 
of the legal system in a variety of media have affected how people understand what 
the legal system is, how it operates, and what it should be.  It could be argued that 
representations of the legal system have always existed.  This is an unarguably true 
statement; from Plato’s rendering of the trial of Scrates to Shakespeare’s Portia to 
Perry Mason, the legal system has since its inception become part of the popular 
parlance of the social order.  Because of the prominent role law plays in valuation, it 
has always been a significant subject in human artistic and intellectual expression.  
Nonetheless, the sheer magnitude of representations and the blending together of 
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fiction and fantasy allowed for by technology have facilitated an environment 
conducive to a shift in valuation of the legal system and its constitutive parts.     
 Mass media technologies, such as cable television and the internet, have 
allowed for the flow of information to accelerate at amazing levels.  People are 
constantly bombarded by information in a variety of forms.  Some of it is largely 
informational, which might appear in varying stages of completeness.  By this, I mean 
information that is not intentionally being used persuasively—raw data.  Nonetheless, 
most of the information is rhetorical in nature, and it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to differentiate between what is factual and what is fictional, which eases the 
transference of standards of valuation between the aesthetic and the ethical.  
Consequently, Burke’s theory suggests that representatio s of reality are having 
greater sway on people’s valuations, and in some instances, the ideal legal system is 
conflated with the actual legal system.  When this happens, valuations are based upon 
the virtual legal system instead of the extant.   
 Consider the various types of legal programming avail ble on cable television.  
It runs the gamut from wildly popular fictional dram s such as Law & Order and CSI, 
which draw many of their story lines from current events, to shows such as A & E’s 
Cold Case Files, wherein real cases are detailed with interviews of actual participants, 
and actual crime scene photos are interspersed with dramatic re-enactments of crime, 
to Court TV, which shows footage from actual trials as they occur ommingled with 
analysis from pundits.  This blurring of fiction and reality as it relates to legal 
questions is already having an effect on how people actually understand legal issues.  
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Many prosecutors argue that they have to present forensic evidence at trials even if it 
does not serve an argumentative function for the prosecution because the juries expect 
it, and studies suggest that the aforementioned shows are changing the ways in which 
juries understand the legal arguments presented at trial (Tibbetts A12).  On a bigger 
scale, the military recently asked the producers of the television show 24,88 in which 
the lead character frequently engages in torture to prevent terrorist attacks, to scale 
back its representations of torture because United S ates’ soldiers in the conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan were basing their understandings of the legal and pragmatic 
efficacy of torture based on its positive representation in the television show.  The 
propositional negative of science is being replaced by the propositional negative of 
the aesthetic; that which is and is not is increasingly being determined by word magic 
that is demonstrably removed from facticity by the influence of fictional television 
programming.  Hence, even in a social realm wherein str ct rules of evidence exist, 
the representation of what occurred can be as significa t as what actually can be 
proven to have occurred.       
 As can be seen by this analysis, word magic has taken on an increasingly 
important role in contemporary society.  The legal system is the embodiment of a 
social order’s values, and the conflicts that are waged in this realm are illustrative of 
competing value systems and the symbols of authority that correspond with them.  As 
such, it is a venue in which competing factions will do battle over what the values of 
the order ought to be.  Because the legal system is reliant upon dialectical terms, the 
                                                     
88 For an explanation of the Pentagon’s reasoning see Ow n Moritz, "Defense Bigs Ask "24" To Cool 
It on Torture," Daily News February 10 2007. 
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decisions that emanate from it necessarily exist in the realm of word magic, and the 
valuations that flow from it are dependent upon the ability of word magic to imbue 
them with legitimacy.  As such the legal system itself has potential to become 
descendant if the conflicts that occur within the legal system lead to a 
delegitimization of the system itself.  The law, however, is not the only realm in 
which word magic has taken on increased import.  A second area of concern is the 
economic system, which I discuss in the following chapter.   
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Chapter 9:  Pop Culture, Identification, and the Commodification of Values  
 A second institution that Burke outlines as being a source of symbols of 
authority is the economy.  His early writings were strongly influenced by his readings 
of Marx.  However, his examination of the role that the economic system plays in 
questions of valuation is sparse, and he mostly focuses on the way in which the work 
that one does affects one’s system of values.  He acknowledges that the work we do 
both reflects and shapes our interests (P&C 240), but at times one’s work may be in 
direct conflict with a person’s personal moral code (ROM 31).  America is grappling 
with this issue as the rights of individuals come into conflict with each other.  Plan B, 
the so called morning after pill, exemplifies this d fficulty.  Some pharmacists believe 
that the pill is a potential abortifacient, and refuse to dispense it.  State governments 
have been struggling with how to deal with this issue, and various laws have been 
passed that have attempted to balance the competing rights of the worker and the 
patient.89  In a rapidly globalizing society, these sorts of personal conflicts are likely 
to emerge more frequently.     
 Burke was correct that the work people do has an effect on how we evaluate 
the broader world around us.  However, in contemporary America our economic 
system plays a more pronounced role in shaping societal values.  Much of our current 
economy is based in the realm of information and representation.  From movies, 
television, songs, the internet, video games, sporting events and all of the secondary 
industries that surround the aforementioned, our economy creates and disseminates 
                                                     
89 For further detail about this controversy see Rob Stein, "Plan B Use Surges, and So Does 
Controversy," The Washington Post July 13 2007. 
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value laden products at an amazing speed.  This coupled with easy access to the 
products, and an apparent desire to escape the extant wi h the ideal ensures that our 
economic system is playing an ever greater role in shaping individual and social 
valuations.90  In 1982, Kimberling argues that “popular art helps socialize its 
audiences into a common culture by providing a set of conventional responses which 
carry stock symbolic meaning” (30).  Cheseboro, who conducted a study of 
primetime television programming from 1974-1991, notes that “producers of these 
series freely admit that persuasive intents guide the development and execution of the 
entertainment they provide,” as they “intentionally formulate and portray certain 
values as more desirable than others” in order to “einforce certain value judgments 
but not others” ("Values and Popular Television" 198).   
 Cheseboro’s study also notes that the values expressed are not consistent over 
time; instead, the values presented were altered across time (218-19).  This trend is 
likely to accelerate as the technological capacity to rapidly create and disseminate 
new programming and images has grown exponentially.  This combined with an 
economic incentive to continually develop something “ ew” increases the likely 
rapidity with which new values are presented for consumption.  In consumer based 
capitalism, it is necessary for people to continually want new products and services to 
replace the old if the economy is going to continue expanding (Featherstone 6).  As 
such, the entelechial push of the economic system is one that relies on the fluidity of 
values.  If we continue to like what we currently have, we do not have a need to buy a 
                                                     
90 I do not mean to downplay the effects that traditional art forms such as literature and plays have had 
on shaping people’s value system.  However, contemporary society is distinct from other historical 
eras in that virtually everyone has access to some or all forms of popular culture.   
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new product to replace it.  One area in which this is particularly true is popular 
culture, which is significant because it is a common s urce for understanding the 
extant world.  
Popular culture plays a significant role in how we understand values, and I 
argue that it does this in three distinct ways.91  The first is the acceptance and/or 
imitation of the values presented; the second is through their rejection, and the third is 
through the responses that others in society have to the implicit valuations.  In the 
first, popular culture has a direct influence in shaping how one understands the world 
and what the appropriate responses to extant circumstances should be.  This can be as 
a direct result of engaging it, or because others in one’s social environment have 
accepted it and one is compelled to follow along.  In the second, one’s identity is 
developed in opposition to the values presented, an in the third, the conflict that 
emerges in response to the popular culture is what shapes one’s value structure.   
From Tipper Gore’s efforts to put parental advisory labels on music in the 
1980s to the FCC’s efforts to control the content tha appears on cable television to 
the burning of books that are viewed as subversive, American society has long been 
concerned with the practical effects of popular culture on societal values.  Those who 
support the regulations and censorship argue that mere exposure to certain ideas and 
words is inherently harmful to one’s value system; those who oppose regulations 
argue that if one’s value system is sufficiently grounded the mere exposure to new 
ideas is harmless because the viewer understands that it is a fictional account.  
                                                     
91 I am not arguing that these three routes are mutually exclusive.  It is probably a combination of allof 
the factors and how they interact with other elements that are also occurring in one’s life.  For the 
purpose of analysis, I will treat them as distinct categories to better flesh out how they function.   
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Burke’s theories suggest that it is not a simple either/or situation, but instead it is a 
both/and, wherein the artistic expression has the capa ity to effect both positively 
and/or negatively.   
The critical questions are “What values are derived from the work itself?”, 
and “How does the artifact valuate extant symbols of authority?”.  It is difficult to 
prove a direct causal connection between popular cuture and changing valuations 
because of the number of variables involved—competing value representations are 
presented in popular culture, which then interact with other sources of values such as 
one’s family, community, and geographical location.  Nonetheless, Burke’s theories 
suggest that popular culture plays an important role in revaluation because it alters the 
environment from which values are learned; it is the “scenic backdrop” of our value 
formation (Kimberling 51).  Value systems and the coi es that are derived from 
them are not static; they are continually emerging as new information and changing 
circumstances are accounted for.  While an individual’s core values may not 
outwardly appear to change because of popular culture, it is naive to believe that it 
has no effect.      
Much of Burke’s discussion of art focuses on its libratory possibility; he views 
it as serving a potential corrective to societal or individual malaise (CS 110-11).  
However, art can also have negative effects when it supports a system of values that 
is destructive to the individual or society.  When one considers art writ large to 
include all forms of popular culture, the implications for value systems are enormous 
as symbols of authority are derived from both the actu l and the imagined.  For 
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example, brokerage firm TD Waterhouse relies on this p enomenon in their 
commercials that star actors Steven Hill and Sam Waterston.  The former played Law 
& Orders’ 92 first district attorney, Adam Schiff, while the latter played ADA Jack 
McCoy.  In the commercials each appears as they do in the television program while 
they tout the benefits of using the company for investment assistance.  The ethos of 
the characters is symbolically transferred to the actors, who in turn transfer it to the 
company.  While neither is a legitimate authority on investment advice, the 
transference of the valuation of them from the artistic to the extant is a powerful 
rhetorical device, which allows viewers to identify with the characters’ personas as if 
they were actual people.    
Identification and Imitation 
   The process of identification is central to understanding valuation; “it is the 
personal variant of the more general concept of orientation” (Branaman 446).  As 
such, it requires a person to make value assessment b cause it necessitates division 
and classification (Burke ROM 22), which requires judgment.  The individual in his
“quest for identity identifies in a symbolic fashion f making choices” as “ the self 
seeks identity through acceptance and rejection of various symbols with which it is 
confronted” (Ambrester 206).  Identification is what allows for “congregation by 
segregation” as it forces one to choose among competing values and their adherents 
(Burke ROM 34).  If one identifies strongly as a Republican, he cannot also identify 
as a Democrat.  Identification requires choosing a side.  In contemporary America, 
                                                     
92 Law and Order is a long-running legal drama that firs aired on television in 1990, and it is still in 
production at the time of this writing.   
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this act, however, is fraught with difficulty because sources of symbols of authority 
are increasingly unstable, which makes it harder to feel connected to self and society, 
and one’s identity may become fractured as disjunctive allegiances come into 
conflict.        
I believe popular culture has a significant impact over individual and social 
values in the contemporary era because of the transference of symbols of authority 
between the realm of aesthetics and entertainment to tha  of people’s lived 
experiences.  People identify with and imitate those who possess social significance 
because they hope the import will be transferred to them and increase their own social 
standing.  Burke notes improvements in one’s social location is a form of 
transcendence (Kenneth Burke ROM 193), and the movement between the two 
realms allows the individual to virtually transcend the circumstances of their lives.  
For Burke, imitation is a form of identification, wherein people can “imitate one 
another’s actions as revealed on the surface, or subtly imitate the underlying 
principles of such action” (ROM 131).93  Hence, identification with pop culture icons 
has the potential to transfer the implicit valuations inherent in the public image of the 
stars to people’s extant existence.   
 This phenomenon is magnified by the drive of the economic system that not 
only continues pushing the envelope of what is considered socially acceptable, while 
at the same time flooding society with increased exposure to the stars and their “bad” 
behavior.  Think about the ongoing saga of singer Brittney Spears; the media exposes 
                                                     
93 Italics in the original. 
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society to the most intimate details of her life, which includes drug and alcohol 
problems, marital and parenting difficulties, and for those who desire, pictures of her 
bare vagina from when she decided underwear were optional when wearing short 
skirts.94  Competition among media sources and the celebritis themselves virtually 
guarantees that the drama will be unending.  While if true competition existed, the 
aggregate effect on valuation would not be as significant, i.e. if the competition 
focused on finding something new or different.  However, the competition seems to 
revolve around who can out-do the other doing the same general thing.  Burke 
recognizes this phenomenon and argues that “from the standpoint of ‘identification’ 
what we call ‘competition’ is better described as men’s attempt to out-imitate one 
another” (ROM 131).  When Burke wrote this, he was describing businesspersons 
who competed ever so hard to own the same insignia representing social status that 
others might possess.  In contemporary popular culture, he competition through 
identification is still strong; however, the competition is to now sell an image that is 
imbued with a plethora of valuations.   
 Many pop culture icons resist the idea that they ar  role models and have a 
responsibility to broader society.  Charles Barkley, a former NBA player who has a 
bad boy image, clearly expressed this view point when e said 
                                                     
94 Britney Spears as a phenomenon is estimated to add $120 million to the economy, which includes 
the paparazzi and the public consumption of her lif.  For a detailed description see ABC News, 
Magazine Estimates Britney Spears Is Worth $120 Million to the Economy January 25 2008, 
Available: http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/Busine s/story?id=4190748&page=1, June 15 2008.  
For a fuller description of her personal problems that frequently make the news see Shan Ross, "Judge 
Rules Britney Must Give up Her Children," The Scotsman October 2 2007.   
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I don't believe professional athletes should be rolmodels.  I believe parents 
should be role models....  It's not like it was when I was growing up.  My mom 
and my grandmother told me how it was going to be.  If I didn't like it, they 
said, ‘Don't let the door hit you in the ass on your way out.’  Parents have to 
take better control.  (Barkley n.p.)    
While increased parental involvement in teaching values might very well be 
beneficial, this assessment assumes that parents have the ability to control with whom 
and what their children identify.  But identification can “operate without conscious 
direction by any particular agent” (Burke ROM 35).  A person may look at an athlete 
and respect their ability and wish they could do the same thing.  Even this small level 
of identification opens the door for identification with other elements of the star’s 
persona.  Simply because talent is what one initially identifies with does not mean 
that identification will stop at that point.  Identification with extrinsic factors 
frequently occurs (27), and if those factors are harmful to society and/or the 
individual, then “bad” identification has happened (ATH 267).     
The depiction of violence in popular culture is an area where a risk of bad 
identification is possible.  Myriad researchers have ttempted to determine if a causal 
connection can be drawn between visual depictions of violence on television and the 
movies and actual violence.  While this is an extremely important question, it is 
beyond the purview of this work.  I will, instead, discuss the way in which violence is 
valuated in its symbolic representations, and how this can lead to symbolic slippage 
between fictional and real-life value judgments.  While violence has always been a 
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part of American popular culture, it current depictions are largely removed from a 
moral framework that indicate under what circumstances violence is an acceptable 
behavior.  While a moral calculus is still present in some representations, some of the 
greatest purveyors of violence have stripped all questions of morality, beyond the 
simple might makes right, from it.  
 The FCC is the governmental agency charged with determining what is 
considered acceptable depictions of both sex and violence on the public air waves.  
While it has been quite active in fining networks that allow even accidental sexual 
content such as the word “fuck” uttered during a live broadcast, or the infamous Janet 
Jackson Super Bowl fiasco wherein singer Justin Timberlake accidentally exposed 
part of Jackson’s breast during the halftime performance of the 2004 Superbowl, 95 it 
has been less diligent in its oversight of depictions f violence.  The amount of 
graphic violence shown on television has increased dramatically during the last 
twenty years.96   
                                                     
95 The participants argued that the exposure was accidental because only Jackson’s shirt was meant to 
be ripped and not her lingerie as well.  While the FCC imposed the maximum fine for the incident, the 
court overturned the fine in 2008.  For further detail see Joann Loviglio, Court Tosses Fcc 'Wardrobe 
Malfunction' Fine, July 21 2008, Yahoo! News, Available: 
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080721/ap_en_tv/cbs_janet_jackson, July 22 2008. 
96 I was struck by how much violence is shown on television in today’s market while watching Quincy, 
M.E. (original air date 1976-1983) in syndication and how mild it is in comparison to today’s trilogy of 
CSI (Crime Scene Investigation) and its spin-offs CSI: Miami and CSI:  New York.  With Quincy, in 
spite of the title character’s job as a medical examiner, the viewer seldom sees a graphic depiction of 
an autopsy.  While the morgue and bodies are shown, ne seldom saw the inside of the body or 
gruesome wounds.  In contrast, on CSI the viewer is frequently confronted with exceptionally bloody 
crime scenes and is shown the removal of bodily organs.  While this may seem trivial to some, 
consider what changes had to be undertaken for this to occur.  The public had to be willing to view the 
gore; the writers had to be able to envision it; the network had to be willing to air it, and advertisers 
needed to believe that their products would not be negatively affected by the gruesome content 
surrounding their advertisements.  The fact that CSI was able be produced, aired, become wildly 
popular and support two spin-offs illustrates how accepting the public has become of gruesome 
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 While it is difficult to prove a causal connection between media violence and 
real violence, the previous analyses of the easy slippage between aesthetic and ethical 
valuation suggests that while depictions of violence may not lead directly to violent 
behavior, it has the potential to affect our value judgments about violent behaviors.  
The television show 2497 is a case in point.  Its lead character, Jack Bauer, is 
repeatedly depicted committing horrific acts of torture in order to stop terrorist 
threats.  Of course, in the television show, torture always works to stop the ticking 
bomb; however, in the real world it is not that simple.  Torture seldom provides 
useful information, and it dehumanizes both those who torture and those who are 
tortured.98  Nevertheless, the army found it incumbent to ask the producers to tone 
down the representations of torture because they believed it was influencing how 
American soldiers fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan understood torture.  The value 
judgment assessed of torturous acts was seemingly altered, in part, by the way in 
which it was depicted on television.     
 Stripping valuations from the appropriate context occurs frequently in 
American popular culture.  The rise of the anti-hero in TV, film and videogames 
portends an uncomfortable answer to the question of wh  can become a symbol of 
authority.  The anti-hero is meant to be a protagonist that is severely flawed, but is 
                                                                                                                                                      
depictions of violence.  Consumers not only accept it, they also expect it.  Watching an episode of 
Quincy is quaint in comparison.   
97 24 first aired in November 2001.   
98 For an explanation of this position see a letter written by 43 retired Generals and Admirals and sent
to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in support of requiring the CIA to follow the standards 
set forth in the Army Field Manuel.  Letter to Select Committee on Intelligence, February 12 2008, 
Human Rights First, Available: http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/08228-etn-military-leaders-
senate-cia.pdf, July 22 2008. 
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deemed worthy nonetheless.  The movie First Blood that came out in the 1980s is an 
example of the sometimes tricky assessment of what behaviors are acceptable or even 
heroic under certain circumstances.  The lead charater, Rambo, is a Vietnam veteran 
who has been mistreated by the military, which gives his law breaking antics an aura 
of heroism and legitimacy.  While First Blood provides a reason why the anti-hero 
could be a genuine hero, many current depictions of violent, anti-social behaviors no 
longer contain the same complexity that allows one t  see both the good and the bad 
of a person at the same time.  Consider the wildly popular video game Grand Theft 
Auto, which has numerous editions.99  In the game one takes on the role of a gangster 
of some sort who must complete a number of illegal tasks in order to advance.  A 
player might undergo a mission to steal cars, shoot enemies, pimp out prostitutes, or 
various other illegal activities.  The better a criminal a player is, the further he will go 
in the game.  While players have to complete certain missions, they are free to engage 
in other activities, such as shooting police who attempt to apprehend them or having 
sex with a prostitute.  Of course, the player can choose to kill the prostitute after 
having sex with her in order to not have to pay for the services.  In the game, a 
complete transvaluation of American values occurs virtually as the player reverses the 
accepted societal frame.  Burke notes that law and order is as much about hierarchy as 
it is regulation (ROM 264), and the player reverses the social order by making 
excellence in criminality the new symbol of authority. 
                                                     
99 To illustrate the popularity of this game, its fourth edition raked in $500 million in sales during its 
first week on the market.  For more detail see Bloomberg News, "Grand Theft Auto Sales Top $500 
Million " International Herald Tribune May 7 2008. 
   
  178 
 While not everyone will ultimately identify with and attempt to imitate acts of 
violence they encounter in popular culture, Burke’s theories suggest the ubiquity of 
the images and their infiltration in almost every con eivable venue makes it probable 
that some will.  At a minimum, the representations e ter into the cultural texture from 
which values emerge.  Desensitization to violence is likely in the broader public, and 
it makes it more likely that people might valuate acts of actual violence differently.  
When the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal first came to public light, the reactions 
from some illustrated the debasement of the American value system as it pertained to 
torture.  Commentator Rush Limbaugh proclaimed loudly that what happened at the 
prison complex was not torture; he went so far as to say that what the pictures 
depicted was no worse than standard fraternity hazing was.100  United States’ 
Representative Dana Rohrabacher from California used th  same argument during a 
Congressional debate about the treatment of prisoner  at Guantanamo Bay.101  While 
pictures of naked human pyramids can be amusing and no -threatening in some 
circumstances, Limbaugh and Rohrabacher’s assessments stripped the images from 
their context and placed them in a benign setting.  I  his discussion of occupational 
psychoses, Burke details the ease with which valuations from one field are transferred 
into another (ROM 133), which is what Limbaugh and Rohrabacher were guilty of.  
In a fraternity house, the pledges understand that they are being humiliated for a 
reason—to increase group cohesion.  They voluntarily agree to engage in the 
                                                     
100 For a more detailed account of Limbaugh’s comments see Media Matters, Limbaugh on Torture of 
Iraqis:  U.S. Guards "Having a Good Time," "Blow[Ing] Some Steam Off", May 5 2004, Available: 
http://mediamatters.org/items/200405050003, July 21 2008. 
101 For a description of Rohrabacher’s speech see Lara Jakes Jordan, "Lawmaker Gets to the Bottom of 
Panties Torture," The Guardian June 5 2008. 
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prescribed acts.  At the prison, however, the individuals were forced to engage in the 
acts photographed.  Violence is an implicit part of he context.  They had no free 
choice to refuse the commands given them.  The ease by which some accepted 
Limbaugh and Rohrabacher’s assessments illustrates the move of valuation from the 
extant to the virtual.  In the real world, prisoners of war do not get naked and pile on 
top of each other for the fun of it while soldiers photograph them, but in the virtual 
world, it is plausible that soldiers did not force th m on top of each other.  When an 
action is stripped from its context, the valuation of it operates in the realm of the 
virtual as the evaluator bases judgment in the ideal and not in the extant.  It is in this 
way that violent representations can emerge as a soci l f rce even when they do not 
lead an individual to commit acts of violence.  It makes it easier to accept violence 
and deem it not that bad, as the individual identifies with and positively valuates the 
violent acts.        
Commodification of Values 
In addition to identification and imitation, a second way in which the 
economic system implicates valuation is through the commodification of values.  In 
A Rhetoric of Motives, Burke briefly touches on the notion of a “cult of 
commodities” (192).  He implies that the cultish devotion that many Americans have 
toward the acquisition of goods can be seen as “a mode of transcendence that is 
genuine, but inferior” (192).  This suggests that peo le seek out sociality by their 
ability to consume.  While this allows connection with others, it is a warped 
connection.  This concern is magnified in the information age as images and ideals 
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have become commodities, which can be bought and sold. This creates a situation in 
which values are no longer simply ideals that provide order and meaning to one’s 
existence; instead, values become “commodities” that can be used to sell oneself or 
one’s ideas or products.  The incentive to be famous and to make money is deemed 
by much mass culture to be more important than the means by which one gains access 
to fame and fortune.  As a consequence, values do not have intrinsic worth; instead, it 
is how the expression of values is packaged to be sold to an audience that is of 
consequence.  Star Muir illustrates the problem when t is cult of commodities 
becomes entrenched within a social order.  
The problem with the cult of commodities is the essential imbalance it builds 
into society.  The problem is precisely that these forces become “cultish,” and 
extreme.  At an individual level, the monetary motive s an alienating one 
since it recasts individual worth and the attainment of goals in quantitative 
terms.  Money and economic habits are “measurable,” in the most direct way, 
and they therefore infuse thinking about social relations.  (21)       
While not everyone in America “buys” into this “cult” as it relates to values, the 
entertainment industry is busy churning out commodifie  values.  To further explain 
this argument, I examine the way the marketing of one’s persona affects the 
representations of one’s values.  I will use two contemporary stars—Jessica Simpson 
and Paris Hilton—as examples of this.        
Both Simpson and Hilton are examples of celebrities who have capitalized on 
making their personal lives available for public consumption in a way that has 
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allowed their persons to become a commodity.  While t eir circumstances differ, in 
both cases their personal lives have been the source f their fame.  Simpson is a 
singer and actress who is the daughter of a Baptist youth minister.  While in high 
school she signed a virginity pledge, and publicly stated her goal to remain a virgin 
until she married.102  While she was apparently successful at maintaining her purity 
until she married her now ex-husband, Nick Lachey, r public actions belie the 
commitment to marriage that undergird her original abstinence pledge, and illustrate 
the way in which her personal values were commodifie .  She and Lachey starred in 
MTV’s reality show, Newlyweds, which aired the most intimate moments of their 
first year of marriage for the world to see.103  Marriages are difficult to maintain even 
under the best of circumstances, and it seems having one’s home invaded by cameras 
and directors for the first year of marriage would put an incredible strain upon it.  Not 
surprisingly, after three years the couple filed for divorce.  In effect, Simpson and 
Lachey packaged their marriage, topped it with a bow and sold it to the American 
public for their consumption.  The monetary value of the marriage as a commodity 
superseded the sacred value of the marriage in spite of the preservation of Simpson’s 
virginity and her stated public views of marriage as a sacred institution.104  However, 
her career was launched, and she has a public persona that relies heavily on a 
                                                     
102 For a description of the incongruity of her virginity pledge and the way in which she sexualized her 
public performances see Cathrin Schaer, The New Trend of Virginity, January 20 2001, 
nzherald.co.nz, Available: http://www.entertainmentwise.com/news/27444/paris-hilton-in-racist-video-
storm, July 22 2008. 
103 The show ran from August 2003-May 2005.   
104 According to Wikipedia, Simpson purportedly agreed to o the show to provide publicity for a 
newly released album.  The show is widely credited with propelling her to stardom.  See for example 
her biography at http://www.jessicasimpsonnet.com/biography/.   
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sexualized representation of her body.  Over a few short years, her public image has 
moved from one of a virginal Christian to a star who is dependent upon the public 
consumption of her sexuality to maintain her career.  Her image operates in a 
repudiation of her previously expressed values.      
In the second example, Paris Hilton, an heiress to the Hilton hotel fortune, has 
engaged in a career that is based almost exclusively on being famous for being 
famous.  She has shown no discernable talent except to make money by exposing her 
personal life to the public.  She has functionally commodified the entirety of her 
existence in order to become even richer than she already was.  She is paid to attend 
parties in Hollywood,105 and she has been involved in a number of infamous events 
that by many people’s accounts would show a lack of m rality.  A sex tape involving 
herself and her ex-boyfriend was distributed on the int rnet;106 she and her sister 
Nicole were caught on video, which was posted to YouTube, using a racial epithet;107 
she has had a number of arrests for driving under the influence, which ultimately 
resulted in her spending time in jail.108  The paparazzi ensured that her court 
appearances and her subsequent internment and release from jail were visible for the 
                                                     
105 Hilton was offered $200,000 to celebrate her 24th birthday at Pure.  For more details see Rigel 
Gregg, Paris Hilton Paid $200,000 to Party on Her Birthday, September 1 2007, Luxist, Available: 
http://www.luxist.com/2007/09/01/paris-hilton-paid-200-000-to-party-on-her-birthday/, July 22 2008. 
106 While this occurrence was a result of actions on the part of her ex-boyfriend, Hilton strategically 
used the episode to further garner attention to herself and hence increase the marketability of herself as 
a “bad” girl.  To illustrate the exposure this has given Hilton, a Google search with the terms “Paris 
Hilton Sex Tape” resulted in over 3.4 million hits.   
107 For a more detailed description on the video see Paris Hilton in Racist Video Storm, February 1 
2007, EntertainmentWise, Available: http://www.entertainmentwise.com/news/27444/paris-hilton-in-
racist-video-storm, July 22 2008. 
108 After Hilton was released from jail she appeared on Larry King Live to recount the experience to 
her viewing audience.  For a description of the appe rance see Ray Richmond, We're All Paying 
Dearly for This Trip to Paris, June 28 2007, Past Deadline, Available: 
http://www.pastdeadline.com/paris_hilton/index.html, July 22 2008. 
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world to see.  While it is difficult to determine what Hilton’s actual values are, she 
has made a small fortune by representing herself as a craven and valueless women.  
She has used her fame from these events to further her economic advantage by 
engaging in business ventures; one of which is the Paris Hilton fashion line, which 
makes it easier for those who identify with her to act like the star they aspire to be.  
The satirical television show, South Park, highlighted potential problems with this 
phenomenon in the episode “Stupid Spoiled Whores.”  This episode uses Hilton’s 
persona to interrogate why parents are willing to dress their young daughters in Paris’ 
clothing line, which symbolically sexualizes the girls.  The implication of the episode 
is that if parents encourage their daughters to emulate a spoiled, drunken, 
promiscuous and vacuous woman, their daughters are likely to grow up to be spoiled, 
drunken, promiscuous and vacuous women.  Burke would concur with the possibility 
and perhaps, the probability of this occurring.  The Paris Hilton phenomenon 
represents the cult of commodification.  Her fame and fortune are more important 
than the values that she represents.   
  The “bad” behaviors are now encouraged, and the selling of a commodity is 
more important than the underlying values being expr ssed.  The violation of social 
values has become a fetish.  This phenomenon is magnified by the rapidity with 
which new programs emerge using the same general form but pushing the inversion 
of the values even further and by the ubiquity of pp culture stars and their antics.  
The economics of the entertainment industry virtually guarantee that stars and the 
package of values with which they are imbued must be constantly changed, which 
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makes it more difficult to have any sort of consistent identification.  While 
identification should lead to transcendence, it can le d to the “empty acquisition of 
verbal paraphernalia” (Burke ROM 337), and I believe this is common in 
contemporary America.  Historically, Burke notes that authority symbols are stable 
and difficult to change (ATH 226, 331-5) because the strength of the allegiance to 
them as well as the as the ability of casuistic stretching to alleviate the dissonance 
caused by inconsistencies in the social order (230).  However, when circumstances 
undermine authority symbols, there is always an interregnum in which rapid shifts in 
valuation can and do occur (216).  I believe the current era to be constantly in this 
state of flux because the rapidity with which the economic system pushes for change.  
The pop culture icon is a commodity that is to be sold and consumed and then 
replaced by a newer and “better” model, and the whiplash effect can be traumatic to 
the stability of values.  Consequently, individuals can become alienated from the 
social system when symbols of authority are discarded like yesterdays trash.  In the 
following chapter, I will further examine the process of alienation.   
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Chapter 10:  Alienation 
 One of the means by which social orders and personal identities are 
maintained is through casuistic stretching.  The lens through which one views the 
world is continually altered by new experiences, and the changes normally occur in 
gradations that are imperceptible, which allows for alterations to one’s system of 
values while maintaining the appearance of their continuity (Burke P&C 142).  
However, efforts at casuistry cannot always resolve the dissonance that occurs when 
societal values no longer adequately account for individual circumstance.  As values 
are bureaucratized by institutions, unwanted byproducts will likely emerge (ATH 
252), which can make it more difficult for people to feel as if they belong to the social 
order.  It is “through shared perspectives” that “peo le identify and develop a 
common view needed for social cooperation” (Kelley 323), and when identifications 
begin to dissociate, the symbolic trappings of transce dent beliefs can begin to 
disintegrate.  When being optimistic, Burke argued that one should view the act of 
dissociation as a cleansing period—a time to remove those elements of the belief 
system that are no longer functional for the indiviual or social order (ROM 153).  
However, cleansing does not guarantee that only the bad will be eliminated from a 
frame; it can cause a rejection of the entire value system, even if many parts of it have 
a positive impact on people’s lives (ATH 222).  Instability necessarily exists when 
transitions between frames occur because a revaluation of values is occurring (216).  
When the foundational aspects of a population’s ident ty are called into question, the 
social order can become factionalized.  It is at this point that alienation can occur 
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because the broader system of symbols of authority has been undermined, and the 
individual no longer feels as if he is connected to the social order (216, 341-44).109    
In this section, I will explore the phenomenon of alienation as it relates to dissociation 
from society and dissociation from one’s physical self.   
 To begin, I will outline Burke’s conception of alienation.  Burke borrows the 
term metaphorically “from Marx, who borrowed it from Hegel, who borrowed it from 
Diderot” (ATH 216).  He uses the terminology in a similar sense as these earlier 
theorists, but as with all of Burke’s borrowing of terminology, he places his own 
meaning upon it.  When he discusses alienation, he refers to a sense of disconnect 
with the social order in which one resides.  He clarifies that “a good synonym for our 
purposes is ‘estrangement’’ (216).  It is “that state of affairs wherein a man no longer 
‘owns’ his world because…it seems basically unreasonable” (216).  As Burke notes 
alienation can be both material and spiritual (216-17), and one can be both connected 
and alienated at the same time.  For example, one culd be materially well off and 
own the insignia of society’s symbols of authority, but at the same time not feel as if 
one fits into the broader social group.  A person is materially alienated when he does 
not have access to the “‘goods’ which his society has decreed as ‘normal’” (216), i.e. 
when an individual does not have access to the insignia of the symbols of authority of 
the social order.  On the other hand, a person is spiritually alienated when “this 
deprivation leads him to distrust the rationale of purposes by which he is deprived” 
                                                     
109 An individual can feel alienated from a broader culture even if the society is not factionalized.  
However, when widespread segments of the population feel alienated it usually signifies a society that 
is in a transitional frame where there is disagreemnt about the order’s symbols of authority and who 
has access to them.   
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(216).  At its core, this is a question of being invested in the value system of the order 
and feeling secure in one’s social location.  For this state to occur people must feel 
connected with others in the society.  Because the identification that lets this occur is 
never complete, and identification also necessitate division a certain level of 
alienation will always exist.  “We are, in various ways, divided, alienated—from 
nature, from each other, from other cultures, even from ourselves” (Coe "Defining 
Rhetoric" 48).   
As I have previously argued, the implications that communication technology 
has on the fluidity of values is enormous.  The economic system is continually 
pushing new “products” that can alter the scenic background in which all valuations 
occur, and the commodification of values provides an economic incentive to push 
different and frequently contradictory valuations.  This fluidity of values in society 
increases the opportunities for alienation to emerge on the individual level as people’s 
since of identity may have greater difficulty keeping up with and accounting for the 
new valuations being presented for consumption, which may make it more difficult 
for people to feel and retain a sense of connection to the broader social order, and 
alienation is a probable outcome.          
 In times of stability, authority symbols have the appearance of being steady 
and foundational because the rate of change is slow, and people’s casuistic efforts are 
able to maintain coherence for them.  In times of transition, however, values are 
called into question and authoritative symbols lose their sheen.  Current 
communication technologies provide the means for the transformation of these 
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symbols, and the economic system is vested in altering the insignia that marks the 
symbols of authority, which can magnify the appearance of a weakening value 
system.  Hence, alienation is likely to exist across social strata as it become 
increasingly difficult for individuals to find foundational values that allow them to 
connect with large segments of society, and pronounced factionalism can emerge 
along a multiplicity of fissures such as race, religion, and political affiliation.  When a 
commonality of values does not exist, factions within t e order can turn on each other 
in order to push their value system to a position of dominance, further undermining a 
sense of community among the factions.   
 According to Burke, one source of alienation is the r etorical act of 
debunking, which is a process of transcendence downward (ATH 92-3).  As a literary 
device it refers to efforts to deflate reputations r to demythologize social myths such 
as proving Washington did not chop down a cherry tree (PLF 145).  As a rhetorical 
strategy in the social and political world, however, it seldom functions to merely set 
the record straight.  Instead, it tends to rely upon creating caricatures of people, ideas 
and actions that destroy the good aspects along with the bad (ATH 74).  When the 
values of a social order are debunked, alienation is likely to occur because values 
provide a sense of connection to the larger order, and when they are delegitimized, 
the likelihood of disassociation from others is increased.   
The risk of alienation in a democratic society is always present because of the 
nature of “factional debunking” that can occur (Burke ATH 77).  In an effort to 
destroy the other party’s candidates and positions, the devaluation of common values 
   
  189 
can ensue.  Consider, for example, the efforts that have been made to undermine court 
rulings that have purportedly expanded rights beyond the “strict wording” of the 
constitution.  Labeling judges as “activists” and as opposed to the Constitution can 
undermine the legitimacy of the courts110 and Burke’s theory suggests that the 
delegitimizing the court’s actions makes it easier for people to disregard all court 
rulings and not just the ones that are controversial.  Alienation from the values of a 
social order can increase the sense that one is notbound by the rules that emanate 
from those values.  While I cannot make a strict causal connection between the 
rhetorical debunking of the judiciary and violent ac s against judges, their families 
and court workers, Burke’s conception of entelechy suggests that it is a possible 
outcome of a rhetorical strategy that undermines th moral legitimacy of the 
judiciary.  A United States Federal Judge indicates that “in federal courts it [violence] 
is more likely to come from litigants representing themselves, particularly those who 
have fired their lawyers, in emotion-laden cases alleging violations of civil rights or 
injuries to self-image, cases that deeply involve notions of personal worth.”  (Kane 
15).  While he does not explicitly tie alienation to the violence, his rhetoric suggests 
that it is connected.  The individuals feel as if the judicial system has ignored their 
rights, and the values of the court are contrary to what they perceive the values ought 
                                                     
110 A 2007 gallup poll indicated that only 34% have confidence in the Supreme Court.  This number is 
the lowest level of confidence reported since the qu stion first started being asked in 1973, and it is 
only the second time the number has dipped below 40%.  For more details about this poll see Benjamin 
Wittes, The Supreme Court's Looming Legitimacy Crisis, June 25 2007, Brookings Instutute, 
Available: http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0625governance_wittes.aspx, July 23 2008. 
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to be.  The judges, in the rhetoric and belief of some,111 have become enemies of the 
state and the individual as opposed to civil servants who are doing their best to 
balance the rights of all people within the social order; responding violently is a 
possible entelechial outcome of rhetorically positining judges as the embodiment of 
that which is wrong with society.  The individual judge is dehumanized through 
characterizations that remove her humanity and turn he  into a symbolic 
representation of the value system being rejected.  As such, the “‘desire to kill’” is 
better understood “as a desire to transform the principle which that person 
represents” (Burke ROM 13).  This sort of debunking strategy creates a narrow prism 
through which all actions are evaluated, which necessarily elides much of the 
complexity of the situation (PLF 152), and it makes it increasingly difficult for social 
relations to develop in which individuals see each other as part of the same 
community based upon shared values (ATH 106).                  
 The above understanding of violence helps to explain actions that seem 
intuitively counterproductive.  During the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, where massive 
looting and destruction of property were prevalent, it was difficult to watch people 
destroy the communities in which they lived.  From an outsider’s perspective, it 
                                                     
111 As an example of this perception United States Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) said in a speech on the 
Senate floor “It causes a lot of people, including me, great distress to see judges use the authority that 
they have been given to make raw political or ideological decisions"…"the Supreme Court has taken 
on this role as a policymaker rather than an enforcer of political decisions made by elected 
representatives of the people"… I don't know if there is a cause-and-effect connection, but we have 
seen some recent episodes of courthouse violence in this country. . . . And I wonder whether there may 
be some connection between the perception in some quarters, on some occasions, where judges are 
making political decisions yet are unaccountable to the public, that it builds up and builds up and 
builds up to the point where some people engage in, ngage in violence.”  For more detail about 
Cornyn’s speech see Charles Babington, "Senator Links Violence To "Political" Decisions," The 
Washington Post April 5 2005. 
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seemed not to be in the best interest of those engag d in the acts of violence.  
However, when one considers it from the perspective of alienation the acts of 
violence become understandable.  Examining the feelings of dispossession and of 
being left behind by the larger, capitalist structure of society helps to illuminate the 
reason why businesses were targeted for looting and destruction; many looters had a 
desire to lash out at the values symbolically represented by the businesses and their 
owners.112  While outsiders may have viewed the riots as an act of self-destruction, 
many of the participants viewed it as an act of reclaiming the neighborhood for their 
own community values.  The rioters expressed a lack of ontrol over their existence.  
As Burke argues, a sense of connection to the social rder is unlikely to exist when 
individuals feel as if they lack control over the circumstances of their lives (ROM 
33), which can lead to a violent backlash against the insignia of the order’s values.       
 Furthermore, alienation can also be precipitated by what Burke refers to as the 
neo-Malthusian principle—the taking of ideas and actions to their entelechial end.  
Values are ideas, and as such, are at risk of being pushed too far and becoming 
unhealthy for the individual and/or the social order.  As values are instantiated, they 
become bureaucratized (Burke ATH 225) and can lead to unintended consequences 
(314).  One of the perils of the entelechial push of bureaucratization is a disconnect 
between the rights of the individual and his subsequent obligation to the social order 
(298).  This move is descendent in nature as the moral view moves from the 
                                                     
112 For more detail of how this attitude was taken by looters see Daniel B. Wood, "L.A.'S Darkest 
Days," The Christian Science Monitor April 29 2002. Interviews with participants illuminate the anger 
about the economic devastation of the neighborhood and how conflicts between ethnic groups charged 
the violence that occurred.   
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universal—the social—back to the individual.  The “thou shall not do X” becomes 
“though shall not do X to me” without a sense of reciprocity to treat others as a 
person demands others treat him.  The individual becom s the central arbiter of 
values at the expense of the social order, and a sense of obligation to others is 
diminished.  Consider the example of a college education and plagiarism.  The 
purpose of attending college is to provide students with the knowledge that they need 
to function in certain segments of the social order, and the degree the student receives 
is the symbol that lets others know that the knowledge was attained.  However, a 
study by the Center for Academic Integrity indicates hat 80% of all college students 
have cheated at least once (Moser-Katz n.p.), which undermines the purpose of the 
educational process and gives students benefits that they did not earn.  The student 
who cheats has determined that he deserves a certain g ade and believes that he 
should not have to do the work to attain it.  All obligation of fairness to other students 
who do their own work is lost in this moral calculation, and the cheater is removing 
himself from the constraints of the value system of the social order while maintaining 
his right to the benefits found within it.  This is an act of alienation because it 
disconnects the individual from the broader value system and any sense of obligation 
to others, which is necessary for a society of shared values to exist.  While it could be 
argued that this is not an example of alienation because the cheating student is over-
identifying with certain values of the social order—the desire to have a college degree 
and the ability to get the type of job this status confers—and as a result, is still 
showing an investment in the symbols of authority of the order; this conception is 
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problematic because the student fundamentally does n t recognize the competing 
rights of others in the social order.  The value system in which he is operating is 
inherently antisocial and represents a form of “bad identification” (Burke ATH 267) 
and is indicative of alienation.       
 When discussing alienation, Burke largely focuses on the ways in which the 
individual becomes separated from others and the social rder; however, I also 
believe that individuals can become alienated from themselves, not just spiritually, 
but also bodily.  The rapidity with which symbols of authority both emerge and 
dissipate in contemporary American society increases th  likelihood of alienation 
occurring.  Burke argues that one of the ways people combat alienation is through the 
immediacy of the senses and a return to the primal (ATH 218), and I argue that this 
attempt to return to the primal can cause one to turn against their own physicality—
becoming alienated from their physical self in an effort to connect with others in 
society.   Current technology makes it possible to abandon the sanctity of one’s own 
physicality, and the cult of commodities makes it easy to see one’s physical being as 
yet one more resource to be manipulated in an attemp  meet a cultural ideal.  
Contemporary society has done much to alienate people from their biological sources 
of being by selling products that claim to “fix” the “problem” that is one’s body.  Hair 
can be re-grown; bodily odors can be masked; teeth can be straightened and 
whitened; bodies can be plumped or shrunken by plastic surgery.  Plastic surgeon, Dr. 
Lisa Jenks, is quoted as saying “I think—for better or worse—our culture has made 
looking our best, looking young so important” (Guillentine n.p.).  A “cure” to every 
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conceivable flaw that one has can be purchased even if it trades-off with maintaining 
one’s physical health.  The preceding article notes that in 2004, approximately one-
third of those having cosmetic surgery had a household income below $30,000, and in 
some instances the sacrifices needed to pay for the surgery included health insurance.  
The body is turned into a resource to be exploited for the purposes of connecting with 
an ephemeral social value of what an “acceptable” body looks like.           
 This phenomenon is further illuminated by the pro-ana movement, wherein 
bad identifications lead to self-destructive behaviors that directly and immediately 
cause harm to one’s physical being.  Anorexia Nervosa is a psychological disorder 
that causes individuals to starve themselves to reach a physically unhealthy weight.  
While most people consider the act of starving oneself to the point of illness or death 
as being a problem, a growing movement of anorexics is defending the act as a 
lifestyle choice.113  Pro-anorexic websites offer advice and encouragement to those 
who wish to starve themselves to meet an unhealthy physical aesthetic.  The desire to 
harm the body to gain “control” over one’s life illustrates a level of self-hatred that is 
best understood as alienation from oneself.  The body is devalued in an effort to gain 
a sense place in the world.  A disjuncture is created in which the only way the 
individual can find a place in the social world is to separate oneself from the 
biological basis of survival.  It could be argued that the creation of community in the 
pro-anorexic movement is a process of repossession.  While it is true that the 
                                                     
113 For example see the following web sites: http://www.ringsworld.com/pro-anorexia.html, 
http://community.livejournal.com/proanorexia 7-23-2008.  As of 2001, over 400 similar sites existed.  
For more detail about this phenomenon see Jessica Reaves, "Anorexia Goes High Tech," Time July 31 
2001. 
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individuals are identifying with others, the valuation present in the community 
furthers a valuation of the self that is pathological and in some instances deadly.   
 While alienation does often have pernicious effects on the individual and the 
social order, alienation can at times be viewed as a positive act.  When the values of 
the social order itself are harmful to people, alienation can be viewed as an act of 
rebellion or resistance.  By rejecting and separating oneself from the dominant value 
structure, the alienated individual can make an affirmative revaluation of values that 
has the potential to better the self and society.  In one sense, all revolutions began as 
alienation as the individuals involved reject the values of the social order and work to 
alter them into a preferable form.  In the next section, I will examine the process of 
repossession, wherein individuals who are alienated tempt to regain a sense of 
control over the symbols of authority and underlying values of the social order.    
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Chapter 11:  Repossession 
Alienation is usually viewed negatively because of the dispossession that 
some feel in relation to the larger social orders in which they reside.  While alienation 
can have horrific effects on the individual psyche and the society in which he lives, 
from a perspective of valuation it does not necessarily have to be seen as bad thing.  
While it does lead individuals to feel as if they no longer have a stake in the current 
value system, this sense of dispossession can also h ve positive effects if it leads to 
the emergence of a value system that better meets the needs of people.  During 
periods of alienation, individuals try to regain contr l over their circumstances by 
attempting to repossess the symbols of authority of he social order (Burke ATH 315).  
As such, repossession is always a moral act because it is an effort to alter the value 
system in some way.  In this section, I will examine the symbolic means of 
repossession, the ways this can alter value systems, and finally the perils and 
possibilities that these alterations can accrue. 
 Individuals attempting to repossess the world in which they live can utilize a 
number of rhetorical strategies.  While these begin as symbolic maneuvers, actions 
frequently follow as people take the steps necessary to actualize the value changes 
they want to see occur.  The first of these is what Burke labels as secular prayer, 
which refers to any mimetic action that encourages a particular attitude or behavior 
(ATH 321) and is always value laden (322).  For example, the recitation of the pledge 
of allegiance or standing and placing one’s hand over her heart during the playing of 
the national anthem are efforts to enact patriotism.  Many times secular prayer is an 
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entirely symbolic act because it is coaching a particular value assessment that relies 
upon people’s voluntary acceptance of it.  However, when these valuations become 
bureaucratized, they move beyond the purely symbolic and involve other factors.  
Laws are the codification of particular value assesments that take on the force of the 
state to ensure people’s compliance with them (141 note).           
 In the process of repossession, secular prayer can play a significant role in 
changing the underlying value judgments made by the social order, and this can be 
affected either from the top down or from the bottom up.  America’s history of race 
relations illustrates this point.  The abolitionist movement attempted to persuade the 
populace and governmental actors that slavery was morally unjustifiable.  While 
many heeded their call, it was not until the nation resorted to the bloodshed of the 
Civil War that the practice was ultimately ended.  However, the abolition of slavery 
was insufficient to alter the underlying perceptions of Black inferiority that 
undergirded the slave trade, and the post-reconstruction South maintained a virtual 
slave trade by systematically disenfranchising the Black population and denying them 
access to the levers of political and economic power (Marable 41).  When Blacks 
succeeded in spite of the efforts of the white majority, they were frequently beaten, 
jailed, and/or lynched to enforce a particular view of race relations.114  This was an 
effort to coach an attitude of white supremacy, Black subservience, and enforcement 
of an economic caste system that reserved access to the insignia of symbols of 
authority for the white population.   
                                                     
114 For a fuller discussion of this issue see White Rope and Faggot. 
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This struggle over race relations in the United States illustrates the process of 
both alienation and repossession.  Under slavery Blacks were alienated from the 
rights and privileges guaranteed by the Constitution; however, when the Constitution 
was altered to allow Blacks access to it, many Southern whites were alienated from 
the broader American culture.115  They rejected the alterations of the new American 
value system, and some to this day perceive the South as an aggrieved population 
whose rights were unjustly trampled upon by the aggressors from the North.116  
Conversely, the Black communities that were formed in the post-war era illustrate the 
effort to possess the symbols of authority to which Blacks had long been denied 
access.  The struggle for racial equality illustrates the how dynamic the process of 
alienation and repossession, which is sometimes largely symbolic, but that is at other 
times corporal in the basest meaning of the word.   
A second means by which people attempt to repossess th  symbols of 
authority of the social order is through historical interpretation.  According to Burke, 
“a rationale of history is the first step whereby the dispossessed repossess the world” 
(ATH 315).  Every effort to place a value judgment on historical events is an effort to 
define the acts and actors in relation to the value system of the present or of a 
preferred value system.  One reading of American history could establish the 
                                                     
115 Obviously, in the instance of slavery this was more than a symbolic act, but Burke’s theory 
encourages one to look at both the symbolic aspects of an issue and the ways in which the symbolic is 
materially instantiated.   
116 As an illustration of this, RedState.com, a conservative blog, in an effort to support the continued 
occupation of Iraq used the following analogy in an email sent to its members:  “Of course, it could 
just be that the Democrats are clueless about the military.  Someone should ask the Democrats if they 
think we’re still at war with the confederacy, the G rmans, and the Japanese given all the standing 
American armies in the South, Germany, and Japan.”  As posted on Liberal Values, April 9, 2008, 
accessed April 25, 2008 <http://liberalvaluesblog.cm/?p=3120> 
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founders of our nation as heroes who were able to throw off the shackles of 
monarchical oppression.  A second reading could say that the American founders 
were subversive terrorists who overthrew a legitimae government.  Each potential 
reading of history has a basis in historical fact, but in each, the value assessment 
differs.  Depending upon one’s current values and desires, one of the readings will be 
more appealing than the other.  When rhetors evaluate history, they are always 
making a value judgment, and the value judgment is a means by which humans 
establish themselves as for or against a particular order, which frequently has 
implications for how we valuate the present system.   
The use of historical valuation can be seen in most efforts to alter the value 
system of a social order.  Social movements frequently rely on rhetorical strategies 
that change who has access to or what constitutes the ymbols of authority of the 
order.  Consider the women’s suffrage movement.  The goal of the movement was to 
establish the full rights of citizenship to women by providing access to one of the 
greatest symbols of authority of a democratic regim—the franchise.  In this instance, 
the goal was not to alter the symbol or its underlying value judgment; instead the goal 
was to expand who could have access to it.  Historically, women were believed to be 
too reliant on emotions and unable to act rationally; one element of the rhetoric of the 
movement attempted to reconstitute the perception of women’s abilities to function in 
a “mans” world.  Through the use of logical argument, many of the rhetors enacted 
the ability to be rational and argued that the reason that women appeared to be 
incapable of rational thought was because they had been denied access to the formal 
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schooling that taught people how to be rational.117  Hence, the valuation of history 
was altered in order to change the values of the current order.   
Rhetorical repossession can also occur via the process of mythmaking, 
wherein people “own a myth to take up the slack betwe n what is desired and what is 
got” (Burke ATH 315).  Burke notes that mythos originally meant “word” and hence 
has come to mean a narrative form (LAS 380) that tells the origin of the order (383), 
and “its moral authority is a direct or indirect means of influencing the dispositions 
and habits” (395) of its members.  In other words, the order is a system of 
governance, and the myth is “designed not merely to acc unt for ‘origins’ but also to 
account for them in ways that provide sanctions for the given order” (395).  Hence, 
all cultures have mythical figures that exemplify the values of the order, and when 
individuals feel alienated from the dominant myth and values, they will frequently 
seek a counter mythology as a means to feel in possession of their lives and as a 
propagandistic tool by which to entice others to identify with the counter myth.  An 
example of this process can be seen in the adaptation of Viking mythology by white 
supremacist groups for the purposes of countering the value of multiculturalism found 
in contemporary American society.118  In an effort to explain the origins of white 
supremacy and to justify the desire to enforce white dominance by force, the hate 
groups bypass the dominant mythologies of America and co-opt an ancient, warrior 
religion that is seen out of place by the culture at large.  The danger of this adaptation 
                                                     
117 See for example Clarina Howard Nichols, "The Respon ibilities of Woman," Man Cannot Speak for 
Her, ed. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1989).   
118 For a discussion of the use of Nordic mythology to advance the cause of white supremacy see Neo-
Nazis:  Two Hate Groups Are on the Move, Spring 2008, Southern Poverty Law Center, Available: 
http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?aid=892, April 26 2008. 
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is in the power of the myth to compel actions by its followers.  As Burke notes, myths 
operate rhetorically by a reductive simplification (137) that “brings up resources of its 
own” (151) because of the entelechial properties of the symbol system itself.  Once 
one accepts the notion that he has not only the right to conquer others but will also be 
rewarded in the afterlife, attempts to violently vanquish the “enemy” are not far 
behind.   
The above analysis is not to suggest that all myth aking is dangerous, but it 
does illustrate the power of mythology to alter the values of a given social order.  In 
some instances, the myth is expansive and attempts to create a means of peaceful 
coexistence among differing peoples; however, in other situations, it can function to 
clearly delineate friend from foe in a way that marks the line of battle and justifies 
whatever means necessary to vanquish the enemy.  Burke, in his essay “The Rhetoric 
of Hitler’s Battle” illustrates the pernicious and destructive outcomes that the latter 
can have for a social order (PLF 164-189) when the mythologized enemy exists in the 
extant world.  Hitler resolved his personal alienation by exterminating those whom he 
saw as the source of his dispossession.                
Closely related to the process of myth making, another symbolic process of 
repossession can be found in what Burke referred to as rituals of purification and 
rebirth.  Many religions provide a means by which individuals and/or social orders 
can be purified and their “sins” can be cast out.  The crucifixion of Jesus Christ in the 
Christian faith and the subsequent ritual of communion that celebrates the sacrifice of 
Jesus is an exemplar of this process.  Christ was sacrificed so that humans could be 
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“forgiven” of their sins, and the act of communion is a ritual enactment that allows 
people access to his sacrifice.  While the notion of ritual purification is well 
understood in religious terms, it also plays a significant role in secular social orders as 
people engage in symbolic behaviors to purify the order.  Through the use of word 
magic, people are able to redefine and reweigh words in an effort to alter one’s 
understanding and valuation of a situation and to symbolically “purge” that which had 
been the source of the “problem.”  Thus, a new order is allowed to emerge from the 
ashes of the old.  Burke argues that symbolic purificat on is “ingrained in the nature 
of symbolic action” (SOM 270), and even slight alterations in the symbols that we 
use can have a purgatory effect (ROM 310).  Consequently, even subtle alterations in 
our language can have a profound effect on how we und rstand the value system in 
which we operate.   
As individuals attempt to regain possession of the world in which they live, 
their choices will necessarily implicate others in the social order, and this means that 
the values of the broader social order will be affected in some way.  As a general rule, 
value changes can either occur slowly and gradually, wherein many of elements of 
the previous value system are still present in whole or in part, or they can occur 
rapidly, wherein large segments of the previous value system are rejected out-of-
hand.  In the former, individuals are able to eliminate elements of the value system 
that are no longer functional for the social unit while retaining those parts that help 
maintain and nourish it.  Amending the United States’ Constitution to expand its 
rights to women and African Americans illustrates thi  point.  The ideals of liberal 
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democracy were maintained while at the same time expanding who was considered 
eligible for those rights; this act of transcendence broadly expanded the notion of 
whom “We the People” are. 
 In some instances, the value structure becomes self-perpetuating and is able to 
largely maintain itself because of the beliefs of those who are alienated from it.  
Burke refers to this notion as an “authoritative structure,” which “encourages the 
dispossessed to feel that his only hope of repossession lies in his allegiance to the 
structure that has dispossessed him” (ATH 329-30).  When this occurs, individuals 
who are alienated turn the blame for their dispossession upon themselves or on others 
who symbolically represent themselves.  Consider th instance of some African 
American leaders in the post-reconstruction South who accepted the dominant 
narrative that only the criminal elements within their community suffered at the hands 
of the lynch mob;119 another example would be that of anti-suffrage women who 
actively worked to keep women from getting the franchise.  In both instances, the 
valuation of the dominant belief structure had been so internalized that their own 
identity was threatened when the value system was criticized.  The problem was 
symbolically constructed such that the value system was not the problem, but instead, 
the people who pointed out the flaws of that system were the threat.  In both of these 
examples, only a minority of the aggrieved population accepted this interpretation, 
and change was eventually enacted.  However, these examples illustrate the 
                                                     
119 Anti-lynching activist Ida B. Wells discusses the pr valence of this attitude in the latter part of the
19th century in her autobiography as she relates her own acceptance of this notion and how the 
lynching of a close friend of hers caused her to come to the realization that this belief was false.  See 
Ida B. Wells-Barnett, Crusade for Justice, ed. Alfreda M. Duster (Chicago:  University of Chicago 
Press, 1970).  
   
  204 
connection between one’s personal identity and the symbols of authority of the social 
order, and the power this has to convince people that the current order needs to be 
maintained in spite of the harms that it may be causing to the self and to others.  In an 
authoritative structure, value change is more likely to occur slowly, and vestiges of 
the old belief structure will likely remain intact because they have never been fully 
discredited.   
 Conversely, value change is sometimes revolutionary, wherein the current 
structure is repudiated and rejected outright.  Symbolically, one of the reasons this 
occurs is by the process that Burke refers to as “being driven into the corner” (Burke 
ATH 220-224), which is an amplifying device “requiring the man who would reject a 
little to reject a great deal” (222).  This occurs when a value system has been created 
that “bears upon every important aspect of a man’s social relations,” which makes it 
“hard for him to question the structure at any one point” (222-3).  Each aspect of 
one’s values implicate others in such a way that “before he is through he is forced to 
reject all sorts of ingredients that he might, originally, have left unquestioned” (223).  
Consequently, even the aspects of the value system that are positive for the individual 
are rejected because of the belief that the system cannot be rid of the negative aspects 
of it.  In these circumstances, people feel as if the only alternative available to them is 
to reject the system outright.  When a large enough number of members of the order 
have these feelings, a revolutionary change is possible, wherein the old system is 
completely repudiated by the newly emergent order.   
   
  205 
 Any time value frames are in flux, the social order will necessarily be 
unstable.  The interregnum is a period in which a new set of perils and/or possibilities 
can emerge (Burke ATH 216).  Old symbols of authority begin to lose favor and new 
ones begin to emerge, but because the new ones have not y t had time to be 
established, values can change rapidly as people attempt to adapt to the new situation.  
When dealing with society as a whole, the interregnum is the time in which the 
society can reemerge as a stronger and more cohesive order, or it has the possibility to 
break apart and become increasingly fragmented.  When repossession occurs on a 
symbolic level, the individual is experiencing a perspective by incongruity as she 
reevaluates her present situation and alters her understanding of it.  It is this change in 
perspective that allows one to see the ways in which language is weighted and how it 
can be converted to adapt to the new situation, which opens one to the possibility of 
transcendence and a new beginning (309-314).         
 However, while repossession may intuitively seem to be a positive act, it can 
occur in such a way that it is problematic for the social order as a whole.  The means 
of repossession can become pathological if the act serves to further fragment the 
social order.  In the ideal, transcendence will occur, which allows all members of 
society to feel invested in its symbols of authority and have the outcome of this 
investment have a positive effect on their lives.  However, the symbolic strategies 
involved in repossession can occur in a way that precludes transcendence from 
occurring.  While “the weightings of rhetoric can be transcended” (Burke ROM 97), 
it can just as easily be descendant, causing increased fragmentation in the social 
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order; this can subsequently lead to acts of identifica on that preclude transcendence 
among the competing factions.  While identification s always transcendent, (326), 
certain types of it can prevent identification beyond a certain point, and in some 
instances, the conflict that cannot be resolved verbally is instead dealt with violently.  
Consider the case of white supremacist groups.  While t e members of the hate-group 
have strong identifications with others in the group, the values present in their ideals 
preclude identification with others from outside of the group.  Humans who do not 
meet the strict requirements of ethnic background and attitudinal support for white 
supremacy can ever become part of the system, and since ethnic minorit es and the 
white people who associate with them are seen as being d structive to the value 
system, transcendence among the groups is unlikely to occur.  The framing of the 
global war on terror as viewed by George W. Bush’s administration is also an 
example of this type descendent understanding of identification.  Bush’s framing of 
the issue of “either you’re with us or you’re against us,” makes it less likely that other 
nations and individuals will accept the invitation to be on “our side,” and it offers a 
possible explanation of why global views of the United States are on the decline.120  
This is not to say that transcendence can never occur, it just indicates that it is highly 
unlikely within the present order. 
 In other instances, repossession can occur in a way that is ultimately vacuous 
and fails to provide the connection that the alienat d individual so desires.  As Burke 
notes, a difference exists between “true transcendence and the empty acquisition of 
                                                     
120 To see how much global approval of the United States has fallen see “America's Image Slips, But 
Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas,” Pew Global Attitudes Project June 13, 2006 8-27-08 
<http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252> 
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the verbal paraphernalia” (ATH 337).  When identification occurs with symbols of 
authority that lack substance and the ability to prvide meaning to the individual’s 
life, the transcendent act of repossession may leave the individual feeling even more 
empty and lonely.  I believe this to be one of the potential problems with a large 
number of symbols of authority emanating from popular culture because the 
individual is left with an ephemeral sense of connection that can evaporate at a 
moments notice, which leaves behind nothing except a sense of greater alienation. 
 A sociological study published in 2006, indicates that individuals in America 
have fewer voluntary associations and have fewer confidants than previous 
generations of people have had (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Brashears 358).  While 
this is a sign of increased alienation, I believe that alternative means of establishing 
social engagements are emerging that Burke’s theories suggest may help to counter 
the type of loneliness outlined by the study.  A number of factors indicate that efforts 
at repossession are occurring.  As argued previously, one way in which symbols of 
authority have changed in the contemporary era is through the use of virtual symbols, 
and the use of virtual settings has the potential to help individuals reestablish a sense 
of community with others—even if the others are anonymous.  I point to three 
examples to illustrate this point:  on-line gaming, virtual worlds such as Second Life, 
and social networking sites such as Facebook and MySpace.  The following 
arguments are based on what Burke’s theory of valuation suggests is possible; they 
are not definitive answers, and are perhaps influenced by my general optimism in 
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people’s ability to refashion their social environment in a way that ultimately meets 
their needs.    
 To discuss the first example of on-line gaming, I will use World of Warcraft 
to clarify my point.121  In this game, individuals develop a character through which 
they engage in virtual adventures with others also p aying the game.  While this game 
can be played by oneself offline, it is increasingly common for individuals to play on-
line with others because it is easier to traverse the virtual world as a group of travelers 
than by oneself.  When people enter the game, they can create alliances with others in 
order to navigate the virtual world, wherein they are undergoing a quest of some sort.  
In some instances, they may align with others where their only interaction is within 
the virtual realm itself, but in other situations, they may have actual contact with the 
other players.  Many gamers have phone headsets that allow them to speak with 
players in other locations in order to better plan their actions within the game.  This 
may seem as an odd sort of voluntary association, wherein individuals may not even 
know the others’ real names or anything about them as real people.  However, the 
efforts at cooperation that are needed to be successful in the game are voluntary 
associations that require the individuals to engage in community formation.  Even 
though the community is in part or in totality virtual and the main connection between 
people is largely anonymous, it is possible that the game provides individuals a means 
by which to express themselves and be involved in all aspects of life that exist in an 
extant social order.  Symbols of authority exist within the game, and individuals are 
                                                     
121 World of Warcraft has an estimated 8 million users worldwide who play the game, and is seen as 
the most popular on-line game.  See for more information about the game see Alan Sipress, "Does 
Virtual Reality Need a Sheriff," The Washington Post June 2 2007. 
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required to make valuations as they make choices as to how to proceed.  In a way, the 
gamers are engaging in a process of symbolic purificat on as they act out needs and 
desires in the virtual realm that has the possibility to alleviate the sense of isolation 
that they may be feeling in the extant world.  Burke argues that ritual purging can be 
small and simple (ROM 310), and gamers are provided the means to express aspects 
of themselves that may not be conducive to living in the extant social order, while at 
the same time creating connections with others that may help to alleviate feelings of 
alienation from that order. 
 The on-line virtual world of Second Life gives an even better example of this 
phenomenon.122  It is an on-line world in which individuals take on an avatar and live 
in the virtual world as the character they create.  Characters can do anything that 
humans can do in the actual world.  They form communities; they buy property (with 
real money); they establish households; some get married; others fight, and some 
commit crimes.  The creator of Second Life established the game with a Libertarian 
philosophy, where the only constraint upon individual behavior is the reaction of 
others.  The entire game is a simulation of a social rder wherein players can play-out 
fantasies and live a life that they are unable to live in the extant world.  Burke argues 
in his essay “Literature as Equipment for Living” tha  one of the benefits of literature 
is that it provides a means to understand ideas and events prior to or without having 
actually experienced them (PLF 253-170).  The game Second Life is a technological 
advancement of this potentiality because not only do players get to encounter events 
                                                     
122 For an in-depth description of the game see "My Virtual Life," Business Week May 1 2006. 
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and ideas that they may not have dealt with in the extant world, they also have a 
chance to experiment with making choices and seeing how others respond to them.  
In the game, players do everything that can be done in a real world, including creating 
societies and the corresponding values by which the ord r should operate.     
 While some might argue that Second Life provides a means of escaping the 
world and hence, it is potentially alienating, Burke’s theory suggests that it has the 
potential to provide a means for people to develop b nds with others in a world in 
which they feel as if they have some control over th ir destiny, and as such, it is a 
means by which individuals can repossess the world that they live in.  However, this 
is not to say that problems do not exist within Second Life that can be transferred to 
the extant world.  The game has been criticized for the “moral” lapses that frequently 
exist within its borders.123  Players commit virtual crimes, and the community is 
highly sexualized.  In some instances, players role-play sex acts, such as pedophilia, 
that if were done in the extant world would end in jail time.  The real possibility 
exists that individuals playing the game could come to view the values of the virtual 
order as acceptable in the extant order, which could lead to anti-social behaviors.  
However, it is important to keep in mind the purgatory effect that role-playing can 
have for individuals.  Burke argues that symbolic purification can be experienced in 
simple ways.  One of which is the mere act of saying something, which he believes 
can have a cleansing effect (SOM 307).  A second is the act of leaving things behind 
(132).  Games such as Second Life permit players to enact desires that they could not 
                                                     
123 As an example of this see Michael Gerson, "Where the Avatars Roam," The Washington Post July 6 
2007. 
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engage in the extant world, and the game allows them to leave the desires behind in 
the virtual realm.  Humans have many desires that are anti-social, and the virtual 
realm give people the opportunity to experience these desires in a safe environment in 
which real people are not hurt.  While it is certainly possible that some players will 
develop a “taste” for the anti-social behaviors that ey develop in the virtual world, 
many others may experience the symbolic cleansing that Burke suggests is possible, 
and the game provides a means for individuals to develop connections with others 
outside of the game itself.  One example of this is that of a couple whose avatars first 
met and married in the Second Life and who then ultimately met and married in the 
real world.124  The game for them ultimately provided a means to create a connection 
in the extant that would not have otherwise occurred, and a new social unit was 
created.   
 Social networking sites such as Facebook and MySpace offer a similar means 
of creating communities that otherwise would not have existed.  Communities are 
formed based upon a number of factors, which include common interests.  The sites 
provide an easy means for people to find others who have similar hobbies, enjoy the 
same music, movies, television shows, etc., and share similar values.  The ability of 
people to interact with others who have commonalities with them has the potential to 
allow individuals to feel a sense of community that they might not have otherwise 
felt.  Unlike on-line gaming, social networking sites assume that individuals are who 
                                                     
124 For the details of this story see Catherine Evans Wales, "Vow Its for Real," Wales on Sunday July 
29 2007. 
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they represent themselves to be,125 and the purpose is to allow individuals to establish 
communities in which they can commune with others via the internet in a personal 
and virtually face-to-face manner, which creates opportunities for individuals to feel 
reconnected to a broader social order.  What it means to be a part of a community is 
dramatically changing, and young adults who have only existed in the internet age 
will likely have very different understanding of what it means to be part of a social 
order than those of us who came of age before its development.   
 The above examples illustrate ways in which people att mpt to create a sense 
of connection in an era of mass communication technologies and suggest that people 
have a greater number of options available to them to develop social units and the 
values that coincide with them.  Burke’s theories illustrate the potential that these new 
social locations have for people to form communities and develop bonds with others.  
Technology has forever altered the world in which we live, and an application of 
Burkean theories provides a means to interrogate the ways in which its products have 
altered the nature of the social order in which we liv .  It is possible that these new 
venues will allow for a level of repossession that people cannot find in their extant 
existence.        
 The complexity of (re)valuation cannot be overstated.  While many humans 
have a desire to believe that an ultimate value system exists, the historical reality is 
                                                     
125 While it is true that some people create false identiti s on these sites in order to engage in unethical 
and sometimes illegal behaviors, the purpose of the site and the way it is deployed by most participants 
is as a means to maintain connections with current f iends and to find other people that they would like 
to befriend.  I do not deny that potential problems such as pedophilia do exist on these sites; however, I 
am examining them on the basis of how they are intended to be utilized and how most users seem to 
actually use them.   
   
  213 
that values emerge from the exigencies which societies face and the ways in which 
humans respond to them.  As such, it is important to understand that the process of 
alienation and repossession is virtually constant and occurs at all strata of society, and 
individuals can simultaneously feel alienated and in possession at the same time.  As 
social orders change, value systems can both provide people with the means to 
positively function in society as well as be the source of dispossession.  
Consequently, it is important to understand the symbolic means by which people can 
most efficaciously deal with these circumstances.    
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Chapter 12:  Conclusion 
 
Throughout this work, I have endeavored two things.  First, I wanted to 
explicate what Kenneth Burke’s understanding of valuation is, and second, I 
attempted to illustrate in a limited way how his theory can illuminate social 
phenomena and value discourse as practiced.  In this final chapter, I will do three 
things.  First, I will outline some broad themes that ave emerged from the preceding 
analysis; second, I will highlight weaknesses of the project, and finally I offer 
suggestions for future research that emerge from this work.   
To begin, one key theme that emerges from the analysis of the ten key terms is 
the role emotions play in value discourse.  Burke suggests that humans have a 
“profoundly emotional…response to meanings” (P&C 167).  As such, one cannot 
discount the role that emotions play in (re)valuation.  While the use of weighted 
words is profoundly ethical, the weighting also provides the emotional force behind 
words that make them aesthetically and rhetorically powerful (167).  Burke discusses 
the “personality of symbols” to illustrate the way in which the weighting of words 
evokes emotions from auditors, which permeates every symbolic act—even scientific 
discourse (SOM 48).  For Burke, there is no such thing as a neutral vocabulary (ROM 
92-3), and emotions inhere to the eulogistic and dyslogistic elements of words.  That 
which is praiseworthy evokes positive emotions while that which is blameworthy 
brings forth negative emotions.  Rhetoric appeals to emotions “by its nature as an 
attitude summed up, or completed, now” (SOM 43 note), and when the emotion is 
“channelized into a symbol,” it “becomes a generative force” (CS 61), which is the 
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power of word magic.  An emotion can be evoked simply through the power of 
symbols to call forth a value judgment.   
 Pieties represent our value system and shape what we see as right and wrong, 
good and bad, beautiful and ugly, etc.  Because they are system builders—they 
represent the core of our identity—pieties will alwys intertwined with our emotions.  
When our pieties are challenged, we have an emotional reaction; when our pieties are 
reinforced we have an emotional reaction, and these emotional reactions can 
ultimately lead to a change in the system itself.  Emotional responses can lead to 
actions that fundamentally alter one’s identity, which necessitates a change in 
valuation.  Consider the way in which fear appeals were utilized after the terrorist 
attack of 9/11 and the subsequent policies that ensued.  Actions such as torture and 
rendition for the purpose of torture occurred with little opposition.  The view of 
America as a bastion of freedom and human rights was washed aside on an enormous 
wave of fear, which fundamentally altered the pieties of the American culture, and the 
previous discussion of Rush Limbaugh and Rep. Dana Rohrabacher equating torture 
with fraternity pranks illustrates this.  The emotional reactions people have can be 
manipulated and/or channeled in order to alter the underlying system of values under 
certain circumstances.  This is not to say that emotional reactions always lead to 
alterations in our values.  Many values people hold are rationally calculated and can 
be justified with reason, and as such, can partially withstand the pressure of emotional 
reactions and manipulations.  However, emotions will always play a role in the 
process; it cannot be helped.  Our first reaction to situations requiring valuation will 
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almost certainly be emotional, and the emotions will remain present even when 
playing a subservient role to the rational.                     
Another way in which emotions interact with valuation is through the process 
of identification, which is a highly emotional maneuv r wherein we allow ourselves 
to feel a connection with another person—at a minimum with the symbolic 
representation of the person.  When identification occurs we overlay a sense of self 
with that of another person, and an action toward the other can be felt as an action 
toward the self (ROM 21), which can bring forth the same range of emotions as if the 
action were directed toward the self.  This key process of social value formation is 
virtually impossible without the ability to emotionally relate with others.  We can also 
identify with ideals and the symbols of authority associated with them.  Consider the 
highly emotional reaction some have to the act of burning the American flag in 
protest.  While the flag proper is just a piece of cl th, what it represents for some is a 
nexus of values that is being symbolically destroyed by the protester, which can lead 
to a highly emotional reaction.  Efforts to elide th  emotional element of value 
systems are doomed to fail because emotions are one of th  driving forces behind the 
instantiation of values within a social order.  Burke’s theory suggests that without 
emotions, we could not have values as we currently u derstand them because 
emotions provide the ability to connect with others in a way that moves beyond the 
strictly utilitarian.  They provide the connections that allow people to put others 
above the self and as such, are a critical component of sociality.         
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However, this emotional aspect of human interaction d es not always provide 
sociality; it can also lead to dissociation.  When one is unable to identify with others 
in the order and/or the order itself alienation occurs, which is a deeply emotional 
response to feelings of rejection.  Identification fu ctions through the arousal of 
emotions that provide a feeling of commonality and connection; alienation functions 
in the opposite direction—by arousing emotions such as anger and vengeance.  
Associations and dissociations are deeply emotional states that can overwhelm the 
rational aspects of humanity under certain circumstances and have the power to alter 
valuations.  For example, consider the number of divorces in America that end with 
two people who formerly had positive attitudes for the other hating each other, and it 
is not uncommon for people in these situations to engage in actions that are contrary 
to their previous value systems because the emotional f rce of the situation is so 
compelling.  Or consider the notion of a hate crime, which is a crime that is based in 
an irrational hatred of a person in a protected category, such as homosexuals.  The 
emotionally driven valuation of a person pushes the perpetrator to view the other as 
less than human and a threat to his value system.   
Emotions are inextricably intertwined with many aspects of the ten terms 
Burke argued are key to moral and aesthetic valuation.  These terms represent humans 
qua humans as morals necessarily deal with human interaction within a social order.  
Burke’s theory suggests that emotions are a significant driving force in all value 
assessments and that challenges to one’s values are likely to result in an emotional 
response.  This emotional response is positive when it allows people to connect with 
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others empathetically, but it also has the capacity to lead to dissociations and 
thoughtless responses that have the ability to alter the entire system of values at the 
expense of pursuing the purity of one value.  From a rhetorical perspective, this 
suggests that one way in which rhetors are able to evoke value change within a 
society is to create an emotionally charged environme t that short circuits thoughtful 
response, and the pursuit of one value that has preemin nce provides the means to 
alter and perhaps undermine other values.                        
Second, Burke’s theory of valuation suggests that value systems are not and 
cannot be static.  They will always be in flux—even though people may desire a 
stable set of values and will use a variety of symbolic maneuvers to retain the 
perception of continuity within the system.  As such, any attempt to alter or maintain 
a certain set of values will always be fraught with difficulty because of recalcitrance 
within the system and of individuals.  Overt efforts to alter values will frequently be 
met with resistance by at least some members of the social order.  As such, any 
alteration of the value system will be negotiated—literally as it is discussed among 
people and within institutions, but also figuratively based upon the choices people 
make and the actions that they take.  Nonetheless, even when a new value assessment 
is resisted, the system will inevitably be altered in some way as a new variable is 
added to the mix.  It will never return to the status quo ante.   
It is also impossible for the value system to emerge exactly as the proponent 
of the new value envisions.  The outcome will never be exactly as intended.  Consider 
the case of Roe v. Wade.  While the decision purported to guarantee a woman’s right 
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to have an abortion, the subsequent actions of the pro-life movement fundamentally 
altered what the meaning of that right was.  Abortions have been limited based upon 
type of procedure, locations, parental notification, etc. through legislation, which has 
been affirmed by court rulings, and by the choices of individual doctors and hospitals 
not to practice abortion.  What this also suggests is that if one wants a particular value 
to be maintained—recognizing that it will never be maintained in exactly the same 
manner—it must be continually coached via secular pr yer to maintain its 
importance.  If it is not, it becomes increasingly susceptible to alteration or removal 
as other values are pushed within the system by other members of the social order.  
A constant interaction between the individual and the social order alters the 
value systems of both.  Burke’s theory suggests that in n increasingly flattened 
globe, these interactions occur at greater levels th n hey have in the past as the 
number of social orders people belong to increases.  This is likely to make it more 
difficult to maintain the perception of a stable value system, which has the potential 
to alter the ability of societies to remain cohesiv.  While some people deal well with 
uncertainty and difference, others do not.  Those who have difficulty with uncertainty 
may respond by attempting to make the order fit their p rceived notions of what the 
order ought to be; however, this maneuver will likely be met with resistance, which 
makes it possible that increased social conflicts will emerge that end in repression or 
violence as people work to “purify” the value system to which they pledge allegiance.                
Third, those who control access to a society’s symbols of authority and their 
insignia have significant ability to shape the values of a social order.  This, however, 
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is not an uncontested power.  Minorities can and do play a role in shaping the order 
through their own actions and via the actions the majority takes toward them (Burke 
CS 71).  While those with power have an advantage in shaping the social order, they 
cannot control it absolutely.  The nature of symbol systems suggests that values will 
always be adapted to particular circumstances, and the entelechial push of the 
symbolically expressed values can move the order in unpredictable directions that do 
not always correspond with the interests of the powerful.  The unintended 
consequences that arise when values are expressed or n w values are suggested move 
beyond the control of those who originally suggested them.  For example, one could 
argue that Saddam Hussein’s evaluation that he needed to maintain the fiction that he 
retained Weapon’s of Mass Destruction to deter Iranw s ultimately what lead to his 
demise as the United States used those weapons as a pretext to invade Iraq and 
remove him from power.  All value choices we make have consequences and those 
consequences are frequently outside of our control.  This is not to suggest that all 
valuations will lead ultimately to our demise, but it does suggest that values cannot be 
determined in a vacuum.  Without considering the cultural, and increasingly the 
global, context in which those values are expressed, one cannot truly understand the 
universe of potential consequences, and even when on  considers all of the 
potentialities that one can fathom, others are still likely to emerge.  While one can 
minimize the unintended consequences of any choice, they cannot be completely 
removed.   
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Finally, the particular ways in which orders attempt to maintain values will 
always be localized, but at the same time, the strategies will rely upon human 
universals—those things, such as emotions, of which all umans are capable.  The 
strategies will be based upon extant cultural beliefs and values as well as the forces 
that the organization of the society necessitates.  For example, the strategy that would 
be used in an advanced capitalist economy is not the same as the strategy that would 
be used in a feudal state because the productive elements of society inherently shape 
what value judgments can be made at a particular time and location.  However, this 
does not deny that humans have the capacity for symbol use, and this capacity is what 
allows us to have a “universal” experience.  Hence, it is fruitful to study the ways in 
which social orders have formed and altered values throughout history.  At first 
glance it may appear that we can learn little that is relevant to our experience from 
past cultures (or current cultures) that seem to have no resemblance to our own; 
however, understanding the way their symbol use shaped the valuations within 
another culture can help to shed light on similar processes in our own culture to 
which our terministic screens blind us.  This thought leads to the next element I 
would like to discuss:  the limitations of my current work as well as suggestions for 
future avenues of inquiry.           
Limitations and Areas for Future Inquiry       
As with any work, this one too has its limitations and from these weaknesses 
potential areas for future inquiry emanate.  As noted previously, Burke has over 500 
original pieces of writing, and I only evaluated ten of them.  While I believe I chose 
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his most significant and representative works, examining other writings by Burke 
could potentially add a deeper level of understanding to how Burke saw (re)valuation 
occurring.  The ten key terms of moral and aesthetic strategy listed by Burke could 
probably be fleshed out in greater detail if other of Burke’s writings were examined.   
A second weakness of this work is that I did little o incorporate secondary 
sources that offered criticisms and extensions of Burkean theory.  This move was 
again purposeful; my goal was to explain what Burke’s theory of (re)valuation is, 
which is a requisite step prior to being able to shw weaknesses or add extensions of 
the theory.  While I did attempt to offer some limited extensions of Burke’s thoughts 
as they relate to the contemporary technological advances that have altered how 
human communication occurs, this was a small effort.  As such, it would be fruitful 
for future research to engage in two efforts.  The first would be to examine current 
criticisms and extensions of Burke’s works as they relate to the ten key terms and the 
clusters that surround them.  For example, much work has been done on the issue of 
form, which has the potential to further clarify, show weaknesses and perhaps extend 
Burke’s theories in a productive fashion.  Second, it would also be useful to examine 
Burke’s theory critically in order to show what itsnherent strengths and weaknesses 
are.  One area that I believe needs to be examined in this way is the question of how 
applicable Burke’s theory is to non-Western cultures.  Burke’s writings are a product 
of Western culture and draw almost exclusively from cultural artifacts of the West.  It 
is important to understand the way in which the particulars of a symbol system can 
shape the overall process of valuation.  Burke suggests that his theories are universal 
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in that humans use symbol systems and what he outlines are the result of symbol use; 
however, it would be useful to examine this claim in greater detail.  While Burke does 
support the notion that all applications of symbol use will be particular to the situation 
in which they are used, he does less to prove the broader claim that all symbol 
systems operate using a similar process.     
A third weakness of this project is that I did not place Burke’s understanding 
of (re)valuation within the broader discussion surro nding values.  Values have been 
an aspect of inquiry for millennia, and it would be fruitful to place Burke’s theory 
within this broader discourse.  Burke’s focus on h w people form values via symbolic 
action is a useful counterpoint for metaphysical theories of values that attempt to 
create a universal basis for values.  Burke is not the only theorist to provide this 
balance, but his works are rich with detail and cover a broad span of topics, which 
makes his works particularly useful for this sort of c mparison.   
Other potential areas for inquiry would also be fertil .  It would be interesting 
to “test” Burke’s theory by analyzing it using the scientific studies regarding brain 
formation and how human cognition occurs biologically.  Some of the claims that 
Burke makes about human understanding have the potential to be supported or 
weakened by these studies.  Much of Burke’s writings deals with issues of perception 
and providing meaning to stimuli; as such, it necessarily implicated by these scientific 
inquiries, and they may provide information that allows for a better refinement of his 
thought.  Burke’s theory also has the potential to explain how the universal biological 
principles are instantiated in differing ways based upon symbol use.  In this way, 
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Burke’s theory has the potential to offer a richer context to better explain the 
biological processes.  As such, his theory has the possibility to yield hypotheses that 
can then be scientifically studied.  In this way, Burke’s theory provides a useful 
heuristic basis for studies in fields such as psychology.   
Furthermore, while Burke lived through enormous technological changes in 
his life-time—of which he was highly skeptical—he passed away prior to the current 
explosion of information technology and its ramifications into social orders around 
the globe.  Hence, his theory needs to be examined to determine how it is implicated 
by the expansion of communication technology.  While I ncorporated a limited 
examination of this in the chapter on repossession, it is insufficient to provide a 
complete answer to this question.  It would be usefl for future analyses to explore 
this area to determine what limitations new technology places upon Burke’s theory as 
well as what Burke’s theory can tell us about the eff ct of technology on 
(re)valuation.   
Finally, Burke was always cognizant of the way societies ordered their 
productive enterprises and the effects this ordering has upon society, its citizens, and 
the values that emanate from both.  As such, the effect that living in an advanced, 
globalized capitalist system has on (re)valuation ca not be ignored.  I explored one 
aspect of this when discussing popular culture and its relationship to values; however, 
this is but one small aspect of the economic system in which we reside.  As such, 
using Burke’s theory to examine other aspects of the economic system would likely 
provide a better understanding of the full ramifications of the economic system upon 
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valuation.  Given that the economic system is a significant—if not the most 
significant—driving force within the society we live, it would be fruitful to examine it 
using Burke’s theory as a heuristic device to gain a better understanding of how the 
economic organization of an advanced capitalist society implicates (re)valuation.  
This would be useful from the perspective of how it affects our own society as well as 
other societies where the tentacles of our economy have spread.   
Overall, I hope this work has provided a better understanding of Kenneth 
Burke’s theory of (re)valuation as well as how his t eory can be deployed in the 
future to add insight into both (re)valuation as a process as well as the effects that can 
emerge from it.  Burke argued that “a project for ‘getting along with people’ 
necessarily subsumes the concept of ‘the good life’ (ATH 256), and our system of 
values—if functioning ideally—would do both.  It should provide a means for 
adjudicating what is right from wrong in a manner that recognizes the differences in 
people’s lived reality in such a way that all members of a social order feel a sense of 
“ownership” of the order and for what it stands.  While this is difficult to 
accomplish—especially if one considers the entirety of the human race a social 
order—Burke’s theory points to the means both by which it has the potential to occur 
as well as the likely exigencies that will have to be overcome.  I hope that this work 
has provided some small insight into the process of (re)valuation that makes it easier 
to achieve this laudable goal.          
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